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While highly respected among evolutionary scholars, the sociologist, 
anthropologist and philosopher Edward Westermarck is now largely forgotten in 
the social sciences. This book is the first full study of his moral and social theory, 
focusing on the key elements of his theory of moral emotions as presented in The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas and summarised in Ethical Relativity. 
Examining Westermarck’s evolutionary approach to the human mind, the author 
introduces important new themes to scholarship on Westermarck, including the 
pivotal role of emotions in human reciprocity, the evolutionary origins of human 
society, social solidarity, the emergence and maintenance of moral norms and 
moral responsibility. With attention to Westermarck’s debt to David Hume and 
Adam Smith, whose views on human nature, moral sentiments and sympathy 
Westermarck combined with Darwinian evolutionary thinking, Morality Made 
Visible highlights the importance of the theory of sympathy that lies at the heart 
of Westermarck’s work, which proves to be crucial to his understanding of 
morality and human social life. A rigorous examination of Westermarck’s moral 
and social theory in its intellectual context, this volume connects Westermarck’s 
work on morality to classical sociology, to the history of evolutionism in the 
social and behavioural sciences, and to the sociological study of morality and 
emotions, showing him to be the forerunner of modern evolutionary psychology 
and anthropology. In revealing the lasting value of his work in understanding 
and explaining a wide range of moral phenomena, it will appeal to scholars of 
sociology, anthropology and psychology with interests in social theory, morality 
and intellectual history.
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This book offers an overall interpretation of the Finnish sociologist, anthropolo-
gist and philosopher Edward Westermarck’s (1862–1939) moral and social theory. 
The study has two main aims. First, it lays out the key features of Westermarck’s 
theory of how people make moral judgements, the nature of emotions in which 
these judgements are based, and the psychological and social elements influenc-
ing them. At the same time, this study shows that Westermarck’s moral theory 
is an ambitious and wide-ranging analysis of the fundamentals of human social 
behaviour and social reality. By combining these moral-psychological and soci-
ological aspects of Westermarck’s work, this book reconstructs his understand-
ing of emotions, and the different forms of emotional contagion in particular, as 
the fundamental elements of human sociality. The second aim of this book is to 
explore Westermarck’s thought in the context of his main sources of inspiration, 
enabling a better understanding of his work. Westermarck’s theory of morality is 
based on a combination of eighteenth-century British moral philosophy, Darwin-
ian evolutionism and the comparative method employed as a means of tracing 
resemblances and differences between different cultures and societies as well as 
human and animal behaviour. In this regard, this study highlights the importance 
of Darwinian evolutionary theory to the different aspects of Westermarck’s pro-
ject. In addition, it demonstrates how Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions 
developed out of, and in response to, David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s study of 
moral sentiments.
Taken as a whole, this book aims to show that one of the great strengths of 
Westermarck’s work is that he succeeds in making visible a wide range of elemen-
tary features of human social and moral life. It provides tools for understand-
ing and explaining their various regularities, which are often so mundane and 
self-evident that they are ordinarily taken for granted. The first part of this book 
focuses on the central elements in Westermarck’s moral and social theory, espe-
cially with respect to the nature of moral emotions, the role of sympathy, human 
reciprocity, the emergence and maintenance of moral norms and moral responsi-
bility. The remaining part of the study expands upon and deepens these discus-
sions by looking at Westermarck’s ideas in relation to the sentimentalist tradition 
in British moral thought, whose importance Westermarck himself emphasised as 
the background for his thinking.
Introduction
2 Introduction
Scholarship on Westermarck’s work on morality has been largely concerned 
with the moral-philosophical aspects and broader historical contexts of his 
thought (Stroup, 1981, 1982a, 1982b; Ihanus, 1999; Kronqvist, 2014; Lagerspetz 
et al., 2017). This study examines Westermarck’s theory of morality as a contri-
bution to the social sciences and introduces his scholarly legacy to an audience 
which remains largely unfamiliar with his work. For reasons related to the diver-
gence between sociology and anthropology in the decades around the Second 
World War, Westermarck has been usually considered as an anthropologist rather 
than sociologist. He has been excluded from the history of British sociology and, 
more generally, European sociology.1 But at the same time, anthropologists and 
the historians of the discipline make mainly occasional and superficial references 
to Westermarck.2
As a result, we have a paradoxical situation where a sociologist who has prob-
ably written about emotions more than any other social scientist is completely 
neglected within the field of sociology of emotions (Barbalet, 2001, 2002; Shil-
ling, 2002; Turner & Stets 2005; Stets & Turner, 2006, 2014). Not only is Wester-
marck ignored in the sociological discussions of moral emotions (Turner & Stets, 
2006; Harkness & Hitlin, 2014), he is also forgotten among scholars in the quest 
for tracing the role of emotions in classical sociology and social theory. Simi-
larly, the recent efforts to link the study on morality more explicitly to sociology 
have occurred without considering Westermarck’s pioneering position (Hitlin & 
Vaisey, 2010), and the same applies to the emergence of the anthropology of 
morality (Zigon, 2008; Lambek, 2010; Fassin, 2012). However, by recognising 
and theorising the role of morality as the core of human social life, Westermarck 
was doing exactly what has been missing in sociological and anthropological lit-
erature for a long time. At the same time, this book aims to incorporate Wester-
marck into the philosophical and historical scholarship on the legacy of David 
Hume and Adam Smith, where his many and varied efforts to develop their work 
have gone largely unnoticed.
The last twenty years or so have seen a steadily growing interest in Wester-
marck’s work. He is increasingly recognised as a precursor of human sociobi-
ology and evolutionary psychology (Hiatt, 2004; Fry, 2006, 2011; Roos, 2008; 
Salter, 2008; Hrdy, 2010; Sanderson, 2012, 2017; Rotkirch, 2017). However, 
Westermarck remains mainly known for his theory of incest avoidance (the so-
called Westermarck effect), and his broader work on moral emotions has rarely 
been featured in the literature on the evolution of morality. Frans de Waal, one of 
the world’s leading primatologists, has been especially instrumental in drawing 
attention to Westermarck’s legacy. In his view, Westermarck ‘deserves a central 
1 See e.g. the special issue on the history of British sociology in The Sociological Review, 55(3); 
Holmwood & Scott (2014); Halsey & Runciman (2005); Renwick (2012, 2014).
2 For more detailed accounts of Westermarck’s place in the history of anthropology, see Stroup 
(1984); Stocking (1995); Ihanus (1999); Lyons (2017); Shankland (2014a, 2014b); Lagerspetz & 
Suolinna (2014). For short comments, see Kuper (1988, 1990); Young (2004).
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position in any debate about the origin of morality, since he was the first scholar to 
promote an integrated view including both humans and animals and both culture 
and evolution’ (de Waal, 2006, p. 17).
Life and work
Westermarck grew up in a wealthy, academic Swedish-speaking family in Hel-
sinki, the capital of the Grand Duchy of Finland, then an autonomous part of the 
Russian Empire. As an undergraduate at the Imperial Alexander University of 
Finland (University of Helsinki), he became much attracted to British empiricist 
philosophers such as Locke, Hume, Spencer and Mill and focused on psychology 
and philosophy. At the same time, with the guidance of Spencer and especially 
Darwin’s Descent of Man, Westermarck’s interests gravitated towards evolution-
ary thought. He was much influenced by liberal ideas of universal individual 
rights and the criticism of religion that spread among student circles in the 1880s 
(MML; Westermarck, 1925). Having embraced an agnostic mindset, he criticised 
the political and social influence of Christianity for the rest of his life. Wester-
marck advocated, both in scholarly writings and social activities, legal reforms 
relating to the liberalisation of divorce laws, the juridical equality of spouses, the 
position of unmarried women and adulterine children and the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality (Timosaari, 2017). His views on the legitimacy of law reveal the 
influence of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, according to which criminal law 
should only be concerned with acts that cause harm to others (Timosaari, 2017).
During his career, Westermarck held teaching positions in Finland and England. 
Shortly after finishing his doctoral thesis on the origin of marriage (1889), Wester-
marck was appointed docent (lecturer) in sociology at the University of Helsinki. 
Between 1906 and 1918, he held a chair in practical (i.e., moral and social) phi-
losophy in Helsinki, and the professorship also included the teaching of sociol-
ogy and social anthropology. Since 1918, he served as a professor of philosophy 
at the Åbo Akademi University. Westermarck worked at The London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) from 1903 until his retirement in 1930. He 
was appointed lecturer in sociology for a three-year term in 1904, after which he 
took up a five-year appointment as a professor of sociology. Westermarck’s posi-
tion was converted into a permanent part-time professorship in 1912.3
For many years, he divided his time between Finland, London and Morocco, 
lecturing and holding seminars at LSE during the summer term. Westermarck was 
a very modest man and much liked among students and colleagues (Montagu, 
1982; May, 1940). He loved the outdoors and observing nature and animals, and 
tells that ‘I have spent many of the happiest years of my life alone among social 
classes and peoples other than the ones I belong – fishermen, peasants, robbers, 
the English, Italians’, or a particular ‘mountain tribe in Morocco’ (Westermarck, 
1927, p. 344).
3 For a precise account of Westermarck’s appointment in LSE, see Husbands (2014, pp. 168–171).
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Westermarck contributed to three main areas of research: marriage and sexual-
ity, Moroccan ethnography and the origins of morality. He presented his theory 
of incest avoidance originally in The History of Human Marriage (1891a), laying 
the foundation for current psychological, anthropological and biological study on 
the subject (Wolf & Durham, 2004; Wolf, 2014; Cartwright, 2016; Lieberman & 
Antfolk, 2015). The Westermarck effect proposes that there is normally a lack of 
sexual attraction between persons who have been in close contact with each other 
during the early childhood of either one. In addition, this sexual indifference is 
combined with emotional aversion if such acts are thought of (HMM II, pp. 192–
194). Because Westermarck linked the origins of these emotional tendencies to 
the harmful genetic consequences of inbreeding, the Westermarck effect is often 
referred to as one of the earliest sociobiological or evolutionary psychological 
hypotheses on human behaviour. However, only a few anthropologists and psy-
chologists have noticed that Westermarck’s work on incest avoidance and incest 
taboo is actually a part of his broader theory of moral emotions and the origin and 
nature of moral rules.
The History of Human Marriage is an encyclopaedic study of family forma-
tion and different marriage practices around the world. The extended and thor-
oughly updated three-volume version of the book was published in 1921. This 
early work of Westermarck’s influenced the development of anthropology by 
refuting the assumption of primitive promiscuity, which dominated the late 
nineteenth-century anthropological thought. During this time, leading anthropolo-
gists and evolutionary thinkers assumed that early humans – like some still exist-
ing ‘savages’ – lived in the state of unregulated sexual promiscuity. These scholars 
viewed monogamy as the end product of civilisational development, and as such 
a relatively recent phenomenon in human history. After reviewing the body of 
ethnological, historical and zoological evidence, Westermarck concluded that the 
origins of the pair bond can be traced to the biological evolution of the human 
species and especially to the evolutionary significance of parental care.4 Family 
is, for Westermarck, a universal human institution based upon a particular set of 
emotions, the most important of which are maternal and paternal affection, pair-
bond attachment, sexual jealousy, filial and sibling attachment and incest aversion 
(Sarmaja, 2003). Subsequently, promiscuity theory continued to live mainly in 
Marxist social thought.
Another important part of Westermarck’s legacy consists of his extensive 
ethnographic study of Morocco, focusing on marriage and religious and magi-
cal practices (Westermarck, 1914, 1926a, 1926b). Between 1898 and 1914, he 
spent a total of six years in the field, including over two years without a break 
at the beginning of the century. Westermarck was one of the first to emphasise 
the necessity of long-term stay among the people studied and of mastery of local 
4 For an excellent discussion of Westermarck’s criticism of promiscuity hypothesis, see Lyons & 
Lyons (2004, pp. 99–114). The first seven chapters of The History of Human Marriage, dealing 
with the promiscuity theory, consist of Westermarck’s (1889) doctoral thesis.
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languages and dialects. He also adopted early on a principle of using only the 
information obtained from his local informants and allowed their descriptions to 
represent only the customs and beliefs of their own community.5 Westermarck 
is a neglected pioneer in developing the methods of ethnography, conveying his 
experiences to his disciples in Finland and England (Lindberg, 2008; Lagerspetz, 
2017). They include Bronislaw Malinowski (1937), who praised Westermarck as 
a scholar ‘whose personal teaching and to whose work I owe more than any other 
scientific influence’ (p. xvi).
Finally, Westermarck’s work on morality is both social scientific and philo-
sophical in content. The impetus for Westermarck’s major contribution to the 
sociology and anthropology of morality, the monumental 1,500-page study The 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (1906–1908), arose from a debate on 
the extent to which a wrongdoer should be treated with kindness. Despite care-
ful reflection, consensus was not reached, and this led Westermarck to reflect on 
‘[w]hy do moral ideas in general differ so greatly? And, on the other hand, why 
is there in many cases such a wide agreement? Nay, why are there any moral 
ideas at all?’ (ODMI, p. 2). The core of his work is characterised by the attempt 
to discern between the universal features and the cultural and historical variations 
in morality, and to trace the underlying causes of these similarities and differ-
ences. The first quarter of the study deals with Westermarck’s ‘general theory 
of the nature of moral consciousness’, which he attempts to vindicate by ‘the 
comparative and historical treatment of the moral ideas’ covered in the rest of 
the book (MML, p. 232). The core of his philosophical writings, notably Ethical 
Relativity (1932), is his critique of moral objectivism. By this he meant ethical 
theories which assume that moral truths are discernible through reason, or some 
other human faculty, and exist independently of human emotions. The overarch-
ing theme of the book is the attempt to demonstrate the emotional background of 
normative ethical systems.
Westermarck had direct successors mainly in Finland, where a circle of scholars 
followed – though with differing emphases – his theoretical and methodological 
approaches. With their universalist and psychological emphases, Westermarck’s 
disciples shared an interest in global comparisons and the ‘origins’ or causes of 
social phenomena such as religion, art, social inequality, warfare, diplomacy and 
human migration (Hirn, 1900; Karsten, 1905, 1935; Landtman, 1905, 1909, 1938; 
Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1937, 1950). Many of them published their main works 
in Britain. In the 1910s and 1920s, Gunnar Landtman, Rafael Karsten and Hilma 
Granqvist were also involved in ‘the intensive study of limited areas’ by conduct-
ing extensive anthropological fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, South America 
and Palestine (Stocking, 1979, 1992; Lindberg, 1995, 2008; Lawrence, 2010; 
Suolinna, 2000b). The Westermarckian school dominated Finnish sociology and 
5 Lagerspetz & Suolinna (2017) provide a reappraisal of Westermarck’s major ethnographic work, 
the two-volume Ritual and Belief in Morocco (1926). For Westermarck’s fieldwork, see Suolinna 
(2000a); Shankland (2014a); Lagerspetz (2017).
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social anthropology until the Second World War, after which Westermarck’s influ-
ence disappeared for more than fifty years.
The preview of the study
The portrayal of Westermarck presented here focuses primarily on the structure 
and logic of his ideas and work. What this means is that I try to look at Wester-
marck’s thinking from his own perspective and with his own terms. In order to 
make Westermarck’s views more comprehensible, I sometimes reconstruct his 
arguments in a more coherent form and depict them in modern terms. Because the 
relevant contemporary discussions close to Westermarck’s interests are abundant 
and span various disciplines, comparisons to present concerns are limited to cases 
that help us to get at his views. The historical aspects of the book throw light on 
Westermarck’s place in the history of evolutionism and, above all, his role as a 
continuator of David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism in the post-
Darwinian period. Since my main focus is on what lies behind the key elements 
of Westermarck’s moral and social theory, I am reading Hume and Smith mainly 
from his viewpoint. Westermarck had a polemical relation especially with Emile 
Durkheim, one of the most influential figures in the development of sociology and 
social anthropology, and I discuss their controversies to the extent that they relate 
to the subject matter of this study. By providing a comprehensive explication of 
Westermarck’s moral-psychological and sociological project as a whole, I hope to 
lay a basis for a more extensive reappraisal of his legacy and historical and cur-
rent relevance.
Besides Westermarck’s writings published throughout his career, I draw exten-
sively on unpublished lecture manuscripts and notes taken down by his students 
in Finland and London. The most important of these are his lectures on the history 
of British moral philosophy, psychology and sociology. Most of these materials 
have been underexplored in the previous scholarship, and many of them have 
not been examined at all. While it is clear that Westermarck’s books and articles 
represent his final word on the topics that he discusses, unpublished materials and 
student notes are valuable aids in clarifying his ideas and concepts, even the most 
basic ones.
Chapter 1 discusses Westermarck’s view of the relationship between ethics and 
sociology and outlines the theoretical and methodological foundations of his work. 
Chapter 2 explores the formative phases through which Westermarck developed 
his theory of morality during the 1890s. First, I discuss Westermarck’s earliest 
writings on morality that are conspicuously inspired by Darwin’s Descent of Man, 
followed by an examination of Westermarck’s early theory of moral judgement. 
Finally, I explain how Westermarck sketched the broad outlines of his complete 
theory on the nature of moral emotions.
Chapter 3 reconstructs the central elements of Westermarck’s mature moral 
theory, especially with respect to moral emotions, the typical conditions in which 
these emotions arise, and the different psychological and social factors influencing 
them. The chapter shows that Westermarck’s analysis attaches great importance 
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to sympathy, denoting feelings and emotions human beings feel as reactions to 
similar feelings and emotions in others. Moreover, I explain how moral rules and 
norms relate to his theory of moral emotions and, more broadly, how an inter-
play between individual and social aspects of morality figure in Westermarck’s 
thought.
Chapters 4 and 5 continue to examine sympathy as the key element in Wester-
marck’s moral and social theory. Chapter 4 shows that sympathy plays a key role 
in his account of family relationships as the evolutionary origin of human social 
and emotional bonds. By reconstructing Westermarck’s description of the expan-
sion of sympathy beyond biological kinship and the pair bond, I explain how 
sympathy relates to his theory on the origins of human society and the evolution 
of moral emotions. Finally, I explore Westermarck’s argument about sympathy as 
determining the limits of moral community. Chapter 5 addresses Westermarck’s 
sympathy-based theory on the genesis and maintenance of moral norms, illustrat-
ing its pervasive importance in his Moral Ideas.
Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive account of Westermarck’s analysis of 
moral responsibility. Westermarck recognised the conceptions of responsibility 
as an integral part of everyday social life, studying the related regularities in the 
framework of his theory of moral emotions. He was also very interested in how 
these attitudes come to be reflected in criminal legislation. The chapter analyses 
responsibility as an illustrative example of Westermarck’s general sociological 
approach, his attempt to make visible the emotional background of social phe-
nomena and institutions.
Chapter 7 examines Westermarck’s perspective on the beginnings and develop-
ment of eighteenth-century sentimentalist moral philosophy. The first part of the 
chapter provides an overview of Westermarck’s exposition and evaluation of Lord 
Shaftesbury’s and Francis Hutcheson’s accounts of the moral sense. The second 
part of the chapter examines Westermarck’s debt to Hume. By concentrating on 
Westermarck’s views on the merits and shortcomings of Hume’s moral psychol-
ogy, it is possible to clarify several issues that have direct bearing on his moral and 
social theory. This concerns Westermarck’s understanding on the role of emotions 
in human action, the objectification of emotions, the nature of moral emotions 
and sympathy, self-evaluation, and the role of social utility in how people make 
moral judgements.
Chapter 8 explores Adam Smith as the main inspiration for Westermarck’s 
theory of moral emotions. The chapter provides a comprehensive examination of 
Westermarck’s interpretation of Smith’s ethics – including the nature of Smith’s 
moral theory, sympathy, emotional foundations of moral judgements, the impar-
tial spectator and human conscience – and demonstrates their significance for 
Westermarck’s theory-building. In the concluding chapter, I pull together the cen-
tral parts of my portrayal of Westermarck’s thought and evaluate his contempo-
rary relevance.
Throughout his scholarly career, Westermarck examined moral beliefs and behav-
iour in many different contexts. This chapter outlines the background of his work 
on morality in three ways. I first discuss the nature of Westermarck’s moral theory 
and pull together the strands of his writings on the subject. After this, I outline the 
main features of Westermarck’s evolutionary approach and analyse his views in 
the context of the history of evolutionism in the social and behavioural sciences. 
The final section presents an overview of Westermarck’s methodological thinking.
Ethics as social science
Westermarck’s approach to morality is characterised by his distinction between 
normative and ‘psychological’ ethics, by which he meant what we would call 
descriptive ethics or moral psychology. In his view, the task of ethics is not to 
formulate prescriptive rules for human action but to reveal the factual regularities 
in the way in which human beings make moral judgements. Ethics as a descrip-
tive and explanatory enterprise studies ‘the origin and nature of moral conscious-
ness’, both in its universal and its particular aspects (Westermarck, [1896] 2003, 
pp. 45–46). In this sense, ethics is a ‘psychological’ and ‘sociological’ discipline 
(Westermarck, 1906b, pp. 191–192; MML, p. 218). Westermarck’s writings also 
include questions typically examined in philosophical meta-ethics, such as the 
analysis of moral concepts and the truth-value of moral judgements. However, 
as Stroup (1981) puts it, he approached ethics primarily ‘from the standpoint of a 
sociologist observing an empirical phenomenon’ (p. 217).
Sociology is, for Westermarck, a science of social phenomena. Westermarck 
defines the term, first and foremost, in terms of human action. A social phenom-
enon is a ‘mode of conduct which is related to an association of individuals’. 
More precisely, it is a question of ‘joint acts of associates, or conduct towards an 
associate or associates’ (Westermarck, 1906b, p. 192). To put it another way, by 
social phenomenon Westermarck means how people, either individually or col-
lectively, respond and react to each other. Against the background of his theory 
of moral emotions, when human beings observe or hear about certain kinds of 
action, they sympathise with the victim and feel a desire to punish the wrongdoer. 
Moral disapproval can also be traced to emotional reactions of disgust, which 
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often are evoked by human characteristics and behaviours that do not affect other 
people in any way. Similarly, other modes of action arouse moral approval in the 
recipient and/or in others, leading them into thinking that the agent is praisewor-
thy. In his lectures on sociology, Westermarck elaborates that besides individual 
and collective behaviour, social phenomena are socially prescribed and binding 
rules of action.1
Outlining the division of labour between sociology and ethics, Westermarck 
(1906b) suggests that their scopes overlap to the extent that ethics is ‘practically 
a part of sociology’. This is because ‘moral feelings and ideas’ which comprise 
the research subject of ethics ‘express themselves through the medium of conduct 
which has reference to associates’. In other words, social phenomena ‘are to a 
large extent expressions of feelings and ideas which form the subject matter of 
scientific ethics’. Psychological or scientific ethics ‘deals with the feelings and 
ideas underlying certain modes of conduct, whilst sociology deals with the modes 
of conduct which spring from those feelings and ideas’ (p. 192). Since Wester-
marck stresses the emotional basis of moral ideas, his ethics deals to a large extent 
with the role of emotions in social interaction, as well as the emotional underpin-
nings of moral rules and norms regulating and restraining human behaviour. As 
Morris Ginsberg (1961) puts it, ‘the connection between his sociology and his 
moral theory’ is something Westermarck ‘pursued steadily throughout his work’ 
(p. 181). In his lectures, Westermarck emphasises that one of the main tasks of 
sociology is to study how emotions manifest themselves in human social action 
and interaction.2
What distinguishes Westermarck from the canonised founders of sociology is 
that he was not concerned with the study of modern industrial societies or the 
social consequences of modernisation. Instead, he regarded sociology as ‘the sci-
ence of social phenomena in the widest sense of the word’ (Westermarck, 1908b, 
p. 27). One can say that Westermarck does not provide a theory of society, but 
a theory of the social. In doing so, he deals mainly with social and moral phe-
nomena that may be observed and explored in all social environments. In his 
view, ‘the object of sociology is to explain social phenomena, to find their causes, 
to show how and why they have come into existence’ (Westermarck, 1908b, 
pp. 24–25). Westermarck’s multidisciplinary approach shows his conviction that 
sociologists and anthropologists should attempt to find out the causes of social 
phenomena, ‘whatever the nature of those causes might have been’. Social anthro-
pology ‘is only a branch of sociology’ which studies, in particular, ‘the cultures 
 1 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 43a: University of London, Remarks referring to the enclosed outlines 
of a course of lectures on sociology); Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 43a: University of London, Course 
of forty lectures on sociology, social institutions and relationships (Economic and Political Insti-
tutions excepted); Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 43a: University of London, Syllabus for lectures on 
sociology).
 2 Åbo Akademi University Archives: Numelin (1911–1912) (Box 44: Prof. E. A. Westermarck’s 
lectures on sociology), p. 2; LSE Archives: Lake Barnett (1911) (Notebook: Social institutions – 
Professor Westermarck, Summer Term 1911), p. 1.
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of non-European peoples and particularly of those who have no written history’ 
(Westermarck, 1936a, pp. 226, 237). Westermarck did not consider his Moral 
Ideas as an anthropological study but instead emphasised his use of anthropologi-
cal facts as a foundation for his theories.3 The content of his lectures on ‘Sociol-
ogy’, delivered in 1909 at the University of Helsinki, shows that, in his view, the 
core issues of the Moral Ideas lay at the heart of sociology as a discipline. These 
topics include the social regulation of human behaviour and social relationships, 
the origin and nature of punishment, the different forms of social sanctions, and 
the nature of legal relationships and institutions.4
By ‘origin’ of moral judgements, Westermarck refers not so much to their his-
torical beginnings but to the emotional basis they continue to have at the present 
moment. He tends to use the terms ‘origin’ and ‘cause’ interchangeably. Thus, ori-
gins serve as reasons for why certain kinds of moral standards and practices exist. 
In the same way, the origin of marriage refers to the key emotions supporting and 
maintaining marriage and family institutions among humans. This forms the very 
essence of Westermarck’s conception of sociology. The ‘development’ of moral-
ity, in turn, refers to the ‘general changes’ that ‘the moral ideas of mankind have 
undergone’ on the way ‘from savagery and barbarism to civilisation’ (ODMI II, 
pp. 744, 746). In his own words, he uses ‘the expression “moral development” in a 
very simple sense, without any hint of some general evolutionary formula’ imply-
ing that there is some predetermined end for this development.5 In his later writ-
ings, Westermarck speaks rather of the ‘variability’ of moral judgements. The most 
important of these large-scale changes in the history of morals refer to the growing 
influence of reflection and knowledge on moral judgements and, secondly, to the 
expansion of the circle of people to whom moral rules are held to apply.
In the comparative and historical parts of the Moral Ideas, Westermarck analy-
ses the most important morally relevant behaviours – those that arouse moral 
disapproval or moral praise towards the agent – and explores how they have been 
regarded in different times and cultures. The vast scale of Westermarck’s project 
is revealed in his comparisons of the similarities and differences between societies 
in respect of attitudes towards behaviours that ‘directly concern the interests of 
other men’. These chapters deal with different forms of killing, bodily harm, altru-
ism and hospitality, the treatment of women, children and the aged, slavery, theft, 
falsehood, honour and politeness. The second section concerns the moral evalu-
ation of actions which affect principally the agent’s own welfare. The remain-
ing chapters deal with the permissible and prohibited forms of sexual behaviour, 
the treatment of animals, attitudes and behaviours towards the dead, and, finally, 
 3 Westermarck’s letter to George A. Macmillan on February 14, 1906 quoted in Ihanus (1999, 
p. 256).
 4 The Central Archives of the University of Helsinki: Report on the activities of faculty members 
1903–1908.
 5 Westermarck (1907) (Box 82: The Moral Development. Lecture delivered on July 5, 1907 in 
Stockholm), p. 1. For an informative discussion of Westermarck’s use of the term ‘development’, 
see Stroup (1980, pp. 41–45).
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human relations with divine powers. Besides describing the variety of beliefs and 
customs, Westermarck seeks, above all, ‘to discover the principle which lies at 
the bottom of the moral judgement in each particular case’ (ODMI, pp. 327–328).
In Ethical Relativity, Westermarck develops his arguments regarding ethical 
subjectivism sketched in the first chapter of the Moral Ideas and presents in an 
abridged form the outlines of his theory of morality. At the same time, his goal is 
to show that normative ethical theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism rest 
on the same emotions of moral approval and disapproval that provide the basis 
for his theory of moral judgement. Westermarck’s last major work, Christianity 
and Morals (1939), examines the influence of Christianity on moral standards in 
Western history, and illustrates how essential Christian moral teachings can be 
analysed in the framework of his theory of moral emotions.
The study of morality is also at the heart of Westermarck’s works on marriage 
and sexuality. Although Westermarck is surprisingly silent about his moral theory 
in the three-volume version of The History of Human Marriage, these themes are 
closely related to his broader account of morality. This is because social customs 
regulating marriage and sexual behaviour are morally structured, meaning that 
their breach arouses moral disapproval that is typically shared in a society or 
social group, and these are the emotions analysed in Westermarck’s moral theory 
as moral emotions. Similarly, although Westermarck’s moral theory is completely 
out of sight in his ethnographic works, his analysis of the multifaceted relation-
ship between moral emotions and social customs provides the wider framework 
for these issues also. Westermarck made his first trip to Morocco with the inten-
tion of acquiring first-hand ethnographic data for the Moral Ideas he was working 
on (ODMI, p. v; Westermarck, 1926a, p. v). The influence of Westermarck’s own 
fieldwork in evident especially in the parts dealing with the relationship between 
religion and moral judgements.
The nature of Westermarck’s evolutionism
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the nascent social sciences were 
dominated by doctrines of social and cultural evolution, which were inspired by 
the French and Scottish Enlightenment’s stage-theories of human social develop-
ment (Stocking, 1987; Kuper, 1988; Sanderson, 2007). The emergence of evolu-
tionism in anthropology and early sociology took place simultaneously with, and 
backed up by, Darwin’s theory of biological evolution and common descent. The 
so-called classical evolutionists were united by their interest in the ‘origins’ of 
human institutions such as law, morality, marriage and religion, along with their 
‘development’ from primitive existence through various intermediate stages to 
Western civilisation.
In the study of evolutionary ethics, Westermarck was preceded, for example, 
by C. S. Wake’s (1878) The Evolution of Morality: Being a History of the Devel-
opment of Moral Culture, Charles Letourneau’s (1887) L’evolution de la morale, 
Alexander Sutherland’s (1898) The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, and 
his colleague at LSE, L. T. Hobhouse’s (1906) Morals in Evolution: A Study in 
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Comparative Ethics. Westermarck was familiar with these works, but they did 
not have substantial influence on his endeavours.6 In his study of morals, West-
ermarck’s links to sociocultural evolutionism are reflected, above all, in his 
description of the development of moral beliefs. The comparative and historical 
parts of the Moral Ideas are also structured around the evolutionary categories of 
savagery, barbarism and civilisation – including lower and higher levels within 
each of these developmental stages – whose criteria of classification Westermarck 
never clarifies (Ginsberg, 1961, p. 211).
However, Westermarck’s main interest was in the theory of biological evolution 
applied to human emotions and sociality. Rather than developing a theory of socio-
cultural evolution, ‘Westermarck was much more interested in using a Darwinian 
approach to understand human nature and its reflection in a wide range of social 
arrangements, marriage and family patterns, and moral consciousness in particular’ 
(Sanderson, 2007, p. 94). These Darwinian and psychological emphases set West-
ermarck apart from the nineteenth-century evolutionists who quickly adopted Dar-
win’s concept of common descent but remained largely uninfluenced by his theory 
of natural selection (Burrow, 1966; Bowler, 1988; Kuper, 1997). Another key dif-
ference is that Westermarck rejected, from his earliest writings, the assumption that 
all societies and cultures pass through the same evolutionary stages towards West-
ern civilisation (Stroup, 1984, p. 586; Ihanus, 1999, p. 292). As he puts it, ‘[n]early 
fifty years ago I strongly opposed theories of this sort and, generally, the belief in 
a unilinear sequence of institutional stages’ that ‘were subsequently contested by 
Boas and other anthropologists’ (Westermarck, 1936a, p. 236).
In addition to its psychological nature, Westermarck’s evolutionism is charac-
terised by the fact that he nowhere employs biological organismic analogies to 
analyse society or social institutions. Rather, the ‘biological-sociological’ view 
of society as an organism has been detrimental to the development of sociology 
(Westermarck, 1897a, p. 127; see also Westermarck, 1936a, p. 239). This is one 
of the key points that distinguish Westermarck from the functionalist tradition 
in sociology and social anthropology.7 What Westermarck says in the following 
applies to his evolutionary approach in general: ‘There is no question here of 
biological analogies applied to the explanation of social evolution – as has been 
mistakenly said – but we are concerned with biological facts underlying psychical 
and social phenomena’ (HHM I, p. 22).
Finally, unlike most of his contemporary biologists and social scientists, West-
ermarck understood already at the end of the 1880s that Lamarckian assumptions 
about the inheritance of acquired characteristics are probably false (MML, p. 78; 
Westermarck, 1891b, pp. 220–224, 236–240).8 Westermarck’s early adoption of 
 6 Westermarck (2011), letter to Rolf Lagerborg April 7, 1900.
 7 On widespread biological analogies in the history of sociology and anthropology, see Levine 
(1994); Hejl (1995); Haines (2011).
 8 For an exhaustive discussion on Lamarckism in biology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, see Bowler (1983). Stocking (1982) provides an account of widespread Lamarckism in 
early twentieth century anthropological and social thought.
Research programme on morality 13
the evolutionary biologist August Weismann’s modern ‘neo-Darwinian’ version 
of Darwin’s evolutionary theory was essential for the biological foundation of his 
theory-building. It is based on the idea that natural selection, operating on varia-
tions in heritable characteristics correlated with reproductive success, is sufficient 
to explain biological evolution and the appearance of design in living organisms. 
In doing so, Weismann cut ties with the Lamarckian notions that had still been, to 
some extent, present in Darwin’s thinking. Due to Westermarck’s Darwinian rea-
soning and clear-cut rejection of Lamarckism, The History of Human Marriage 
has been called ‘the first orthodox application of modern evolutionary theory in 
anthropology’ (Kuper, 1988, p. 108).
‘Darwinism’ refers for Westermarck specifically to the idea of natural selection 
as the mechanism for evolutionary change, because the idea that all organisms are 
descended from a common ancestor was already presented before Darwin. West-
ermarck (1891b) regarded the basic principles of natural selection as ‘extremely 
simple’ (p. 220), providing ‘an explanation of the appearance of purpose in 
organic life without calling in the aid of the hypothesis of a providence’ (MML, 
p. 79). First, there is always variation among individuals of the same species. 
Second, the reproductive potential of organisms is much greater than the number 
of individuals which actually grow, develop and reproduce. Third, all organisms 
are, from the beginning of their existence, interacting with and influenced by their 
organic and inorganic environment. Naturally occurring variation in individual 
characteristics affects the chances of survival and reproduction. Fourth, the most 
favourably equipped individuals transmit through heredity advantageous traits at 
least to some of their offspring. In this way, certain physical and psychologi-
cal characteristics are selected in the course of many generations, and deviations 
from the original form can develop to the extent that they can be considered as 
a new species (Westermarck, 1891b pp. 220–223; 1897a, pp. 116–117). Wester-
marck employs evolutionary theory in this specific sense throughout his oeuvre, 
although its weight varies greatly in different works.
Westermarck on sexual selection
Contrary to what many commentators on Westermarck have argued, he did not 
reject Darwin’s theory of sexual selection entirely. Darwin identified two forms 
of sexual selection, male combat and female choice. In his discussion of sexual 
selection in animals, Westermarck states that in both, the processes of selection are
carried on by individuals of the same sex; but in one these individuals, gener-
ally the males, try to drive away or kill their rivals; in the other, they seek to 
excite or charm those of the opposite sex, generally the females, who select 
the most attractive males for their partners.
(HHM, p. 240; HHM I, p. 477)
Westermarck agreed with Darwin’s view of male combat, arguing that the 
struggle between males tends to favour greater male size and strength, as well as 
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various ‘weapons of offence or defence many of them possess’. But he disagreed 
with Darwin’s view that female mate choice could produce characteristics that 
are harmful for their bearers in terms of survival. It seemed unlikely that ‘cer-
tain colours, forms, ornaments, sounds, or odours’ could be favoured and spread 
in a population merely for their aesthetic value (HHM, pp. 240–242; HHM I, 
pp. 477–479). In Westermarck’s reasoning, many of the traits Darwin attributed 
to female choice are useful because they facilitate sexes finding one another and 
prevent inbreeding by attracting individuals from a distance (HHM, p. 249; HHM 
I, p. 488). Later on, the modern ‘good genes’ models of sexual selection have 
cast light on the issue, suggesting that conspicuous ornaments are ‘honest’ indica-
tors of biological fitness and parasite resistance (Hamilton & Zuk, 1982; Breed, 
2017). However, Westermarck’s view on mate choice in human evolution differs 
substantially from his perspective on animal behaviour.
Good-genes sexual selection theory goes back to British naturalist Alfred Rus-
sell Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of evolution by natural selection (Cronin, 
1991). Wallace was young Westermarck’s mentor and wrote an introductory note 
to his History of Human Marriage.9 In Wallace’s view, bright colours and other 
ornamental structures could arise and spread through natural selection because 
they are positively correlated with vigour, health and parental care. Westermarck 
doubted whether the correlation proposed by Wallace, ‘depending on some 
unknown physiological law, is so necessary that it takes place even when colour 
is positively disadvantageous to the species’ (HHM, p. 243; HHM I, p. 480). At 
the same time, unlike Wallace, Westermarck applied similar ideas to humans.10
He noted early on that sexual selection has probably ‘had some influence on 
the physical aspect of mankind’ (HHM, p. 277). Although perceptions of physical 
attractiveness ‘vary greatly’ across cultures and individuals, certain basic attrac-
tiveness judgements seem ‘fundamentally similar throughout the world’ (HHM II, 
p. 5). In Westermarck’s view,
The full and healthy development of those visible properties which are essen-
tial to the human organism may be assumed to be universally recognised as 
indispensable to perfect beauty – physical deformity, an unsymmetrical shape 
of the body, apparent traces of disease or old age, being regarded as infavour-
able to personal appearance.
(HHM II, p. 5; also HHM, p. 259)
What Westermarck proposes is that general male and female preferences have 
an evolutionary basis because certain physical characteristics are indicators of 
health and reproductive potential (HHM II, pp. 3–4, 14). He suggests that the 
 9 For the correspondence between Wallace and Westermarck, see Wikman (1940).
10 The following section is indebted to Rainer Rosengren’s and Jukka-Pekka Takala’s excellent but 
unfortunately unpublished paper ‘Edward Westermarck’s Evolutionary Approach’. I thank Takala 
for access to the article.
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evolution of mental characteristics may have also been moulded by the choice of 
mates, since ‘emotional, moral, and intellectual qualities may, by evoking affec-
tion, approbation, or admiration, indirectly act as sexual stimulants’ (HHM II, 
p. 23). However, Westermarck applied his theory of mate choice only to humans, 
and the reason for this may be that the characteristics humans seem to find attrac-
tive do not have similar harmful effects on their bearers as animal ornaments 
(Rosengren & Takala n.d., MS, p. 19).
Evolutionary sociologist and anthropologist in  
twentieth century perspective
Westermarck’s History of Human Marriage proved to be a great success and 
was quickly translated into several languages, including French, German, Italian 
and Japanese. After the publication of his second book, the Moral Ideas, West-
ermarck’s fame as a sociologist and anthropologist was at its peak. The book 
received much attention (Lagerborg, 1953; Stroup, 1982a; Roos, 2008), and 
Westermarck received invitations to lecture at several American universities. The 
Department of Economics at Harvard also offered him a full professorship (MML, 
pp. 247–248). However, Westermarck’s reputation began to decline already dur-
ing the 1920s, and after the Second World War he was identified as ‘one of those 
nineteenth century evolutionists, whose work was no longer of interest to any-
body’ (Pipping, 1984, p. 317).
There is hardly any doubt that Westermarck’s eclipse is linked to the broader 
decline of evolutionary theories of mind and behaviour in the twentieth-century 
social sciences (Degler, 1991; Richards, 1987). During the early decades of the 
century, theoretical approaches emphasising the divide between psychologi-
cal and sociological explanations, on the one hand, and the social and cultural 
determination of human behaviour, on the other, diffused in the sphere of social 
sciences and psychology. British social anthropologists increasingly embraced 
Emile Durkheim’s doctrine of ‘social facts’, emphasising that ‘any explanation 
of a particular sociological phenomenon in terms of psychology, i.e. of processes 
of individual mental activity, is invalid’ (Radcliffe-Brown, [1931] 1958, p. 64). 
Accordingly, the structural functionalism of Alfred Radcliffe-Brown tried to 
explain customs and institutions by their contributions to the social system of 
which they are a part. As is well known, Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown had 
a major influence on the American sociology which spread to Europe after the 
Second World War. Malinowski’s version of functionalism emphasised the impor-
tance of the individual and was more open to psychology and biology, arguably 
reflecting Westermarck’s influence. In any case, functionalist anthropology was 
united by an interest in the interrelations of customs, beliefs and institutions 
within one social community and, above all, by the idea that societies should be 
studied as integrated wholes.
In the United States, Franz Boas and his followers began to emphasise the 
importance of culture and the unique historical development of each society in 
shaping human psychology and social behaviour. The main target of Boasian 
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anthropology was the notion of unilineal cultural evolution and the racial and 
biological explanations of cultural differences. But at the same time, ‘[n]o one 
could provide [Boas] the proof that similar cultural practices of different societies 
could be produced by a common biological cause’ (Richards, 1987, p. 510). Simi-
larly, as anthropologist Arthur Wolf (1995) argues, the near universal rejection 
of Westermarck’s theory of incest avoidance shows that anthropologists increas-
ingly adopted the Freudian view of the dichotomous relationship between nature 
and culture (or society). What became ‘the orthodox anthropological view’ was 
that the seemingly universal rules, such as the incest taboo, are conventions that 
exist to repress our primal passions and inclinations. In Westermarck’s alternative 
view, these rules rather exist as an expression of human emotional constitution 
(pp. 13–19).11 I will return to this topic in Chapter 5.
Finally, there is the rise and dominance of behaviourism between the 1920s 
and 1960s. Westermarck’s evolutionism was not the kind of instinct psychology 
that preceded behaviourism in the early decades of the century (Ihanus, 1999, 
p. 51). During this time, psychologists and social scientists enumerated a variety 
of instincts, which were then invoked as explanations for nearly any patterns of 
behaviour (Krantz & Allen, 1967; Cravens & Burnham, 1971; Boakes, 2008). 
However, as psychologists abandoned the idea of evolved behavioural predisposi-
tions in favour of learning and social conditioning, the Westermarckian view of 
universal human emotions also began to appear outdated.
After the rise of sociobiology – emerging from the work of evolutionary biolo-
gists William Hamilton, George Williams, Robert Trivers, John Maynard Smith 
and others in the 1960s and 1970s – there has been some confusion surrounding 
one important aspect of Westermarck’s evolutionary approach.12 As Trivers points 
out, Darwin was generally ‘clear on the idea that natural selection favors traits that 
benefit the individual possessing them but that are not necessarily beneficial to the 
larger groups, such as the species itself’. At least until the late 1960s, however, 
it was common for biologists to reason in terms of ‘the species-advantage view’, 
assuming that ‘selection has operated at a higher level than the individual, that is, 
at the level of the group or species, favoring traits that allow these larger units to 
survive’ (Trivers, 1985, pp. 67–68).13 Since the emergence of sociobiology and 
the individual- or gene-centred view of evolution, the appraisals of Westermarck’s 
11 For Westermarck’s extensive critique of Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, see Westermarck 
(1934).
12 Sociobiology is broadly defined as the comparative study of the evolutionary and biological bases 
of social behaviour in animals and humans. While most sociologists and anthropologists remain 
critical of the field, it has had a profound influence on the study of animal behaviour and biological 
anthropology (Hrdy et al. 1996; Segerstråle, 2000). There are, broadly speaking, three main con-
temporary evolutionary approaches to human behaviour: evolutionary psychology, human behav-
ioural ecology and gene-culture co-evolutionary theory (Laland & Brown, 2011; Smith, 2000).
13 For the history of the group selection in biology, see Borrello (2010). For excellent reviews of the 
present-day debates on this issue, see West, Griffin, & Gardner (2007, 2008); West, El Mouden, & 
Gardner (2011).
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evolutionism have been mixed. Badcock (1994) claims that ‘far from being a Dar-
winian in a modern sense’, Westermarck was a ‘self-evidently group selectionist’ 
who ‘rejected Darwin’s individualistic view of natural selection because it did not 
seem to serve the interests of the species’ (p. 148). For Salter (2000), ‘[t]he main 
shortcoming of Westermarck’s evolutionary theory is his assumption that selec-
tion occurs at the level of whole species, which is now rejected by most evolution-
ary theorists in favour of selection at the level of individuals (or genes)’ (p. 14). 
Others have claimed that even Westermarck’s theory of incest avoidance is based 
on a ‘classical group selectionist argument’ (Stepher, 1983, p. 47).
Then again, van den Berghe (1991) emphasises that where most of the early evo-
lutionists in social science ‘adhered to questionable notions of group selection and to 
misleading and fallacious organismic analogies’, a few others, notably Westermarck, 
‘were remarkably modern in their thinking’ (p. 274). Similarly, for Rotkirch (2008), 
Westermarck ‘did not advance explanations on a species level’ (p. 47). According 
to Sanderson (2012), Westermarck ‘was the very first person that we could call a 
sociobiologist or an evolutionary psychologist, because he was applying Darwinian 
natural selectionist thinking in essentially the same way as do modern-day evolu-
tionary psychologists’ (pp. 177–178). On the other hand, Sanderson (2017, p. 71) 
also regards Westermarck’s species-advantage view as a flaw in his thinking.
Much of this divergence of views stems from the fact that Westermarck’s lan-
guage regarding Darwinian evolutionary theory is often vague. In many places, 
he speaks of emotions and related behaviours serving the benefits for the spe-
cies. However, as David Haig (1999) remarks of Westermarck’s incest theory, 
‘Westermarck’s appeal to the good of the species was typical of the times, but 
his argument can easily be restated in terms of advantages to individuals or their 
genes’ (p. 84). It is essential to notice that the same holds true for the bulk of 
Westermarck’s evolutionary arguments. He seems to have assumed that, at some 
undefined ultimate level of analysis, traits that benefit the individual possessing 
them in terms of survival and reproduction are also indirectly useful to the species 
itself. However, his ideas are usually formulated in a way that they make sense 
in the individual selectionist framework. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 3, 
Westermarck’s theory of the evolution of ‘retributive emotions’ is explicitly cast 
in terms of natural selection operating at the level of individuals. This also applies 
to his account of the evolution of ‘moral emotions’, which are unique to humans. 
Perhaps the best formulation of Westermarck’s view of natural selection is pro-
vided in his lectures on psychology. In his view, the gist of Darwinism is that in 
all organisms, ‘physical and mental characteristics’ that are ‘advantageous in the 
struggle for existence are preserved in the genus thereby that individuals equipped 
with such traits have the greater chance to survive and reproduce compared to 
those individuals who are not equipped with such useful characteristics’. Since 
‘[o]ffspring inherit many of the traits of their parents’, ‘these advantageous traits 
become thus fixed characteristics of the species’.14
14 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Psychology), p. 182.
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Methodological foundations
The comparative method Westermarck employs in his works on morality and 
marriage is founded on the Darwinian evolutionary assumption that despite all 
the differences between individuals and groups, human ‘mental constitution’ is 
‘essentially similar everywhere’. A comparison of behaviours and customs across 
cultures is possible because ‘all the different ethnic groups belong to the same ani-
mal species and therefore must present resemblances which have a deeper founda-
tion than all differences which are the effects of the social environment’. And the 
only way to distinguish between what is local and particular and what is general 
is via comparison (HHM I, pp. 10, 17). Westermarck’s comparative approach has 
often been criticised for taking customs and beliefs out of their social context, 
and failing to analyse societies or cultural configurations as integrated wholes 
(Durkheim, [1907] 1979; Lowie, 1937; Mills, 1948; Pipping, 1982; Allardt, 2000; 
Lagerspetz, 2017). While there is much truth to this, it should be emphasised that 
the main features of Westermarck’s moral and social theory are not dependent on 
his written sources. Instead, they deal with phenomena that may be observed and 
explored in all social environments. In the same way, the most interesting sec-
tions in the comparative parts of the Moral Ideas offer general sociopsychological 
explanations that Westermarck assumed to possess universal validity.
When assessing Westermarck’s methodological thinking, it is important to 
understand that he saw comparative syntheses and locally limited ethnographies 
as complementary to each other (HHM I, pp. 14–18; MML, pp. 298–300; 1936a, 
pp. 238–239). In the comparative and historical parts of the Moral Ideas, Wester-
marck employs diverse empirical materials, including observations of everyday 
life and customs and laws as seen through various sources (ODMI, pp. 2, 158). 
When assessing the trustworthiness of anthropological materials, he stressed the 
importance of using mutually independent observations. Westermarck was well 
aware of the inaccuracy and unreliability of many of the sources that were avail-
able in his time. This is exactly why he emphasised the need for intensive anthro-
pological fieldwork providing a more solid basis for cross-cultural syntheses. It is 
often claimed that this emphasis was a reaction to the rise of functionalist anthro-
pology in the 1920s. In truth, this was in his agenda long before the comparative 
method became increasingly questioned. The treatment of weak points of com-
parative study was also part of Westermarck’s teaching at LSE.15
Westermarck (1910) highlighted early on that there were ‘no other inves-
tigations so urgently needed as monographs on some definite class of social 
phenomena or institutions among a certain group of related tribes’. This is 
because social phenomena and institutions are not ‘isolated’ phenomena but 
‘largely influenced by local conditions, by the physical environment, by the 
circumstances in which the people in question live, by its habits and mental 
15 LSE Archives: Lake Barnett (1911) (Notebook: Social institutions – Professor Westermarck, Sum-
mer Term 1911), p. 3.
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characteristics’. It is obvious that such considerations ‘can be properly taken 
into account when the investigation is confined to a single people or one ethnic 
unity’ (pp. v–vi).16 Through his ethnographic works on Morocco, Westermarck 
was also contributing to the production of such knowledge. For the time being, 
he simply attempted to make the best use possible of whatever empirical materi-
als were available.
In his methodological thinking, Westermarck was above all inspired by Darwin 
(MML, p. 77; HHM I, p. 24). In his view, Darwin’s main works, autobiogra-
phy and correspondence constitute an excellent methodological guide, enabling 
‘the step by step following of the great master’s working and train of thought’.17 
First and foremost, Westermarck appreciated Darwin’s ability to draw generalisa-
tions and conclusions from a vast number of isolated facts and observations. He 
explains that Darwin always began by formulating tentative hypotheses that he 
tried to control by a diligent study of facts and observations. Then, within the pro-
cess, he rejected the hypotheses that proved to be unsatisfactory and formulated 
new ones. Most importantly, Darwin doubted his assumptions from the outset and 
strove to find facts and explanations that opposed them. For this reason, when 
Darwin published his conclusions they evoked very few objections that he had not 
thought of beforehand.18 This entails a deliberate struggle against self-deception. 
The fundamental lesson Westermarck learned from Darwin was always to devote 
‘special attention to the facts that seemed at variance with [the] general results’ 
(MML, p. 77).
Second, Westermarck greatly valued Darwin’s view that the greatest danger in 
scientific inquiry is not incorrect theories but counting on incorrect facts (MML, 
p. 77). As Darwin puts it, false facts ‘often long endure’, whereas ‘false views, if 
supported by some evidence, do little harm, for everyone takes a salutary pleasure 
in proving their falseness; and when this is done, one path towards error is closed 
and the road to truth is often at the same time opened’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, 
p. 385). Since Darwin stressed the importance of finding contradictory evidence 
and that the refuting of theories contributes to the advancement of science, his 
views bear a resemblance to principles later promoted by Karl Popper (Ghiselin, 
1969; Ayala, 2009). This is true also for Westermarck, who emphasises how strik-
ingly Darwin’s ‘scientific intellect’ differs from Herbert Spencer, ‘who is always 
on the hunt for facts that confirm his theories and shuts his eyes for everything 
16 See also ODMI, p. 2; Westermarck (1908b, p. 27); HHM I, p. 15, MML, pp. 298–299; Wester-
marck (1936a, p. 238).
17 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lectures. Lamarck, Darwin), pp. 17–18. Westermarck’s discussion 
of Darwin’s method was part of his lectures on the history of evolutionary thought when teaching 
philosophy at the University of Helsinki in the mid-1890s and after the turn of the century (Central 
Archives of the University of Helsinki: Untitled report of lectures for the Department of History 
and Philology in May 1897).
18 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lectures. Lamarck, Darwin), pp. 17–18; Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 78: 
Lectures. Fragmentary pages on Darwin’s theory of selection), p. 19. Here, Westermarck’s account 
paraphrases Darwin ([1887] 1958, pp. 123, 139–141).
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that speaks against them’.19 Westermarck was especially attracted to the ‘clear-
ness and a sense of reality’ that he found in the tradition of British empiricism 
and moral sentimentalism. These features in philosophical and scientific inquiry 
enable refutation and further advancement, because ‘even if its hypotheses were 
not unfailingly true, in every case it seemed possible that they could be corrected 
by a deeper search into the facts of experience’ (MML, p. 30).
Third, Darwin’s method embodies an exemplary balance between inductive 
and deductive reasoning. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection ‘is 
a deduction, it is a conclusion which no direct experience can verify, but this 
deduction is based on the thorough study of facts, to the widest induction’.20 In his 
autobiography, however, Darwin claimed that he followed ‘true Baconian [induc-
tive] principles, and without any theory collected facts on a wholesale scale’. On 
the other hand, he admitted that ‘I cannot resist forming [hypotheses] on every 
subject’ (Darwin, [1887] 1958, pp. 119–120, 141). And his letters declared that 
‘all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!’; 
‘let theory guide your observations, but till your reputation is well established be 
sparing in publishing theory. It makes persons doubt your observations’ (Darwin, 
1861 & 1863, quoted in Bonner & May, 1981, p. xiii). With his emphasis on the 
combination of inductive and deductive reasoning, Westermarck indicates that 
researchers always need some kind of a hypothesis, more or less explicated, to 
guide their work.
Like Darwin, Westermarck supports his conclusions with massive citing of 
data. ‘It is only by comparing a large number of facts’, he says, ‘that we may hope 
to find the cause or causes on which a social phenomenon is dependent’ (HHM, 
p. 4). In many places, Westermarck also emphasises the inductive nature of his 
theory formation. It is solely through the ‘troublesome process of minute induc-
tion’ that sociologists can avoid making groundless generalisations, ‘building cas-
tles in the air’ (Westermarck, 1908b, pp. 26–27). Related to this, Westermarck 
points out that the ‘long enumerations of facts’ found in his books ‘are not meant 
merely to illustrate some particular theory of the author – as has been alleged by 
certain critics – but they form the basis on which the theory is built’ (HHM I, 
p. 24). What is particularly relevant to our subject is that Westermarck describes 
also his theory of moral psychology in the making as the result of the ‘inductive 
study of the actual conceptions of right and wrong’ (Westermarck, [1896] 2003, 
p. 45).
In reality, at least regarding the outlines of his moral theory, Westermarck 
was paying the same kind of lip service to straight induction as Darwin. Ronald 
Fletcher (1971) rightly emphasises that in the Moral Ideas, ‘Westermarck was 
not undertaking a comparative study only to establish empirical generalizations’. 
In addition, he attempted to explain these social regularities ‘by deductions and 
19 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 78: Lectures. Fragmentary pages on Darwin’s theory of selection), p. 19.
20 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 78: Lectures. Fragmentary pages on Darwin’s theory of selection), p. 19. 
For Darwin’s methodological pluralism, see Mayr (1991, pp. 10, 105).
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hypotheses drawn from his knowledge of human psychology, which, in its turn 
was rooted in biological evolution’ (p. 102). It is also apparent that Westermarck’s 
growing familiarity with Hume’s and Smith’s work guided the shaping of his 
overall views. When this background is combined with the admiration of Dar-
win’s methodological principles that Westermarck had developed already in the 
late 1880s (MML, p. 77), we may assume that the formation of his moral theory 
was grounded on the interplay between tentative hypotheses and the review of all 
sorts of empirical evidence and data.
This procedure is well illustrated by Westermarck’s understanding of the inven-
tion of hypotheses. In his view, the process usually begins with the setting of a 
tentative hypothesis based on the available facts. Scientific inquiry consists of 
‘confirming or, if possible, refuting the hypothesis’. If the new observations or 
results are not consistent with the initial hypothesis, the researcher ‘rejects it and 
formulates a new hypothesis which now becomes the clue guiding his further 
studies’. In this way, the research process goes on until the researcher succeeds in 
formulating a theory that accounts for all the known facts. Westermarck empha-
sises that because the hypotheses and theories are usually based on insufficient 
facts, one actually relies on ‘a guess of inductions’, that is, on ‘incomplete induc-
tive reasoning’.21 In stressing the combination of induction and deduction, and, 
above all, hypotheses as clues that guide the making and interpretation of obser-
vations (reformed or abandoned when necessary), Westermarck comes close to 
American pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce’s abductive inference, which is 
sometimes called reasoning to the best explanation.
21 Westermarck (1915) (Box 80: Lectures. Psychology II), pp. 170–171.
Westermarck’s memoirs reveal that he had decided to write a work addressing the 
‘origin and development of the moral consciousness’ already before The History 
of Human Marriage (1891) was completed (MML, p. 100). From the very start, 
the gist of Westermarck’s position was that ‘[o]ur notions of morality are closely 
connected with the instinctive feelings engraved in our nature’ (HHM, p. 280). 
However, it took some time before he was able to formulate a satisfactory theory 
of the nature of these emotions. While marriage was a well-defined subject for 
Westermarck, he ponders on how ‘morality extends into infinity’. Accordingly, 
‘[i]t took a full five years before my ideas of the nature of the moral emotions had 
become more or less settled’. After that, it took ten more years before the work 
was finally published (MML, p. 102). This indicates a time frame of some fifteen 
years in the course of which Westermarck started working on the topic in 1890, 
proceeded to develop his own theory in 1892 and reached the phase of elaboration 
and literary composition during 1897.1 The first part of the Moral Ideas, where 
Westermarck presents his theoretical conclusions, was completed in late 1903 
(MML, pp. 196–197), and the book finally appeared in two volumes in 1906 
and 1908.
The present chapter explores Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions by trac-
ing and analysing the phases of its development, both its continuities and discon-
tinuities. The three parts of the discussion proceed in chronological order. First, 
I discuss Darwin’s account of the evolution of morality, which marks the begin-
nings of Westermarck’s interest in the subject. Westermarck follows Darwin’s the-
ory of morality, structured around his account of the social instincts and the moral 
sense, from the late 1880s to the early years of the 1890s. Then, I look at the five-
year formative period to which Westermarck points in his autobiography, when 
he departs from Darwin’s moral sense theory and formulates his early theory of 
moral judgement. Lastly, I examine how Westermarck frames the first outlines of 
his mature conceptions during 1897, finally published in 1906. After that, Wester-
marck’s account of moral emotions underwent only minor stylistic improvements 
 1 Westermarck (1897) (Box 42a: Academica, work papers, To the University Senate, application for 
Hermann Rosenberg grant), pp. 1, 4.
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and occurs in nearly identical forms and even identical phrasings throughout his 
writings. In other respects, too, after the publication of the Moral Ideas, all the 
main features of Westermarck’s theory of morality remain unchanged.
Darwin leading the way
Westermarck’s earliest contribution to debates on ethics is his lecture in 1889, 
‘The theory of selection and its importance for the physical, mental and social sci-
ences’, delivered to the members of a student society at the University of Helsinki 
(Westermarck, 1891b). A year later he set forth his views in a lecture, ‘Darwin’s 
hypothesis concerning the origin of the moral sense’, at the meeting of the Philo-
sophical Society of Finland (Westermarck, 1890). Westermarck’s nascent interest 
in the sources of morality was conspicuously inspired by Darwin’s Descent of 
Man and his theory of the moral sense. It is found, Westermarck (1891b) sub-
mits, ‘in one of the most ingenious chapters [Darwin] has ever written’ (p. 231). 
Westermarck begins his account of morality by juxtaposing how people generally 
judge acts as morally wrong with the moral condemnation of incest. Where incest 
is considered wrong because ‘such relationships contradict our natural instincts’, 
Westermarck suggests that the same seems to apply also to ‘other acts that we call 
immoral’. These kinds of actions contradict our social instincts, and thus the foun-
dation of morality according to Darwin’s evolutionary account (Westermarck, 
1891b, pp. 231–232).2
Darwin on social instincts and the moral sense
In Descent of Man Darwin ([1871] 1981) attempts to demonstrate that the 
mental and behavioural differences between humans and animals are differ-
ences in degree rather than in kind. Humans and other animals possess ‘similar 
passions, affections, and emotions’ as well as similar mental abilities, ‘though 
in very different degrees’ (pp. 48–49). These common features include the 
social instincts. Darwin links to social instincts (1) the pleasure social animals 
take in each other’s company; (2) the tendency to feel sympathy by which he 
meant the capacity to share and be affected by the feelings of others and (3) 
the altruistic disposition to perform various services for individuals of the 
same group. In humans, the social instincts also include (4) the strong desire to 
gain the approval of others and avoid their disapproval (Darwin, [1871] 1981, 
pp. 71–72, 85–86; Krebs, 2011, p. 41). These four characteristic features are 
particularly bound up with sympathy, which Darwin regards as the foundation 
stone of social instincts.3
 2 The English translation of Westermarck’s (1891b) lecture has been published in Shankland 
(2014c).
 3 For more on Darwin’s view on sympathy, see Richards (1987, pp. 208–210); Krebs (2011, 
pp. 41–44); White (2013).
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Darwin conceives the social instincts as behavioural dispositions developed 
and spread through natural selection. In species in which group living has pro-
moted survival and reproduction, individuals who enjoy the company of others 
and respond to their emotions have best avoided different dangers. More solitary 
individuals, on the other hand, are left without the community protection, which 
exposes them more easily to various threats (Darwin, [1871] 1981, p. 80). Dar-
win’s knowledge of social animals and especially the primates enabled him to 
reconstruct the social life of early humans. Early modern humans had ‘instinc-
tive love and sympathy’ for other members of the social group, which manifested 
themselves in mutual aid and other forms of cooperation (Darwin, [1871] 1981, 
pp. 84–86, 161–162). Man, endowed with the social instincts, is ‘influenced in 
the highest degree by the wishes, approbation and blame of his fellow-men, as 
expressed by their gestures and language’. ‘Even when we are quite alone’, Dar-
win continues, ‘how often do we think with pleasure or pain of what others think 
of us, – of their imagined approbation or disapprobation; and this all follows from 
sympathy’ (Darwin, [1874] 2004, pp. 133, 136). Westermarck summarises Dar-
win’s fundamentally emotional and social conception of human nature by stat-
ing that ‘human beings possess innately instinctive love and sympathy for their 
companions; even the most barbarous savage is helpful and loyal to one’s tribe-
speople’. He endorses Darwin’s view that ‘social instincts have been acquired 
through natural selection’ because they have survival value for animals, including 
humans, which benefit from group living. Finally, and most importantly, Wester-
marck believes that ‘from these social instincts arise many of the actions we call 
moral’ (Westermarck, 1891b, p. 232).
While arguing for the continuity between animal and human psychology, Dar-
win ([1871] 1981) regards ‘the moral sense or conscience’ as the most important 
uniquely human feature (p. 70). By grounding his moral theory in moral sense 
and sympathy, Darwin was continuing the legacy of the eighteenth-century Brit-
ish moral sentimentalism (Dixon 2008; Ruse, 2008; White, 2013). He conceives 
the moral sense as a natural extension of animal social instincts. Although Darwin 
and most of his later commentators often write vaguely about ‘the moral sense 
or conscience’, Darwin also distinguishes between these two. He refers to ‘the 
moral sense, which tells us what we ought to do’ and, on the other hand, to ‘the 
conscience which reproves us if we disobey it’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, p. 93). This 
distinction is endorsed by Westermarck’s presentation of Darwin’s theory, dis-
tinguishing between moral sense and remorse. In Westermarck’s (1891b) view, 
‘remorse generally constitutes a criterion that shows that our moral sense has been 
offended’ (p. 233).
Young Westermarck (1891b) was particularly impressed by Darwin’s attempt 
to demonstrate ‘how even the moral sense could be explained by the theory of 
selection’ (p. 231). Darwin describes the moral sense as ‘the deep feeling of right 
or duty’ which prompts altruistic acts. He assumes that dispositions towards 
altruistic behaviour, which is costly to the agent but beneficial to the recipient 
or recipients, could arise because, in some special cases, natural selection acted 
on groups or communities rather than individuals. While in many cases ‘a high 
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standard of morality’ would be costly to the individual in terms of survival and 
reproduction, the increase of moral traits within the group would ‘certainly give 
an immense advantage to one tribe over the other’. Thus, tribes consisting of 
individuals endowed with the readiness ‘to give aid to each other and to sacrifice 
themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; 
and this would be natural selection’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, pp. 70, 163, 166). 
However, as we shall see in Chapter 4, Westermarck provided later on a radically 
different description of the evolution of altruistic behaviour.
The workings of conscience
Besides the idea of the moral sense, Westermarck (1890) placed great value on 
Darwin’s theory of conscience. Darwin proposes a four-part explanation for the 
evolution of conscience, of which Westermarck highlights the first two, the social 
instincts and the increased cognitive capacities, which are associated with the 
ability to remember one’s past actions and to reflect on them afterwards by com-
paring self-regarding actions with other-regarding alternatives.4 Westermarck 
quotes Darwin to sum up the question of the moral sense and conscience:
Why should a man feel that he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than 
another? Why does he bitterly regret if he has yielded to the strong sense of 
self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature; 
or why does he regret having stolen food from severe hunger?
(Darwin, [1871] 1981, p. 87; Westermarck, 1891b, p. 232)
The answer, Westermarck submits, is found in the conflict between differ-
ent instincts and especially in the variations in their mental manifestation. What 
determines the workings of conscience is that the social instincts are more endur-
ing than other kinds of instincts. Although the social instincts are ‘ever present 
and persistent’ in human nature, Darwin suggests that we are often moved by 
more selfish urges such as the instinct of self-preservation, lust, or the desire 
for vengeance. These selfish impulses are transient by nature and, once satis-
fied, they lose their motivational power (Westermarck, 1891b, p. 232; Darwin, 
[1871] 1981, pp. 89–90). However, as increased intelligence improves memory 
 4 In addition to social instincts and intelligence, Darwin argues that the moral sense and conscience 
are further moulded by the acquisition of language, resulting in the increasing receptivity to the 
common opinion about what constitutes right and wrong. Moreover, these emotional tendencies 
are strongly influenced by habit and social learning. To sum up, instead of being a simple gut feel-
ing, ‘[u]ltimately a highly complex sentiment, having its first origin in the social instincts, largely 
guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by 
deep religious feelings, confirmed by instruction and habit, all combined, constitute our moral 
sense or conscience’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, pp. 165–166). For more detailed accounts of Darwin’s 
four-part theory of the moral sense and conscience, see Richards (1987, pp. 207–219); Dixon 
(2008, chapter 4); Krebs (2011, chapter 4).
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and imagination, images of past actions come constantly to the subject’s mind. 
Because of this, Westermarck quotes Darwin’s solution:
He will be compelled to compare the weaker impressions of, for instance, 
past hunger, or of vengeance satisfied or danger avoided at the cost of other 
men, with the instinct of sympathy and good-will to his fellows, which is 
still present and ever in some degree active in his mind. He will then feel in 
his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which now seems 
comparatively weak; and then that sense of dissatisfaction will inevitably be 
felt with which man is endowed, like every other animal, in order that his 
instincts may be obeyed.
(Darwin, [1871] 1981, pp. 89–90)
Westermarck continues that because the individual now feels that he or she has 
neglected the social instincts in the past situation, the resulting feeling of dissatis-
faction makes itself manifest in the form of regret or remorse. In sum, for young 
Westermarck, Darwin’s account of the moral sense and conscience served as a 
clear and indisputable example of the necessity to incorporate the evolutionary 
perspective into ethical inquiry (Westermarck, 1891b, p. 233).
Early theory of moral judgement
For all the impetus for the study of morality that Westermarck received from Dar-
win, he soon distanced himself from Darwin’s reflections on the subject. During 
the first half of the 1890s, Westermarck served as a lecturer in sociology, and 
from 1894 as an acting professor of philosophy at the University of Helsinki. In 
connection with this, Westermarck developed his early theory of moral judge-
ment. From this time, notes taken down by a student of Westermarck’s (1894) 
lectures entitled ‘Social Science’ have survived, enabling us to explore how West-
ermarck’s views took shape. Considering Westermarck’s extensive contributions 
to the study of moral emotions, his early lectures on sociology are of special inter-
est, for they reveal his first attempts to analyse moral emotions as the fundamental 
elements of human sociality. In 1895, Westermarck also presented his theory in 
the Philosophical Society of Finland talk entitled ‘Moral feeling’.5 In connection 
with Westermarck’s early theory of moral judgement, I use the term ‘moral feel-
ings’ rather than ‘moral emotions’. This is because, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, in his mature writings Westermarck uses the term ‘feeling’ to refer to the 
relatively simple feelings of pleasure and pain and as distinguished from ‘emo-
tion’. In his early moral theory, moral feelings are explicitly feelings of pleasure 
 5 Since these lectures are by and large identical, I will treat them in parallel, together with West-
ermarck’s other addresses to the Philosophical Society of this period. For discussion of West-
ermarck’s other activities in the Philosophical Society, see von Wright (1982); Stroup (1982a, 
chapter 2); Ihanus (1999, pp. 165–171).
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and pain. The most significant difference with regard to his initial position was 
that Westermarck no longer considered the moral sense or feeling to be the motive 
for altruistic action, but rather he saw it as the basis of moral judgement.
In his early lectures, Westermarck (1894) begins his account of morality by 
discussing the elements that comprise the human mind. Westermarck’s analysis 
is grounded on the tripartite classification of mind, according to which the mind 
comprises cognition, feeling and the will. These mental activities are analytically 
simple constituents, so simple ‘that they cannot be defined, only classified fur-
ther’. At the same time, no mental activity is exclusively cognition, feeling or 
conation, since these elements are inseparably interwoven. His threefold clas-
sification is an analytical distinction, since ‘classification in psychology is not 
natural, but artificial’ (pp. 32–33).6
Westermarck views cognitions as sensations and ideas which could be divided 
according to the five senses. In the Humean spirit, he classifies cognitions into 
‘direct sensations’ and ‘free ideas’ that arise out of recalling sensations. Cognitions 
are closely related to feelings, because ‘ideas are always bound up with an emo-
tional tone’. Conation or the will, in turn, is divided into the categories of instinct, 
drive, intention and decision. All of these are ‘impulses for action’, but they differ 
in relation to two matters. These are, first, the extent of which the person is con-
scious of the end of an action, and, second, how reflectively he or she enters into 
performing an action. At the same time, the conative elements are not separate 
mental activities, and it is impossible to say into which category individual acts of 
will should be classed. Rejecting the traditional dichotomy between instinct and 
reason, Westermarck argues that conscious and reflective actions have instinctual 
underpinnings. Conation and cognition come hand in hand also because thinking 
implies directing one’s attention, and attention stands for an act of will (Wester-
marck, 1894, pp. 33, 36–37). By emphasising the emotional input in the cognitive 
and volitional processes, Westermarck follows the now widespread Humean posi-
tion that feelings and emotions are not a conflicting force to reason but rather the 
constituent making decision-making possible (Damasio 1994, 2004).
In developing his theory of moral emotions, Westermarck also applied himself 
to the bodily expressions of emotions and lectured on the theory of emotion Wil-
liam James and Carl Lange had proposed independently in the mid-1880s. As 
Thomas Dixon (2003) points out, the traditional model assumed that the passions 
and emotions of the soul acted on the body and generated bodily changes. The 
revolutionary element of the James-Lange theory was to reverse the direction of 
causation and propose that ‘the bodily changes that people had been inclined to 
call the “expression” of an emotion were in fact the primary constituent cause of 
 6 Then and subsequently, Westermarck’s main guide to more narrowly psychological topics was 
the Danish philosopher-psychologist Harald Høffding (Ihanus, 1999). Much of Westermarck’s 
account of the mind is based on Høffding ([1882] 1896). On Høffding in the context of Darwin-
ism, see Kjærgaard, Gregersen & Hjermitslev (2008); Hjermitslev (2010). For the history of the 
threefold division of mind into cognition, feeling and conation, see Hilgard (1980).
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the emotion’ (pp. 204–207). Accordingly, when we perceive a certain object or 
event, our body reflexively reacts in a certain manner, and emotions are the felt 
sensations of these physiological changes. Therefore, cognition does not cause 
emotions, but emotions are feelings of instinctive bodily response (James, 1884). 
Westermarck himself assigned bodily reactions a significant role in all mental 
activity, but added the caveat that there was not yet enough evidence to support 
the presumption of causality between bodily responses and emotions. As he puts 
it, ‘I simply want to eliminate from the James-Lange hypothesis every reference 
to a causal relationship’. For Westermarck, feelings and emotions are inextricably 
linked to sensations of bodily changes, but ‘we do not know if the organic sensa-
tions, that is, the sensations of the inner state of the body, exclusively determine 
the nature of the affects, we only know that they play an important part therein’ 
(Westermarck, 1896, pp. 347–348, 353). Westermarck’s position on this issue 
continues along similar lines in his mature theory of moral emotions.
The feelings of moral approval and disapproval
The starting point for Westermarck’s treatment of morality is the plain fact that 
we continuously evaluate the actions of others in moral terms. However, when we 
claim or think that certain acts are right or wrong, Westermarck argues that we are 
not referring to the outward act itself, nor to its consequences, but to the intention 
behind the act. He defines intention as the will to reach a given end. What then 
makes us to regard some intentions as moral, or approvable, and some as immoral, 
or blameworthy? Westermarck begins his answer by proposing that moral judge-
ments are based on moral feelings, which are of two kinds, moral approval and 
disapproval. Moral approval is a feeling of pleasure, and moral disapproval is a 
feeling of pain (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 37–38).
The gist of Westermarck’s position at this stage of its development is that moral 
feelings arise from putting ourselves in the other person’s place. When we observe 
the actions of others, we spontaneously form a ‘vague idea’ of how we would have 
acted if we were in that person’s shoes. The process depends on a ‘fully natural 
and simple association of ideas’ and is analogous to the kind of nausea we are 
prone to feel at looking at someone eating a substance we find revolting or the 
dizziness we feel when seeing someone stand on the edge of a cliff (Westermarck, 
1895, pp. 237–238). In modern psychological terms, Westermarck discusses cog-
nitive empathy or perspective-taking, the capacity to understand another’s situa-
tion and states of mind. This particular psychological mechanism is the source of 
our feelings of moral approval and moral disapproval:
The moral feeling arises when the intention of the person in action corre-
sponds or fails to correspond with the intention I personally assume I would 
have if I were to be in his place. The correspondence between the ideas of 
intention arouses pleasure and evokes approval; the lack of correspondence 
evokes pain, disapproval.
(Westermarck, 1894, p. 69)
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Considering the interactive psychology through which the moral feelings arise, 
they belong to a wider class of ‘relational feelings’. The relational character 
implies that moral feelings arise out of the relationship between two ideas. First, 
there is our interpretation of the agent’s intention, and, second, our notion of how 
we would have acted in the same situation (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 33, 38–39).7 
Westermarck also clarifies what he means by putting oneself in another person’s 
shoes. It is not that I imagine myself to be the other person, but it is to imagine 
‘myself with the whole of my own psychological nature’ in the same situation. 
Hence, the moral reactions carry a subjective stamp; they ‘depend on the quality 
of my own will’. For example, when we feel that we would have resisted a certain 
temptation whereas the person we observe did not, we are roused to an unpleas-
ant state of mind and we disapprove of his or her action (Westermarck, 1894, 
pp. 69–70).
At the same time, Westermarck emphasises that when we express moral judge-
ments we are only concerned with how acts stand in relation to the person’s will as 
a whole, that is, to his or her character. As in his later works, Westermarck follows 
Hume in arguing that humans have a natural tendency spontaneously to evalu-
ate whether behaviours can be regarded as true expressions of character (Wester-
marck, 1894, p. 70). Unless we interpret human action this way, ‘social life would 
be impossible’ (Westermarck, 1892, p. 195). To employ Westermarck’s example, 
if we consider a theft to be strongly influenced by some nonvolitional, external 
circumstances with uncontrollable strength to an average human being (severe 
hunger or a threat, for example), we are likely to think that the agent’s action does 
not quite reflect his or her actual character. This, in turn, is likely to mitigate our 
moral disapproval. Most importantly, Westermarck already at this stage settled on 
his final position, emphasising that in our everyday reasoning, we in general do 
not reflect on how someone’s character has become such as it is. We simply take 
one’s character as it is, and as such it is the subject of moral judgement (West-
ermarck, 1894, p. 70; ODMI, pp. 325–326). These discussions mark the begin-
nings of Westermarck’s major interest in moral responsibility. Related to this, his 
view that the subject of moral judgement is not action, but rather intention behind 
the action, construed as an expression of person’s character, remains constant in 
Westermarck’s writings.
As in his earlier discussion of Darwin, Westermarck observes that people feel 
moral approval and disapproval also towards themselves. Instead of describing 
self-evaluation in terms of a conflict between selfish and social instincts, he now 
describes its workings via the relational nature of moral feelings. This means that 
we morally disapprove of our own action if we, afterwards, do not share our ear-
lier intention (Westermarck, 1895, p. 238). Westermarck describes remorse as a 
self-directed moral disapproval, which arises from the lack of correspondence of 
 7 Westermarck’s idea of relational feelings is derived from the Scottish philosopher Alexander 
Bain (Westermarck, 1895, p. 237) and the Danish psychologist Alfred Lehmann (Ihanus, 1999, 
pp. 180–181).
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intentions. Correspondingly, if we assume that we still were to act in the same way 
if the situation should repeat itself, there is no conflict between intentions and our 
conscience is at ease. For Westermarck, these emotional expressions may be titled 
conscience, defined as ‘the feeling of pleasure or pain which arises when the idea 
of one of my previous intentions comes into relation with the nature of my will 
as it is now’ (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 39–40). As is the case with other-directed 
moral emotions, also Westermarck’s understanding of self-directed moral emo-
tions underwent great changes by the time of his mature moral theory.
Elsewhere in his early writings, Westermarck points also at the stabilising 
impact the feeling of shame has on human conduct. He quotes approvingly Alex-
ander Bain’s remark on the social nature of shame, implying that it ‘is resolved 
by a reference to the dread of being condemned, or ill-thought of, by others’. For 
Westermarck, ‘[s]uch dread is undoubtedly one of the most powerful motives of 
human action’ (HHM, pp. 208–209). Strangely enough, both in his lectures under 
discussion and later works on morality, the explicit analysis and references to 
shame are conspicuously absent.
The rules of morality and the general will
Since the formulation of his early theory of moral judgement, Westermarck con-
sistently looked beyond the strictly psychological facets of moral feelings or 
emotions as well as the dyadic relationship between spectator and agent. He was 
equally interested in the social settings in which moral emotions are embedded, 
considering it crucial to study the influence of social context on these emotions. 
At the same time, he studied the manifestations of the same human emotions in 
different cultural settings, including their transmission in the form of moral cus-
toms and rules.
These efforts are clearly visible already in Westermarck’s early work because 
relationality is not the only distinctive feature of moral approval and disapproval. 
The 1895 lecture makes clear that the second defining characteristic of moral 
feelings is that the intentions we imagine ourselves to have in the agent’s place 
must ‘come within the sphere of recognised general rules, or the so-called moral 
commandments’ (Westermarck, 1895, p. 239; von Wright, 1982, pp. 43–44). In 
other words, our feelings of pleasure and pain are moral feelings only if our idea 
of how we would have acted in the same situation accords with some generally 
recognised moral rule. The reason why Westermarck calls this second characteris-
tic of moral feelings ‘only of a formal type’ appears to be his consideration that we 
may be aroused to moral disapproval simply because the agent’s action conflicts 
with our personal moral conviction. Therefore, ‘moral feeling does not arise, as it 
is often proposed, so that the will that judges, whether it is my own or of others, 
stands in conflict with abstract moral rules’ (Westermarck, 1895, pp. 238–239).
One of the most neglected aspects of Westermarck’s ethics concerns his major 
interest on the emergence and maintenance of moral norms. His first analysis 
of moral rules is provided in the early lectures. The general moral precepts are 
expressions of ‘the general will’ (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 29, 40), or ‘the will 
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that is dominating in a society’ (Westermarck, 1895, p. 230). His early concept 
of the general will suggests that the ‘character of people’s will is more or less 
uniform’ (Westermarck, 1894, p. 43). Because the moral feelings are relational 
feelings, differences with regard to them lead to conflict: ‘If a person has a sepa-
rate will which departs from the general will, he is disapproved of, as a result of 
the feeling of pain evoked by the lack of correspondence’ (Westermarck, 1895, 
pp. 239–240). The resulting feeling is ‘the public moral feeling of pain’, and this 
moral disapproval, which is socially shared, gives rise to general moral rules such 
as the prohibition against killing and theft inside the community (Westermarck, 
1894, p. 41).
Importantly, for Westermarck, general moral rules have originated spontane-
ously. Although some moral commandments have personal initiators, they ‘have 
in general sprung directly from the general will, without having some special per-
son announcing them or as an originator’ (Westermarck, 1895, p. 239). The fun-
damental moral rules found in all human societies express the similarity of human 
conation, that is, the fact that ‘people are generally by nature equipped with social 
and egoistic instincts’. The Darwinian social instincts partly explain why human 
beings are generally reluctant to harm other members of the community and why 
they respond with moral disapproval when another person is hurt. In addition, 
we are led to the same direction by our egoistic instincts because we are likely to 
‘refrain from actions which may elicit revenge’, that is, actions potentially harm-
ful to ourselves (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 40–41).
The customs of society
In his discussion of Westermarck’s early moral theory, Timothy Stroup (1982a) 
argues that even though Westermarck’s concept of the general will looks very 
Rousseauesque, he ‘arrives at the notion as a Darwinian’. According to Wester-
marck, Stroup says, ‘the concept is simply a (perhaps unfortunate) shorthand for 
the fact that the continuous operation of natural selection has resulted in a large 
measure of emotional agreement about important issues’ (pp. 67–68). However, 
the Darwinian reading of Westermarck’s notion of the general will is not the whole 
story of the concept. If the rules of morality are manifestations of the general will, 
the concept must somehow take in also the factual diversity of moral standards. 
Taking this into account, Westermarck goes beyond the strictly Darwinian argu-
ments discussed earlier. Westermarck’s more inclusive view is represented in his 
account of the intimate connection between the general will and social customs. 
For young Westermarck (1894), ‘custom is always an expression of the general 
will materialised in action’. In his view, human beings are inclined to identify the 
rules of custom and moral standards, since customs are ‘rules for conduct laid 
down by the general will’ (pp. 41, 43). Referring to Westermarck’s mature moral 
theory, G. H. von Wright (1982) has rightly observed that ‘the great emphasis 
Westermarck placed on the importance of custom [. . .] represents a continuation 
of his thinking from the time of the mid-1890s’ (p. 45). In his later works, Wester-
marck suggests that people tend to feel their emotion-based moral judgements as 
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‘disinterested’, ‘impartial’ and shared by others when they are in congruence with 
the prevailing customs, the social setting of morality.
When discussing the connection between customs and the general will in his 
early lectures, Westermarck first defines habit simply as something human indi-
viduals are accustomed to do. Custom, on the other hand, ‘is a habit elevated to 
a norm of conduct’. Customs are rooted in habits and they include a binding and 
regulating character, implying how one should act if one wishes to avoid social 
sanctions. He further notes that, for those habits that are for some reason, what-
ever it may be, regarded important for society, a general demand arises that they 
should be obeyed (Westermarck, 1894, pp. 27–30). The shift from habits to social 
customs is further supported by the fact that action is commonly associated with 
normative expectations: ‘In general one could say that moral rules are based on 
people’s will: people act in a certain way and want that others should behave simi-
larly’ (Westermarck, 1895, p. 239).8 He makes a similar distinction between habits 
and customs in his mature moral and social theory (ODMI, p. 118; ER, p. 109). 
There the question of how ‘social habits’, due to the influence of collectively 
shared moral emotions, give rise to ‘rules of custom, or institutions’ (HHM I, 
pp. 69–71) becomes of even more pivotal importance. In this way, while retaining 
the idea of biological evolution as a central background element, Westermarck’s 
moral theory assumes a social process of institutionalisation as a crucial condition 
for the development of moral norms.
Key shifts towards a theory of retributive emotions
Westermarck’s views developed rapidly and underwent great changes in the two 
years following the 1895 ‘Moral feeling’ lecture (von Wright, 1982, p. 45). This 
comes up also in his correspondence where he writes, ‘[w]hen I was teaching my 
little course on social science for the first time, I had a view on the moral emo-
tion that I now regard fundamentally incorrect’.9 Broadly speaking, Westermarck 
arrived at the outlines of his main conclusions, published finally ten years later 
in a more elaborated form in the first part of the Moral Ideas, by the spring of 
1897. The first rough outlines of Westermarck’s mature theory of moral emotions 
are set forth in his lecture ‘The predicate of moral judgements’, delivered in late 
April 1897 to the Philosophical Society. Before turning to this, it is useful to 
consider his lectures on psychology from the early 1897, which shed light on this 
crucial period in the development of his thought.
From these lectures, it becomes clear that at that time, Westermarck still 
adhered to the essentials of his early moral theory. However, it is his new account 
of the origin of moral rules that represents an important transition towards his 
 8 In these transitions from habits to moral norms, Westermarck (1894) places great emphasis also 
on supernatural beliefs and fears, especially regarding the punishment of ancestors’ spirits, which 
have ‘always proved to be a prime mover in social life’ (p. 27).
 9 Westermarck (2011), letter to Rolf Lagerborg October 2, 1898.
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mature theory of moral emotions. Instead of tracing the source of moral rules to 
the general will, Westermarck emphasises explicitly, as also later on, the specta-
tors’ sympathetic resentment as the foundation of moral norms. Westermarck sug-
gests that moral rules are based on such approval and disapproval which concern 
not only one’s own interests, but also actions directed towards others. He argues 
that human beings have a natural tendency to think that a person who intention-
ally inflicts harm on another and violates a moral rule should be punished. The 
most important alteration in Westermarck’s argumentation is that this takes place 
because such actions have a tendency to arouse the emotion of resentment or 
revenge. This applies both to the person wronged and the spectators who are 
not personally involved. Drawing conspicuously on the main concepts of Adam 
Smith’s moral theory, he emphasises that moral rules are based upon the impartial 
spectator’s sympathy with the resentment of the injured party. Similarly, Wester-
marck follows Smith in suggesting that when we consider the agent as meritori-
ous or worthy of reward, our moral judgement is based on our sympathy with the 
gratitude felt by the recipient of a good deed.10
Later in the same spring, Westermarck presented his revised views on the 
nature of moral emotions to the Philosophical Society. In his view, moral judge-
ments are based on moral approval and moral disapproval, but contrary to his 
earlier position, they are not merely passive feelings of pleasure and pain. Instead 
they are reactive emotions directed towards another person as a response to his 
or her action. In Westermarck’s (1897b) words, ‘moral disapproval is an emotion 
of indignation’, which means that it ‘is accompanied by a distinctive desire to 
punish’. Respectively, ‘moral approval is always accompanied by the desire to 
reward’ (p. 300). However, not all emotions of approval and disapproval are moral 
emotions. Here Westermarck introduces for the first time ‘disinterestedness’ as the 
descriptive characteristic by which moral emotions are distinguished from related 
emotions. This implies that a disapproving judgement ‘does not simply mean that 
the person making the judgement desires to reproach or punish X [the agent], but 
that X deserves to be reproached or punished. The difference is that in the latter 
case, all self-interest is excluded’. There are also self-directed moral emotions 
which possess these same characteristics (Westermarck, 1897b, p. 300, emphasis 
added). Moreover, disinterestedness implies that we feel a desire to reward and 
punish also when we are not personally involved nor influenced by the action.
It was thus only during the spring of 1897 that Westermarck gave up his earlier 
twofold theory of moral feelings. First, he replaced the idea of relational feel-
ings with the emerging theory of moral approval and disapproval as ‘retributive 
emotions’. This was accomplished by combining his account of moral approval 
and disapproval on the one hand, and resentment and gratitude on the other, into 
a single unified theory of moral emotions as retributive emotions. By linking the 
moral emotions with the evolved tendencies for returning benefit for benefit and 
10 The National Library of Finland: Hagelin (1897) (Notes according to Dr. E. A. Westermarck’s 
lectures), no pagination; Puukko (1897) (Psychology of feeling), pp. 46–47.
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injury for injury, Westermarck gave the tendency towards reciprocity a central 
position. Concerning the retributive nature of moral emotions, Westermarck 
declared the next year to have ‘reached a degree of conviction which surely no 
power in heaven or on earth can weaken, at least not all the way to the ground’.11 
This prediction turned out to be right. Second, he replaced his early ideas of moral 
commandments and the general will with the feature of ‘disinterestedness’, soon 
supplemented with the descriptions of ‘relative impartiality’ and ‘flavour of gen-
erality’. These three empirical characteristics, which found their way to the Moral 
Ideas, were presented for the first time in an article on the emotional basis of 
moral concepts published in Mind (Westermarck, 1900).
Simply put, this very heart of Westermarck’s mature moral theory suggests 
that when the emotions of approval and disapproval are moral emotions, they are 
characterised by ‘disinterestedness’ – because they are felt as independent of any 
benefit to oneself; ‘apparent impartiality’ – because we feel that we do not favour 
any of the parties involved; and ‘a flavour of generality’ – because we assume 
that most other people we identify with would respond the same way in a similar 
situation (ODMI, pp. 101–105). Due to these characteristics, moral emotions are 
typically felt as justified and generalisable: we feel that almost anyone who would 
happen to be in a similar situation would respond, or at least ought to respond, 
in the same way. These self-transcending features attach to moral emotions and 
judgements their specifically moral character, constantly cropping up in human 
interaction.
Continuities in Westermarck’s thought
Despite the major changes in his views, the main features of Westermarck’s mature 
moral theory are present in nascent form already in his early work. These constant 
elements concern his attempt to develop a theory on the emotional basis of moral 
judgements. He was also early to analyse the connection between moral emotions 
and social customs and to develop an interest in the folk notions of responsibility. 
Above all, the desire for retribution as a distinctive feature of human psychol-
ogy and social reality figures already in his early lectures on sociology. Here, 
Westermarck traces the occurrence of retribution in its many variations to the 
simple fact that human beings are on evolutionary grounds equipped with emo-
tional tendencies which prompt the modes of behaviour we call revenge. In his 
definition, revenge, as an emotion, is the ‘desire to inflict harm or pain to some-
one who has inflicted or wanted to inflict harm or pain to me’. Westermarck also 
observes that revenge in the simple form of direct and immediate retaliation is 
found in many animals. The feeling of revenge obviously does not always lead to 
the act of revenge, since ‘this desire can in the blink of an eye be checked by other 
stronger feelings’. However, ‘it may well be doubted that any human being would 
be totally free from this law of nature [. . .] that he would not feel the slightest 
11 Westermarck (2011), letter to Rolf Lagerborg October 2, 1898.
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desire for revenge, if another individual inflicted him some harm’ (Westermarck, 
1894, pp. 46–48). Related to this, Westermarck discusses already at this point the 
origins of different forms of punishment in collectively shared punitive responses, 
thus anticipating his later and clearly more advanced contributions to the sociol-
ogy, anthropology and philosophy of punishment.12
The crucial difference between Westermarck’s early and mature positions is 
that in his early account of retribution, he did not yet argue for the resemblance 
between the emotions of revenge and moral disapproval. As he would put it later 
on, ‘[i]t is the instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain’ – whether mental or physi-
cal – that gives moral indignation its most important characteristic’ (ODMI, p. 92; 
ER, p. 85). Indeed, Westermarck’s letters hint that it was especially due to his 
closer studies on the nature of revenge that gave him the keys to figure out the 
‘essence and basis of moral emotion’.13 Similarly, as we have seen, it was not until 
the early 1897 that Westermarck was arriving at his equally central notion that the 
emotion of moral approval is akin to gratitude.
G. H. von Wright (1982) argues that ‘[i]t is not possible to say at what stage 
Westermarck came decisively under the influence of [Adam] Smith’. Referring 
specifically to Westermarck’s account of moral emotions, he estimates that ‘the 
main points of Westermarck’s moral philosophy were arrived at without any direct 
influence from Smith’ (pp. 47–49). There is, however, more to add to von Wright’s 
question. First, Smith’s influence on Westermarck is apparent already in his early 
moral theory. His view that moral approval and disapproval arise from the process 
of placing oneself imaginatively in the shoes of the agent shows obvious paral-
lel with Smith’s theory of moral judgement. In his early lectures, there is also a 
passing reference to the Smithian concept of the impartial spectator. More impor-
tantly, there are good reasons to claim that Westermarck reached his fundamen-
tal conclusions concerning the nature of moral emotions specifically as a result 
of studying Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments more closely. As noted above, 
Westermarck’s account of the spectator’s sympathetic resentment and gratitude, 
presented in his 1897 psychology lectures, simply repeats the key arguments of 
Smith’s theory of moral judgement. Smith’s decisive role in the formation of 
Westermarck’s views is also reflected in an application for a travel grant the same 
spring, where Westermarck calls Smith the most important scholar so far to have 
addressed the origin and nature of morality.14 After this, Westermarck seems even 
to have understood his endeavours partly as a matter of putting Smith’s theory 
of moral sentiments to an empirical test. Referring to his still unfinished Moral 
Ideas, Westermarck (1900) emphasises that a ‘comprehensive study of the moral 
12 For Westermarck’s mature account of the emergence and nature of the institutions of punishment, 
see ODMI, pp. 168–201. In Ethical Relativity, Westermarck defends his descriptive retribution 
theory against various philosophical doctrines of punishment. John Mackie (1982) provides a 
philosophical defence of Westermarck’s position.
13 Westermarck (2011), letter to Rolf Lagerborg October 2, 1898.
14 Westermarck (1897) (Box 42a: Academica, work papers, To the University Senate, application for 
Hermann Rosenberg grant), p. 2.
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ideas of various nations and in various ages confirms the ingenious hypothesis set 
forth by Adam Smith, that resentment and gratitude belong to the root-principles 
of the moral consciousness’ (p. 185).
As to other continuities, Westermarck points already in the same sociology lec-
tures, albeit only in passing, to the impartial nature of moral feelings. Although an 
explicit account of impartiality would emerge in his moral theorising only several 
years later, Westermarck (1894) settled early on his final view that revenge, prop-
erly speaking, is a feeling or emotion which more directly concerns one’s private 
interests, whereas ‘moral feeling is an impartial feeling’. However, Westermarck 
is not far from his mature position when he observes that we may likewise feel 
the desire for retribution when we, as spectators, only observe someone hurting 
or aiming to hurt someone else (pp. 46–48). From 1897 onwards, Westermarck 
began to emphasise this kind of sympathetic response as the core of his theory 
of moral emotions. What follows is that besides responding morally to actions 
directed towards ourselves, we respond morally to how other people are treated. 
At the heart of Westermarck’s scholarly interests lies the study of the classes of 
acts that cause us to feel hostile towards a person even though we are not person-
ally at the receiving ends of those acts. The following chapters explore the dif-
ferent ways that the retributive nature of moral emotions ‘at once throws light on 
many of the otherwise dark corners of the moral consciousness’.15
15 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 83.
The gist of Westermarck’s moral theory is the view that human moral judgements 
are ultimately based on emotions that he calls moral emotions. This chapter pre-
sents a comprehensive account of Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions, the 
main focus being on its psychological and social elements. I begin by examin-
ing Westermarck’s view of ‘retributive emotions’, through which he locates the 
origins of morality in emotional reactions and, further, in the more rudimentary 
behavioural patterns humans share with the widest possible range of other animal 
species. Next, I look at his analysis of the characteristics by which the moral emo-
tions are distinguished from other retributive emotions. This is closely related to 
the endeavour to identify and explore the typical conditions in which the moral 
emotions arise. These concern, first, Westermarck’s examination of sympathy and 
other forms of emotional contagion, second, the emotional reactions of liking 
and disliking, and third, the connection between the moral emotions and social 
customs. Third, I outline Westermarck’s understanding of the interaction between 
emotional and cognitive aspects in moral judgements. Fourth, I explain how the 
psychological phenomenon of objectification takes central stage in his thought. 
I conclude by showing how Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions shows a 
continuous interplay between individual and social aspects of morality, which 
may also be called the interplay between the individual and society. In addition, 
I look at Durkheim’s critique of his work.
Theory of retributive emotions
Westermarck suggests that there are two kinds of moral emotions, moral approval 
and moral disapproval or indignation. They belong to a wider group of emotions 
that may be called ‘retributive’, a term used by Westermarck in a broad sense to 
designate both positive and negative reactions. Negative retributive emotions are 
forms of resentment, which he defines as an ‘aggressive’ or ‘hostile attitude of 
mind towards a cause of pain’. Positive retributive emotions are forms of retribu-
tive kindly emotion, defined as a ‘friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of 
pleasure’ (ODMI, pp. 21–22, 93, 314; ER, pp. 62–63, 68, 86, 172). The retributive 
nature of these emotions implies a tendency to reciprocity. Emotions of resent-
ment motivate punishment, characterised by a ‘desire to inflict pain in return for 
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pain inflicted’. ‘Retributive kindly emotion’ is characterised by a ‘desire to pro-
duce pleasure in return for pleasure received’ and may thus motivate people to 
return good for good (ODMI, p. 94). There are both moral and nonmoral retribu-
tive emotions. Moral disapproval or indignation is akin to anger and revenge, 
which are nonmoral forms of resentment. Moral approval is akin to gratitude, 
which is a nonmoral form of a ‘retributively kindly emotion’ (ODMI, pp. 21–22, 
ER, p. 63). Westermarck’s categorisation of retributive emotions is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.
Although Westermarck does not always distinguish between the terms ‘emo-
tion’ and ‘feeling’, the central theoretical parts of his works are consistent in using 
‘feeling’ to denote reactions of pleasure and pain as distinguished from retributive 
emotions. This concerns, above all, his definition of retributive emotions and his 
description of how moral emotions arise by means of our first-order feelings of 
pleasure and pain. It was typical of Westermarck not to define his terms any more 
than necessary to introduce the reader to the ideas and distinctions he had in mind. 
However, Westermarck’s lectures on psychology and ethics help to throw more 
light on his view of emotions. He argues that, although in colloquial language 
‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ indicate much the same thing, they can be distinguished 
from each other. For Westermarck, there are only two kinds of feelings, pleasure 
and pain. They are basic affective reactions humans share with a variety of living 
organisms, and ‘everyone knows by experience what it means to feel pleasure and 
pain’.1
These basic responses are at the core of Westermarck’s theory of retributive 
emotions, because anger, revenge and moral disapproval are always directed 
 1 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lectures, Ethics: fragmentary pages), p. 4.
Retributive emotions
Resentment Retributive kindlyemotion
Anger and
revenge
Moral
disapproval
Moral 
approval
Nonmoral retributive kindly 
emotion, including gratitude
Moral emotions
Figure 3.1  Westermarck’s categorisation of retributive emotions, taken from ODMI, p. 21
Source: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, vol. I. London: Macmillan.
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towards the cause of pain. Correspondingly, gratitude and moral approval are 
directed towards the cause of pleasure. We react to these feelings, because our 
retributive emotions are ‘always reactions against pain or pleasure felt by our-
selves’ (ODMI, p. 108; ODMI, II, p. 739; ER, p. 96). Painful feelings are of bio-
logical importance in serving as warnings to the organism in order to avoid or 
remove the cause of danger. Conversely, the causes of pleasure are, generally 
speaking, biologically advantageous for organisms (or at least have been so at 
some point in the past). For this reason, pleasure is associated with the endeavour 
to retain its cause.2 However, these affective reactions are not emotions.
Westermarck’s view of emotion is componential, referring to emotions as men-
tal states consisting of the elements of feeling, cognition and conation. The pri-
mary component of every emotion is pleasure or pain. Applied to his theory of 
retributive emotions, anger, revenge and moral disapproval are hostile states of 
mind dominated by the feeling of pain. Moral approval and gratitude, in turn, 
are dominated by the feeling of pleasure. A certain emotion may also contain 
both of these feelings. In Westermarck’s view, anger and revenge do not con-
sist exclusively of pain, since in these emotions the painful feeling may, to some 
extent, intermingle with pleasure. Similarly, gratitude does not consist exclu-
sively of pleasure, because in some cases gratitude can also feel unpleasant and 
oppressing.3
Second, emotions are always bound to cognitions, by which Westermarck 
means sensations and ideas. Cognitions are insomuch interwoven with emotions 
that we cannot think back to an emotional state we have experienced without 
at the same time recalling the cognition to which it was related. Similarly, the 
lucidity of an emotion depends on how clearly we remember the related cog-
nitions.4 Even though ‘[c]ertain cognitions inspire fear in nearly every breast’, 
because of the individual variations in emotional disposition, ‘same cognitions 
may give rise to emotions that differ, in quality or intensity, in different persons 
or in the same person on different occasions’ (ER, p. 216; also ODMI, p. 11). 
Third, emotions are linked to bodily alterations which are in many cases vis-
ible to the eye. In psychological terms, the third constituent of emotion is the 
‘conative element’ that gives emotions their reactive and motivational quality. 
Importantly, the conative element is a crucial part of retributive emotions as 
they involve the deep-rooted desire to reward or punish another person due to 
his or her actions.5
 2 Westermarck (1915) (Box 80: Lectures, Psychology II), pp. 146–148; Westermarck (1914) 
(Box 78: Lectures, Psychology), p. 178a. Westermarck’s description of pleasure and pain is much 
influenced by Harald Høffding ([1882] 1896, pp. 272–274). I take up some details of Wester-
marck’s pleasure-pain psychology in Chapter 7.
 3 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Psychology), p. 178a; Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lec-
tures, Ethics: fragmentary pages), p. 4.
 4 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lectures, Ethics: fragmentary pages), p. 4; Westermarck (1915) 
(Box 80: Lectures, Psychology II), pp. 149–150.
 5 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: Lectures, Ethics: fragmentary pages), pp. 4–5.
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As noted, moral disapproval is, for Westermarck, akin to anger and revenge. 
Although these two nonmoral retributive emotions are impossible to distinguish 
accurately, anger may be defined as ‘sudden resentment, in which the hostile 
reaction against the cause of pain is unrestrained by deliberation’. That moral 
disapproval and anger stem from the same root shows also in their nonverbal 
expressions: ‘When possessed with strong moral indignation, a person looks as if 
he were angry, and so he really is, in the wider sense of the term’ (ODMI, pp. 22, 
42; ER, pp. 64, 68–69). Importantly, the close relationship between anger and 
moral disapproval ‘has been ignored by those who have described moral approval 
and disapproval merely as feelings of pleasure and pain’ (ER, p. 69). The emo-
tion of revenge, in turn, is a form of resentment that is ‘more or less restrained by 
reason and calculation’ (ODMI, p. 22; ER, p. 64). Compared to anger, revenge in 
Westermarck’s sense of the term is more ‘delayed reaction and therefore presup-
poses a certain ability to remember, and to make and stick to plans’ (Ross, 1975, 
p. 126). Correspondingly, moral approval is an ‘emotion of which moral praise or 
reward is the outward manifestation’. Moral approval is akin to gratitude, which 
involves ‘a definite desire to give pleasure in return for pleasure received’. Grati-
tude is often mixed with a ‘feeling of indebtedness’, that is, ‘he upon whom a 
benefit has been conferred feels himself as a debtor and regards the benefactor as 
his creditor’ (ODMI, pp. 21–22, 93–95; ER, pp. 62–63, 86–88).
As we shall see in Chapter 6, one of the key features of Westermarck’s theory 
of moral emotions is that they are directed towards living beings as the cause 
of pleasure or pain. In the same way, the anger of a hurt or irritated animal is 
directed towards the real or assumed offender, especially among the primates 
(ODMI, pp. 22, 37–38). It is due to the retributive nature of moral emotions that 
human beings feel anxious if an altruist is faced with ingratitude and, especially, if 
a wrongdoer does not receive some kind of punishment. Westermarck recognises 
that sometimes guilt extends according to group membership, as is the case with 
blood feuds or in cases where the parents of an offender guilty of a very serious 
wrong meet strong moral indignation. However, according to Westermarck, the 
agent is not overlooked even in such cases, because condemning emotions are tar-
geted at persons assumed to be connected with the wrongdoer. The same applies 
to moral praise, which may be directed not only towards the benefactor, but may, 
at least to some extent, extend also to persons nearly related to the agent (ODMI, 
pp. 30–37, 95–96).
The evolution of retributive emotions
Westermarck construes retributive emotions as human universals, though their 
ways of expression and the behaviours they are directed to can be specific to 
particular cultures. Moral judgements are based on emotions expressing ‘a mental 
constitution which has been acquired through the influence of natural selection’, 
because they have a ‘tendency to promote the interests of the individuals who feel 
them’ (ODMI, pp. 41, 108, emphasis added). Westermarck’s account of the evolu-
tion of retributive emotions is very brief and general. The emotions of resentment 
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seek punishment, and by them ‘evils are averted’ (ODMI, p. 95; ER, p. 88). Thus, 
regarding the origin of retributive emotions, ‘the evolutionist can hardly enter-
tain a doubt’. The emotion of resentment, ‘like protective reflex action, out of 
which it gradually developed, is a means of protection for the animal’. In the more 
rudimentary forms of resentment that are widespread across the animal kingdom, 
there is not necessarily any actual desire to inflict pain or suffering on another 
individual, only the endeavour to remove the cause of danger. And to give his 
theory the broadest possible empirical basis, Westermarck explains that ‘[a]s we 
proceed still lower down the scale of animal life we find the conative element 
itself gradually dwindle away until nothing is left but mere reflex action’ (ODMI, 
pp. 22, 40; also ER, pp. 68–69).
Similarly, for Westermarck, the origin of retributive kindly emotions is 
explained by Darwinian selection. As these emotions motivate humans to repay 
benevolent acts in kind, they are springs for reciprocity and by them ‘benefits are 
secured’. Again, in the rudimentary forms of retributively kindly emotion found 
in simpler animals, there is no definite desire to produce pleasure, only an endeav-
our to retain the cause of the pleasure experienced (ODMI, pp. 93–95; ER, pp. 86, 
88). What Westermarck suggests is that natural selection has favoured individuals 
who respond angrily and resentfully towards those who attempt to injure them. 
Similarly, it has favoured individuals who respond positively and kindly towards 
those who are friendly and helpful towards them. Westermarck’s basic under-
standing about retributive emotions as characteristics humans share with other 
animals – and moral emotions as outgrowths of these rudimentary impulses – 
gains support from modern research on primate sociality. Frans de Waal (2001) 
explains that ‘[w]hen I watch primates, measuring how they share food in return 
for grooming, comfort victims of aggression, or wait for the right opportunity to 
get even with a rival, I see very much the same emotional impulses that Wester-
marck analysed’ (p. 350).6
Another key feature of Westermarck’s moral theory is that the emotions of 
resentment are considerably more prevalent and intense in their manifestations 
than are the kindly emotions. Similarly, owing to ‘the uniformity of its function 
and its extreme importance in the life of the species’ (ER, p. 68), resentment is 
widely prevalent in the animal kingdom. Retributive kindly emotion, on its part, 
is far less prevalent: ‘In many animal species not even the germ of it is found, and 
where it occurs it is generally restricted within narrow limits’. This is explained 
by the fact that, in evolutionary terms, the emotions of resentment are built-in 
protective mechanisms that have immediate survival value for the individual. 
Another reason for this difference is that retributive kindly emotions occur only 
in cooperative animals that live in groups, and ‘even gregarious animals have 
many enemies, but few friends’ (ODMI, pp. 40–41, 94–95, 129; ER, pp. 68–69, 
87–88, 98).
 6 For overviews on the literature on reciprocity and associated emotional dispositions in primates, 
see Bonnie & de Waal (2004); Schino & Aureli (2009); Kappeler & van Schaik (2006).
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Besides what happens in two-person interactions, the same difference in 
strength and frequency occurs between the positive and negative retributive emo-
tions of third parties. Westermarck observes that the indignation of bystanders 
towards wrongdoers is almost without exception much stronger and more fre-
quent than moral praise towards benefactors, even though in neither case does 
the agent’s action concern the spectator personally. Besides the evolutionary rea-
sons discussed above, the human disposition to envy and jealousy often weakens 
the strength of gratitude and moral approval people feel on the behalf of others, 
because they may evoke some kind of resentment not only towards the object of 
the benefit, but towards the benefactor as well (ODMI, p. 129; ER, p. 98).
These emphases are visible in the fact that, in his examination of retributive 
emotions, Westermarck pays considerably more attention to punitive emotions 
than rewarding ones. Similarly, in his study of various morally relevant behav-
iours, the main focus is on actions that tend to elicit moral disapproval, not moral 
praise. Simply put, ‘disapproval has in all ages played a far more important 
part in the moral consciousness of mankind than approval’ (ER, p. 122). This 
is because, first, the emotion of moral disapproval or indignation plays a crucial 
role in the emergence and maintenance of moral norms and, second, the desire 
to punish those who violate shared moral standards is a distinctive feature of 
human morality (ODMI, p. 122; ER, p. 111). In a wider perspective, without the 
retributive nature of moral disapproval, ‘moral condemnation and the ideas of 
right and wrong would never have come into existence’ (ODMI, p. 92; ER, p. 85). 
Similarly, for Westermarck, because moral indignation occurs universally more 
often and with more intense manifestations than moral approval, moral rules and 
laws concentrate universally mostly on proscriptions and punishment (Luoma, 
1967, p. 33).
The characteristics of moral emotions: disinterestedness, 
impartiality and generality
As we have seen, according to Westermarck, moral emotions are closely akin to 
their nonmoral counterparts: moral approval to gratitude, and moral disapproval 
to anger and revenge. However, he was after something of the essence in human 
social reality when proposing that the moral emotions have their special charac-
teristics that distinguish them from other retributive emotions. As Knud Haakons-
sen and Donald Winch (2006) put it, Westermarck presented ‘simply an empirical 
hypothesis to the effect that people tend to give special status to commonly shared 
reactive passions and this special status is what we have come to call morality’ 
(p. 383). As will become evident later on, Westermarck’s way of exploring moral 
approval and disapproval in relation to similar emotions that lack certain observ-
able characteristics that are specific to moral emotions bears a close resemblance 
to the analytic method employed by David Hume and Adam Smith.
To find out the attributes of moral emotions, Westermarck advises the exami-
nation of how people in practice express moral judgements. They are ‘definite 
expressions of moral emotions’ because ‘such judgments could never have been 
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pronounced unless there had been moral emotions antecedent to them’ (ODMI, 
p. 101; ER, p. 90). Westermarck’s description of moral judgement is as follows:
Particular modes of conduct have their traditional labels, many of which are 
learnt with language itself; and the moral judgment commonly consists sim-
ply in labelling the act according to certain obvious characteristics which it 
presents in common with others belonging to the same group.
(ODMI, p. 9; ER, p. 115)
In other words, we observe certain kinds of actions – taking another’s property 
or telling an untruth, for example – and these actions are traditionally called ‘theft’ 
and ‘lying’. Theft and lying are generally considered wrong, and therefore these 
actions are also called wrong (ER, p. 115). Westermarck’s view on the relation 
between emotions and moral judgements contains some important details that 
will be discussed later on in this chapter. In general terms, however, Westermarck 
suggests that moral judgements simply would not occur if moral emotions were 
not part of the human biological endowment.
To begin with, moral emotions are characterised by ‘disinterestedness’. This 
means that they appear to be independent of our personal interests (ODMI, 
p. 101; ER, p. 90). If a person experiencing moral indignation or disapproval 
was himself the object to the action, he feels that ‘his condemnation is not due 
to the particular circumstance that it is he himself who is the sufferer, that his 
judgment would be the same if anybody else in similar circumstances had been 
the victim’ (ER, p. 90, emphasis added). Secondly, moral approval and disap-
proval are characterised by the appearance of ‘impartiality’. Impartiality denotes 
that we assume that we would react in the same way regardless of who was the 
agent and who was the recipient of the act (ODMI, pp. 103–104; ER, pp. 92–93). 
Thus, as de Waal (2006) puts it, Westermarck suggests that moral approval and 
disapproval are connected to more ‘general judgments of how anyone ought to 
be treated’ (p. 20). Otherwise resentment is not moral disapproval, but more like 
‘personal anger’ concerning more directly one’s own interests. Similarly, retribu-
tive kindly emotion is moral approval only if it has the feel of disinterestedness 
and impartiality. Otherwise it is more like ‘personal gratitude’ (Westermarck, 
1936b, pp. 233–234; 1939, p. 7).
It is important to understand that for Westermarck the recognition of these qual-
ities does not mean that the moral emotions would be disinterested and impartial 
in some actual or objective sense. However, even when personal interest clearly 
affects how these emotions occur, people tend to view their moral opinions as 
disinterested (ODMI, p. 101; ER, p. 91). Similarly, impartiality can be ‘real or 
apparent’. In other words, in reality our moral beliefs and judgements are often 
biased in favour of one party over another, but ‘not knowingly’ (ER, p. 93; also 
ODMI, p. 104). Simply put, ‘Westermarck did not claim that the behaviors moti-
vated by the moral emotions are necessarily moral in any larger sense. They only 
become moral when people see them as moral and thus only when they appear 
disinterested and impartial’ (Wolf, 2008, p. 193).
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As the third distinctive feature of moral emotions, Westermarck introduces 
‘a certain flavour of generality’. This suggests that when making moral evalua-
tions, people do not usually feel like expressing merely their personal opinion. 
Quite the opposite, moral judgements have typically a reference to the emotions 
of others as well. By this Westermarck means that they include a ‘vague assump-
tion’ that the great majority, or at least the group of people one identifies with, 
would respond the same way in a similar situation. This feeling of generality is 
found even when the person is aware that his or her viewpoint is not shared by 
others: ‘He then feels that it would be shared if other people knew the act and 
all its attendant circumstances as well as he does himself, and if, at the same 
time, their emotions were as refined as are his own’. This typical feature of moral 
experience is manifested such that ‘[e]ven when standing alone, he feels that his 
conviction is shared at least by an ideal society, by all those who see the matter as 
clearly as he does himself’ (ODMI, pp. 104–105, 123).
The flavour of generality characterises moral emotions as ‘public emotions’ 
that certain acts have a tendency to arouse in a given society or social group. 
People of similar backgrounds tend to react in the same way to similar behaviours 
and phenomena, and ‘this touch of generality, which belongs to public approval 
and public indignation’, is never found in our more personal emotions of grati-
tude and revenge (ODMI, 105). These three characteristics of moral emotions 
can be summarised by saying that when our indignation is moral indignation, we 
feel our reaction is justified. We think that anyone in the same situation would 
respond with similar righteous indignation.7 On the other hand, nonmoral retribu-
tive emotions stemming directly from our immediate situation are more difficult 
to justify or defend by appealing to others, or to the collective good, because other 
people do not as readily share these emotions. It is noteworthy that Westermarck 
omitted the ‘flavour of generality’ as the characteristic of moral emotions by the 
time of publishing Ethical Relativity in 1932. However, this change in his moral 
theory is not very substantial because his permanent notion that moral emotions 
are typically ‘public emotions’ that are shared in a given society or social group as 
regards certain behaviours encompasses much of the contents he attached earlier 
to his notion of generality.
Self-directed retributive emotions
Besides emotions that are directed towards others, Westermarck also analyses 
retributive emotions we feel towards ourselves. In his definition, ‘moral self- 
condemnation’ or ‘remorse’ is a ‘hostile attitude of mind towards one’s self as the 
cause of pain’. Being also a retributive emotion, it ‘involves, vaguely or distinctly, 
some desire to suffer’. Although this emotion, too, varies in strength in different 
 7 Frans de Waal (2006) emphasises that in this Westermarckian area of moral emotions, dealing with 
right and wrong at a more abstract level, ‘humans seem to go radically further than other primates’ 
(p. 20).
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conditions and in different individuals, Westermarck observes that ‘[w]e may feel 
actual hatred towards ourselves, we may desire to inflict bodily suffering upon 
ourselves as a punishment for what we have done’. Remorse can reach such lev-
els of intolerability that it leads offenders to expose themselves voluntarily, even 
with the awareness of the severe punishment that will follow. On the other hand, 
‘moral self-approval’ is a ‘kindly emotion, a friendly attitude towards one’s self 
as a cause of pleasure’. It is not merely personal satisfaction with one’s conduct, 
but it contains a notion of social recognition and makes one feel that ‘one’s own 
conduct merits praise or reward’ (ODMI, pp. 105–106; also ER, p. 94).
Like other-directed retributive emotions, Westermarck distinguishes between 
nonmoral and moral self-directed retributive emotions. He recognises that we 
may be angry with ourselves for purely selfish reasons, as is the case when we 
regret having acted contrary to our own interests. Similarly, we may feel self-
approval on egoistic grounds, such as when succeeding in bringing benefits to 
ourselves or our close ones. It is only when remorse and self-approval possess the 
characteristics of disinterestedness and impartiality that we can begin to speak of 
them as moral emotions (ODMI, pp. 106–107; ER, p. 95). This points to the fact 
that remorse, which appears to be felt merely due to social disapproval or the fear 
of punishment, does not appear as real or genuine in the eyes of others. Similarly, 
we do not consider self-approval as moral or justified if a person appears to feel it 
in consequence of an obviously self-interested or unjust act. Like other-directed 
moral emotions, self-approval and remorse also appear the most evident when 
they go together with the knowledge or implicit assumption of being socially 
shared (ODMI, p. 107). The retributive emotions Westermarck included in his 
edifice can thus be classified according to (1) whether they seek punishment or 
reward; (2) whether they are nonmoral or moral and (3) whether they are other-
directed or self-directed.
The origin of moral emotions (I): disinterestedness
Thus far we have seen that Westermarck argues that the evolutionary origin of 
retributive emotions – both in their moral and nonmoral forms – is accounted 
for by their biological ‘usefulness’ for the individuals who feel them (ODMI, 
pp. 94–95, 108; ER, pp. 88, 95). However, he presents different types of explana-
tions for the origin of the specific moral elements discussed above. This approach 
may be illustrated by his perspective on moral judgements in general. As Ronald 
Fletcher (1982) puts it, ‘when Westermarck spoke of the “origins” of moral ideas 
[. . .] he was distinctly not entering into a kind of chronological historical quest 
for the first instances of them’. By origin he ‘clearly meant the distinctive socio- 
psychological context within which they arose, and which gave rise to them’ 
(p. 207). Westermarck explains that in order for us to ‘discover the origin of those 
elements in the moral emotions by which they are distinguished from other, non-
moral, retributive emotions’, we must identify and ‘distinguish between different 
classes of conditions under which disinterested retributive emotions arise’ (ODMI, 
p. 108; ER, p. 95). In other words, Westermarck was to trace the combination of 
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psychological and social factors in human experience that underlie the expres-
sions of moral approval and disapproval.
Westermarck’s account of the disinterested character of moral emotions is part 
of his analysis of why human beings in general feel retributive emotions on behalf 
of others. In Westermarck’s view, retributive emotions may acquire the feeling 
and appearance that they are independent of one’s personal interests through three 
kinds of conditions. They relate to (1) our capacity to sympathise with the feelings 
of others; (2) another kind of emotional contagion where retributive emotions are 
transmitted from one person to another and (3) the reactions of liking and dislik-
ing that may be released in a variety of conditions. I will look at each of these in 
turn and then examine Westermarck’s more complex account of the impartial and 
general nature of moral emotions.
Sympathy as the source of disinterested retributive emotions
Westermarck begins by observing that disinterested retributive emotions fre-
quently arise via sympathy. We may feel disinterested disapproval and approval 
‘on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with 
whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly 
interest’ (ODMI, p. 108; ER, pp. 95–96). In Westermarck’s view,
Man is by nature both resentful and sympathetic. When he sees some of his 
comrades suffer injury or death at the hands of another individual, he feels 
pain and resentment himself, and, though not himself a direct object of the 
injury, he desires that the offender shall be punished. In this simple combina-
tion of resentment and sympathy we have a fact of extreme importance for 
the moulding of the moral consciousness.
(Westermarck, 1898, p. 306)
More specifically, the feelings of pleasure and pain may be transmitted from 
one person to another merely via their bodily expressions: ‘The sight of a happy 
face tends to produce some degree of pleasure in him who sees it; the sight of 
the bodily signs of suffering tends to produce a feeling of pain’ (ODMI, p. 109; 
ER, p. 96). Second, sympathetic feelings may arise from observing acts and situ-
ations. This means that we, as spectators, instinctively anticipate the emotional 
reactions that are usually associated with certain acts or situations – ‘a blow may 
cause pain to the spectator before he has witnessed its effect on the victim’. It is 
through perceiving the situational context that we may sympathise with another 
without detecting a similar emotion in that person. This is the case when we ‘feel 
resentment on his [an injured individual] behalf though he himself feels none’ 
(ODMI, pp. 109, 114; ER, pp. 96, 106). By the same token, we may feel gratitude 
towards a benefactor though the recipient of an altruistic act shows none. How-
ever, the emotions of disapproval, in particular, are intensified when both of these 
causes – the perception of emotional displays and their situational contexts – are 
simultaneously producing the emotion (ODMI, p. 109).
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So, what does Westermarck mean by sympathy? He is consistent in his notion 
that sympathy is neither a single emotion nor a process through which emotions 
arise. Instead, Westermarck speaks of sympathy in the sense of sympathetic feel-
ings or emotions, denoting feelings and emotions that we feel as reactions to simi-
lar feelings and emotions in others. This can happen even when we do not observe 
any emotional expressions in the person concerned, since, as noted above, sym-
pathetic feelings and emotions may arise as a consequence of observing acts or 
situations alone. At the same time, it is slightly misleading to suggest that West-
ermarck ‘seems to have been one of the last writers to use the term “sympathy” 
in its 18th century naturalistic sense, denoting simply the transfer of emotions 
of any kind, positive or negative, from one person to another’ (Hintikka, 2006, 
p. 43). This is because Westermarck distinguishes between sympathy in the sense 
of mere transfer of feelings or emotions and ‘what is generally understood by 
sympathy’ (ODMI, p. 109).
The reasoning behind this is that, for Westermarck, sharing the feelings and 
emotions alone is not sufficient for us to feel disinterested moral emotions on the 
behalf of other people. In order for these emotions to arise, sympathy ‘requires the 
cooperation of the altruistic sentiment or affection’ (ODMI, p. 110; ER, pp. 96–97, 
emphasis added). Whenever Westermarck talks about the manifestations of moral 
emotions through sympathy, he means sympathetic emotional reactions that involve 
the influence of altruistic sentiment. It is in this sense that ‘sympathy produces in us 
disinterested retributive emotions, when the individual towards whom we are kindly 
disposed is hurt or benefited’ (ER, p. 98).8 This should, however, not be understood 
as coupling sympathy with altruistic action. Westermarck’s primary interest on the 
subject of sympathy lies in explaining the arousal of moral emotions in the specta-
tor, not in the study of action that sympathy may motivate.
What, then, is the altruistic sentiment that serves as a key element in West-
ermarck’s view of sympathy? In Westermarck’s sense of the term, ‘sentiments’ 
in themselves cannot be felt at any given moment, but they are psychologi-
cal dispositions that may give rise to many different emotions. This may be 
clarified by considering that, in addition to ‘altruistic sentiment’, Westermarck 
discusses also ‘maternal’, ‘paternal’ and ‘patriotic’ sentiments. The sentiment 
of altruism denotes ‘a disposition of mind which is particularly apt to display 
itself as kindly emotion towards other beings’. It is crucial for the study of how 
moral emotions arise, because this ‘sentiment, only, induces us to take a kindly 
interest in the feelings of our neighbours’ (ODMI, p. 110; ER, pp. 96–97).9 It is 
 8 In the sense of sharing another person’s emotions, sympathy is today usually referred to as ‘emo-
tional empathy’ and when including perspective-taking, ‘cognitive empathy’. For a discussion on 
the conceptual transition from sympathy to empathy in psychology and social psychology during 
the twentieth century, see Jahoda (2005). For different conceptualisations and uses of sympathy 
in British psychology and philosophy at the end of 1800s and the turn of the century, see Lanzoni 
(2009); Debes (2015).
 9 Westermarck’s dispositional use of the term ‘sentiment’ can be explicitly traced to the work of his 
close friend, British philosopher-psychologist Alexander Shand (ODMI, p. 110; Shand, 1896).
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obvious that there are vicarious emotional responses that do not involve a kind 
attitude towards another person. In such cases, the other person’s condition 
may be ‘a matter of complete indifference’ to the spectator. It is only due to the 
altruistic sentiment that we ‘to some extent identify, as it were, our feelings 
with those of our neighbour’. Through this, ‘we naturally look upon any per-
son who causes him pleasure or pain as the cause of our sympathetic pleasure 
or pain, and are apt to experience towards that person a retributive emotion 
similar in kind, if not always in degree, to the emotion which we feel when we 
are ourselves benefited or injured’ (ODMI, pp. 109–111; also ER, pp. 96–97).
The contagion of retributive emotions
In addition to sympathy, Westermarck suggests that disinterested approval and 
disapproval may arise from observing the outward signs of retributive emo-
tions in others. Emotional contagion of this kind may seem identical to West-
ermarck’s account of sympathy, but he distinguishes between them. While 
sympathy is about the spectator’s affective responses to the benefits and harms 
caused to others, retributive emotions are in many cases transferred from one 
person to another without the second person being aware of the cause of the 
original emotion (ODMI, pp. 114, 117; ER, pp. 105–106, 108). As ‘a group 
of chimpanzees may be thrown into a state of blind fury by the angry cries 
of one of its members’, one may be sucked into the anger of a crowd without 
being aware of its cause (ER, p. 106; also ODMI, p. 114). Anger or indignation 
that is transmitted from one individual to another and that spreads in groups 
is ‘of considerable importance both as an originator and a communicator of 
moral ideas’. Language, too, may convey retributive emotions, as is the case 
when moral disapproval is evoked by the perception of signs of strong indigna-
tion in speech. Similarly, emotions of approval may be produced by perceiv-
ing signs of positive retributive emotions in others (ODMI, pp. 114–117; ER, 
pp. 106–108).
For Westermarck, these forms of disapproval can even be considered as ‘the 
main foundation of moral tradition’. Moral standards can outlive the conditions 
from which they originate, and some matters elicit moral disapproval without 
anyone quite knowing why. The original causes of moral condemnation ‘may 
have been ignorance, superstition, prejudice, or sheer selfishness in those who 
once laid down the rules of conduct, and their prescriptions may nevertheless 
be indiscriminately and thoughtlessly accepted by succeeding generations’ 
(Westermarck, 1936b, pp. 235, 238–239; also ODMI, p. 121). These effects 
are further boosted by the fact that human beings are strongly inclined to share 
the moral disapproval of those they respect, and thus to have similar moral 
opinions. Quoting Hobbes, Westermarck asserts that people are often ‘like lit-
tle children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but the correc-
tion they receive from their Parents, and Masters’ (ODMI, pp. 115, 121; ER, 
pp. 106–107, 110–111).
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Reactions of disliking and liking
In the cases discussed above, retributive emotions are reactions to feelings and 
emotions felt by other people. In the third type of condition through which disin-
terested retributive emotions may arise, these emotions are quite independent of 
the emotions of others. Moral emotions often derive from reactions of disliking 
or disgust, termed by Westermarck as ‘disinterested antipathies’ and ‘sentimental 
aversions’. People often ‘feel hostile to a person who inflicts no injury on anybody’ 
(ER, p. 107), and this is an equally important moral psychology phenomenon as 
our capacity to sympathise with others. It is not unusual that ‘when a certain act, 
which does no harm – apart from the painful impression it makes on the spectator – 
fills people with disgust or horror, they may feel less inclined to inflict harm upon 
the agent than if he had committed an offence against person, property, or good 
name’ (ER, pp. 107–108; also ODMI, p. 116). Emotional aversions that lead to 
moral disapproval may concern such apparently trivial phenomena as differences 
of taste, habit, or opinion (ODMI, p. 116; ER, p. 107). Similarly, ‘antipathy which 
is so commonly felt against anything unusual, new, or foreign, may lead to the 
idea that it is wrong’ (ER, p. 107).
The human repertoire of emotions includes also ‘disinterested likings’ that lead 
people to react positively to another person. An example of such responses is the 
admiration or esteem people may feel towards courage quite irrespective of the 
purpose of the associated action (ODMI, p. 117; ER, p. 108). Moreover, in many 
cases the spectator’s reactions of liking give rise to the moral approval of con-
duct that concerns only the agent’s own interests (ODMI II, pp. 266–267). Also 
here, Westermarck emphasises the significance of emotional contagion and social 
environment because ‘[w]e are easily affected by the aversions and likings of our 
neighbours’ and these emotions increase when we observe similar emotions in 
others (ODMI, p. 116).
The origin of moral emotions (II): impartiality and generality
Let us now turn to Westermarck’s view that moral emotions are not characterised 
only by disinterestedness, but also by the appearance of impartiality and ‘the feel-
ing of being publicly shared’ (ODMI, p. 117). These latter are due to the fact that 
it is not only one person who reacts in a certain way but almost all members of 
a social group are inclined to react with similar retributive emotions to similar 
events. The emotions of moral approval and disapproval are typically felt gener-
ally with relation to certain behaviours, or the individual at least feels that others 
should respond similarly. The specific impression that one’s reaction or judge-
ment is justified, with real or assumed social backing, attaches moral emotions to 
social customs (ODMI, pp. 117–121; ER, pp. 108–111).
Customs are at the heart of Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions because 
people tend to experience their approval and disapproval as impartial and socially 
shared when they are in congruence with established social customs. In short, 
customs are universally conceived as ‘moral rules’ whose breach has a tendency 
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to evoke moral disapproval (ODMI, pp. 118–121; ER, pp. 109–111). The central 
importance given to sympathy, the contagion of retributive emotions and customs 
shows that Westermarck linked morality closely to its social context: ‘Society is 
the school in which we learn to distinguish between right and wrong. The head-
master is Custom, and the lessons are the same for all the members of the com-
munity’ (ER, p. 50; also ODMI, p. 9).
Thus far I have been concerned with Westermarck’s descriptive account of 
‘how retributive emotions may become apparently impartial and be coloured by a 
feeling of generality’ (ODMI, p. 117, emphasis added). Moving from description 
to explanation, Westermarck says that
the real problem which we have now to solve is [. . .] why disinterestedness, 
apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteris-
tics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retribu-
tive emotions. The solution of this problem lies in the fact that society is the 
birthplace of the moral consciousness.
(ODMI, p. 117, emphasis added; also ER, pp. 108–109)
When the idea of society as ‘the birthplace of the moral consciousness’ is 
analysed in the context of the overall arguments of the Moral Ideas, it becomes 
clear that it is a very succinct way to phrase Westermarck’s complex notion 
concerning the evolutionary context in which the uniquely human moral emo-
tions evolved and became part of our biological heritage. Society is, for West-
ermarck, ‘an association of individuals of the same species characterised by 
some kind of cooperation’.10 In his view, the tendency to feel moral emotions 
evolved by natural selection in the context of ancestral close-knit social com-
munities. These emotions gave a selective advantage to individuals who feel 
them because in such conditions the individual and group interests coincide 
(ODMI, p. 108; ODMI II, pp. 195–198). The question is about associated indi-
viduals responding with moral approval to behaviours that simultaneously ben-
efit themselves and others, and above all, with moral indignation to behaviours 
that threaten them. I will return to these issues in more detail in the next chapter. 
At this stage, it is sufficient to note that, for Westermarck, ‘the first moral judg-
ments expressed, not the private emotions of isolated individuals, but emotions 
felt by the society at large’ (ODMI, pp. 117–118; ER, 109, emphasis added). 
And because the moral emotions evolved in close interaction with elementary 
rules of conduct, ‘[t]he origin of custom as a moral rule no doubt lies in a very 
remote period of human history’ (ODMI, p. 124).
10 LSE Archives: Lake Barnett (1911) (Notebook: Social institutions – Professor Westermarck, Sum-
mer Term 1911), p. 4; Mitrany (1916) (Social institutions – Westermarck), p. 6. This definition is 
repeated verbatim in both student lecture notes. Similarly, according to another student at LSE, 
Westermarck regarded society as ‘a grouping characterized by more or less cooperation, not neces-
sarily involving physical proximity’ (Harper, 1933, p. 337).
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Customs are also important for Westermarck’s comparative investigations, 
which focus mainly on ‘tribal and national customs and laws’ (ODMI, p. 158). 
Despite the close relationship between customs and moral beliefs introduced 
above, it was clear to Westermarck that the moral components of custom and law 
are not necessarily shared by all members of a society (ODMI, p. 161). However, 
generally speaking, ‘[c]ustoms and laws express the general feelings of the com-
munity and punish acts that shock them’ (Westermarck, 1936a, p. 236). Customs 
are central to the study of morality because ‘the only way in which we can get 
an insight into people’s feelings and ideas is by studying their conduct’.11 Even 
‘[t]he laws themselves, in fact, command obedience more as customs than as 
laws’. Since social customs serve as the approximate benchmark for people’s 
notions of right and wrong, Westermarck emphasises that in contemporary West-
ern societies, too, ‘the ordinary citizen stands in no need of studying the laws 
under which he lives, custom being generally the safe guiding star of his conduct’. 
As the determining factor of moral standards, customs have universally ‘proved 
stronger than law and religion combined’ (ODMI, pp. 164–166).
Westermarck’s concept of custom
In Westermarck’s definition, customs are ‘public habits’, by which he means ‘the 
habits of a certain group of men, a racial or national community, a class or rank 
of society’ (ODMI, p. 118; ER, p. 109). In his published lectures on ‘The history 
of customs’, Westermarck begins his discussion on the formation of customs by 
pointing out that ‘certain kinds of actions can become common in a society as a 
consequence of more or less blind instincts’. These customs are above all associ-
ated with parental care and incest avoidance, occurring in relatively similar forms 
everywhere. Second, many customs can be traced to magical or religious beliefs, 
while others are based on utilitarian considerations. Third, the emergence of cus-
toms and their maintenance over generations is much influenced by the strong 
human tendency to imitate what others around us do. Imitation influences human 
behaviour together with ‘the specific force of habit, i.e., the force that is included 
in public habit as habit’ (Westermarck, 1912, pp. 2–3).12
The influence of habit shows that when we act in a certain manner, we tend to 
act similarly under similar circumstances. Since ‘the same external effects are 
disposed to evoke the same motion effect’, when we become accustomed to doing 
certain things, ‘we gradually come to perform them automatically’. Our actions 
turn easily into nonreflective habits, and ‘customs become sorts of social reflexes’. 
As a result, there is a high degree of uniformity in human activities, and in many 
situations people act in similar ways without knowing the reason why (West-
ermarck, 1912, pp. 2–3). In addition to these causes, and partially overlapping 
11 Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 43a: University of London, ‘Lectures at the University College’), p. 8.
12 For Westermarck’s discussion of the role of utilitarian conceptions, see ODMI II, pp. 52, 110–111, 
332–335, 660–663.
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with them, Westermarck emphasises the importance of emotional disgust because 
‘aversions which are generally felt readily lead to moral disapproval and prohibi-
tory customs or laws’ (ER, p. 249).13 Finally, according to Westermarck, many 
basic moral rules are based on our capacity to sympathise with the feelings and 
emotions of others.
This leads us to Westermarck’s view of the intimate connection between habits 
and institutions. He defines social institutions as ‘social relationships regulated 
by society’, and such established forms of social interaction are essentially cus-
toms.14 ‘Social habits’, Westermarck says, ‘have a strong tendency to become true 
customs, that is, rules of conduct in addition to their being habits’ (HHM I, p. 69). 
In other words, ‘customs of a people are an outcome of collective mental activity 
in a much deeper sense than being merely a habitual repetition of certain modes 
of behaviour’ (Westermarck, 1936a, pp. 237–238). This is because there is a very 
close connection between the two main characteristics of custom, ‘its habitualness 
and its obligatoriness’ (ODMI, p. 159). What gives custom its chief binding and 
coercive force is the emotion of moral disapproval that is felt generally in a certain 
group of people. As Morris Ginsberg (1982) puts it, Westermarck suggests that 
these emotions give rise to customary rules, ‘but having come to be established 
in a given community they are upheld by the tendency of their violation to arouse 
disapproval whether or not the act in itself, i.e., apart from its being condemned 
by custom, would arouse emotions in particular individuals’ (p. 9).
It was obvious for Westermarck that not all public habits are structured morally. 
In other words, ‘not every public habit is a custom, involving an obligation’. In 
all societies, we find habits that most people, in principle, condemn, but that are, 
after all, quite common. Such behaviours pass as allowed, or the disapproval they 
generate is not, at any rate, ‘very deep or genuine’ (ODMI, p. 159). On the other 
hand, when social habits become regulated and sanctioned by custom, some in 
addition by law, they are transformed into what Westermarck understood as social 
institutions. The core of Westermarck’s theory of moral norms is that the emotion 
of moral disapproval cannot be excluded from the analysis of this process of insti-
tutionalisation. This particular emotion ‘is at the bottom of the rules of custom and 
of all duties and rights’ (HHM I, p. 71).
13 See also ODMI, p. 121; ODMI II, p. 185. Research on incest avoidance is increasingly proceed-
ing towards the origin of the incest taboo through the analysis of third-party attitudes (Lieber-
man, Tooby, and Cosmides, 2003; Fessler & Navarrete, 2004; Antfolk et al., 2012). Despite the 
vibrant discussion and scholarship on these issues, Westermarck’s more wide-ranging perspective 
on human disgust is poorly known. In his view, attitudes relating to sexuality and especially homo-
sexuality have traditionally been shaped by emotional aversion (Westermarck, 1936b, p. 239; 
ODMI II, pp. 483–484). The same applies to various prohibitions concerning food (ODMI II, 
pp. 324–326, 332), the basic standards of personal cleanliness (ODMI II, pp. 346, 351–352) and 
attitudes towards bestiality and cannibalism (ODMI II, pp. 576–577, 580; Westermarck, 1917, 
p. 749).
14 LSE Archives: Lake Barnett (1911) (Notebook: Social institutions – Professor Westermarck, Sum-
mer Term 1911), p. 2; Lake Barnett (1911) (Social rights and duties), pp. 1–3; Mitrany (1916) 
(Social institutions – Westermarck), p. 3.
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In his lectures Westermarck (1912) emphasises that ‘the influence of custom 
is especially strong in less developed societies, where the public opinion is more 
uniform, and emotions and beliefs are more homogenous’ (p. 4). In primitive soci-
eties, customs are ‘the only moral rules ever thought of’ and the ‘opinions of the 
many are the opinions of all’ (ODMI, pp. 119–120, 161). On the other hand, the 
binding force of custom is lessened by the ‘progress in culture’ and ‘advancement 
in civilisation’. This in turn enables the ‘differentiation of moral ideas’ (ODMI, 
pp. 122, 161). There is certain ambiguity in Westermarck’s position on the extent 
to which customary practices determine ‘primitive’ morality. On the one hand, 
he writes that the ‘savage strictly complies with the Hegelian command that no 
man must have a private conscience’ (ODMI, pp. 119–120; ER, pp. 109–110). 
Similarly, as an illustrative example of primitive human condition, he cites the 
following: ‘Solitary individuals amongst them rarely adopt any new opinions, or 
any new course of procedure. They follow the multitude to do evil, and they fol-
low the multitude to do good. They think in herds’ (ODMI, p. 119).
At the same time, Westermarck criticises Durkheim and his disciples for over-
rating the ‘homogeneity of the group-mind’. In his view, it is essential to keep 
in mind that even among ‘savages’, ‘the homogeneity of thoughts and actions 
inside society is not absolute’. To support his argument on primitive individuality, 
Westermarck points to ethnographic research conducted by his students among 
the native peoples of Siberia and Kiwai Papuans of New Guinea in the 1910s. 
Even in such conditions, there existed considerable individuality in actions and 
beliefs, and ‘it is hardly possible to distinguish in every case between practices 
and beliefs which are general and such as are individual’ (HHM I, pp. 18–19).15 
The same even applies to religious conceptions, which Durkheim regarded as an 
‘essentially collective phenomenon’ (Westermarck, 1932b, p. 167). Westermarck 
concludes that because anthropologists have failed to distinguish between ideas 
and beliefs that are general and those that are individual, social scientists ‘must 
be warned against making too liberal a use of the term “collective ideas”, or that 
favourite expression of the French sociologists, “representations collectives” ’ 
(HHM I, pp. 18–19).
The emotional basis of moral judgements
It is sometimes argued that Westermarck’s approach to morality ignores the role 
of reflective processes and the interplay between emotional experiences and cog-
nitive factors (Joas, 2005; Hodgson, 2012). However, while arguing that moral 
judgements are based on moral emotions, he emphasises that these emotions 
15 Westermarck refers here to Finnish ethnologist Kai Donner’s (1915) fieldwork in Siberia and 
the anthropologist-sociologist Gunnar Landtman’s (1927, 1931) ethnography among the Kiwai 
Papuans. Also in dealing with Durkheimian sociology in his private correspondence, Westermarck 
invokes to Landtman’s findings on religion as an indication of ‘how careful one must be when 
assessing collective ideas among primitive people’ (Westermarck (2011), letter to Rolf Lagerborg 
March 5, 1932; Lagerborg, 1951, p. 428).
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depend substantially on cognitive processes such as the interpretation of situa-
tions, the level of reflection, and differences in knowledge and beliefs. In this 
sense, moral emotions have a ‘cognitive basis’ (ER, p. 60). Cognitions, or ‘sensa-
tions or ideas’, modify the moral emotions and, by implication, moral judgements 
in various ways. First, all retributive emotions, like all more complex emotions, 
‘are determined by cognitions’. Consequently, these emotions ‘vary according as 
the cognitions vary, and the nature of a cognition may very largely depend upon 
reflection or insight’. This shows that our indignation with a person who tells an 
untruth may die away when we discover that his or her motive was benevolent. 
Similarly, we feel anger when someone hurts us, but our anger subsides when we 
realise that what happened was an accident. ‘The change of cognitions, or ideas, 
has thus produced a change of emotions’ (ODMI II, p. 744; also ER, p. 147).16 
Second, different behaviours and human qualities may generate moral indignation 
due to religious or magical beliefs that are connected with them, and these emo-
tions may change when those beliefs change or disappear (ODMI II, pp. 744–746; 
ER, p. 187). Third, an increase in knowledge may affect moral emotions by pro-
viding people with a better understanding of psychological facts. This underlies, 
for example, the changes in moral evaluation concerning acts performed by per-
sons with mental illnesses (ODMI, pp. 269–277, 298–299, 316; ER, pp. 168–170).
In contrast to the pure emotivism of Westermarck’s early moral theory dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, his mature position does not identify moral judge-
ments with emotional expressions. He stresses that ‘[t]he theory of the emotional 
origin of moral judgements I am here advocating does not imply that such a judg-
ment affirms the existence of a moral emotion in the mind of the person who utters 
it’ (ER, p. 114; see also ODMI, p. 4). It is of course true that people very often 
express moral judgements because some things arouse approval or disapproval in 
them. But equally, for Westermarck, moral judgements are often uttered ‘without 
feeling any emotion at all’ (ER, p. 114), or at least that emotions are involved to 
a very limited extent, insofar as completely nonemotional mental states can exist 
at all.
Another important aspect of Westermarck’s position is that he does not claim 
that moral judgements can in every individual case be directly traced to the retrib-
utive moral emotions. It is rather that many different emotions may lead people 
into making moral evaluations (ER, p. 62). Instead, Westermarck (1900) makes a 
more wide-ranging and general point, namely, that ‘without such emotions there 
would have been no moral predicates at all’ (p. 184). Strictly speaking, we are 
dealing with the emotional basis of moral concepts human beings use when mak-
ing moral judgements. The question Westermarck regarded essential for ethical 
inquiry was ‘whether there are any specific emotions that have led to the formation 
of the concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, and all other moral concepts, 
and therefore may be appropriately named moral emotions’ (ER, p. 62, emphasis 
added). The relationship between moral concepts and moral emotions was close 
16 See also ODMI, pp. 10, 319, 321–322; ER, pp. xvii, 59, 147, 180–181, 187, 216.
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to Westermarck’s heart, as is evident from the fact that he devoted individual 
chapters to the subject in the Moral Ideas and Ethical Relativity and again sum-
marised his conclusions in Christianity and Morals. This was necessary because 
the topic ‘has been much neglected by the moralists of the emotional school, 
although it is evidently a matter of paramount importance’ (ER, pp. 117–118).
What Westermarck suggests is that, when we look at how, and under what cir-
cumstances, people use certain concepts when discussing moral issues, it comes 
out that the notions of ‘bad’, ‘vice’, ‘wrong’, ‘ought’, ‘duty’, ‘right’, ‘rights’, 
‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ are ultimately rooted in moral disapproval, whereas the 
notions of ‘good’, ‘virtue’ and ‘merit’ are rooted in moral approval. Bear in mind 
Westermarck’s step back from simple emotivism. He does sometimes
speak of moral concepts as ‘direct expressions’ of emotions, but more often 
he puts the relationship between a moral concept and an emotion back a 
stage: such concepts can be ‘traced back to’, are ‘ultimately based on’ emo-
tions; emotions are ‘at the bottom’ of the moral concepts.
(Stroup, 1981, pp. 220–221)
Westermarck restricts his analysis to the principal terms used in English, which, 
however, have equivalents in other European languages as well. He openly leaves 
others to decide to what extent these concepts have equivalents in other languages. 
In any case, that all people ‘have moral emotions is as certain as that they have 
customs, and there can be no doubt that they give expression to those emotions in 
their speech’ (ODMI, p. 131; ER, p. 118).
Many philosophers during the twentieth century have read Westermarck as 
aiming to offer an analysis of the meaning and logical relations of moral concepts. 
However, this kind of interpretation tends to distort the nature of Westermarck’s 
approach (Stroup, 1981; Salmela, 2003). Instead of analysing moral concepts 
from the logical and semantic perspective of analytical philosophy, Westermarck 
aimed at providing a genetic account of how these terms arise and come to be 
used (Stroup, 1981, p. 225). In the Moral Ideas, Westermarck even emphasises his 
analysis of moral concepts as crucial to the validity of his whole theory of moral 
emotions:
We have assumed that the moral concepts are essentially generalisations of 
tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions. We have fur-
ther assumed that there are two kinds of moral emotions: indignation and 
approval. If these assumptions hold good, either indignation or approval 
must be at the bottom of every moral concept.
(ODMI, p. 131, emphasis added)
He was aware that, when we speak of human actions and characteristics in 
moral terms, we are not usually discussing our emotions but qualities we attribute 
to acts and persons. However, for Westermarck, the moral concepts we use when 
passing moral judgements are essentially ‘generalizations of tendencies to feel 
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moral emotions’ (ER, p. 91). Ultimately, Westermarck sought to demonstrate that 
human beings formulate and use moral concepts in a fairly uniform way. These 
concepts refer to phenomena – typically actions and character traits – that have a 
tendency to arouse moral emotions. We are used to calling certain classes of acts 
good or bad ‘because they have evoked moral approval or disapproval in our-
selves or in other persons from whom we have learned the use of those words’. 
People learn the meaning and scope of these concepts easily, since many of the 
moral labels attached to certain modes of conduct are learned with the language 
itself. Finally, when the use of these concepts is learned, they can be brought into 
play without experiencing the particular emotions of moral approval and disap-
proval (ER, pp. 114–116).
Whatever one thinks of the details of Westermarck’s account of moral concepts, 
it seems indisputable that the ways in which people use and apply these concepts 
reveal traces of their emotional origin. However, as Stroup (1982a) emphasises, 
when Westermarck discusses the relationship of moral concepts and judgements 
to moral emotions, he often uses the word ‘ultimately’ to underline the indirect-
ness of the relation, ‘and the word cannot be stressed enough’. Moral concepts are 
generalisations of our tendencies to feel moral emotions, but generalisations that 
comprise a mixture of emotions, cognitive elements and objectification (pp. 195–
196). The psychological phenomenon of objectification, being one of the centre-
pieces of Westermarck’s ethics, warrants a brief review.
Objectification of emotions
For Westermarck, objectification refers to a typical feature of moral judgements. 
It is also a crucial factor underlying the disinterested, impartial and public nature 
of moral emotions. By objectification, Westermarck means the human tendency 
to interpret one’s subjective experiences as external, objective facts (ODMI, p. 8; 
ER, p. 49). More specifically, it is a question of the tendency to interpret our emo-
tions as the qualities of objects and phenomena that give rise to them. This takes 
place by attributing seemingly self-evident moral qualities to acts and character 
traits that are the objects of moral judgements. Westermarck suggests that when 
we regard acts like theft, murder or deceit as wrong and immoral, we hold the 
wrongness as an intrinsic quality of these acts. However, in reality, the question 
is of the emotion of moral disapproval that the act arouses in us or to which we 
otherwise refer.
Although Westermarck argues that the ‘tendency to assign objectivity to our 
subjective experience’ is ‘particularly strong and persistent with regard to our 
moral experience’ (ER, p. 49), he does not confine the phenomenon of objectifica-
tion to the moral realm: ‘A similar translation of emotional states into terms of 
qualities assigned to external phenomena are found in many other cases: some-
thing is “fearful” because people fear it, “admirable” because people admire it’ 
(ER, p. 114). Moral emotions are comparable to sense perceptions, which are also 
attributed as the qualities of objects. People pronounce ‘certain acts to be good 
or bad on account of the emotions those acts aroused in their minds’, just as they 
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call ‘sunshine warm and ice cold on account of certain sensations which they 
experienced’ (ODMI, p. 4).
Besides isolating the process of objectification and recognising its importance 
for moral evaluation, Westermarck raises chief factors that strengthen its influ-
ence. Much of this has to do with the fact that, as John Mackie (1980) puts it in his 
study of Hume’s moral theory, ‘projection or objectification is not just a trick of 
individual psychology’ but rather a social phenomenon ‘in which the sentiments 
of each person both modify and reinforce those of others’ (p. 70). To understand 
the full breadth of Westermarck’s thesis of objectification, it is important to take 
both its individual psychological and social dimensions into account.
In the first place, according to Westermarck, people are inclined to assume 
that similar objects and events arouse similar impressions in the minds of others. 
Because of the substantial similarity of the human intellectual and emotional 
constitution, this assumption is often just about right – at least within a given 
moral community (ER, pp. 49–50; ODMI, p. 8). To quote Brand Blanshard’s 
(1961) excellent account of Westermarck’s argument, the tendency to objectivise 
our moral emotions when they are like those of others is similar to saying ‘when 
I report that snow is white, everybody else confirms it’, ‘when I say a rainbow 
is beautiful, everyone understands and agrees’, and ‘when I say that lying is 
wrong, everyone again understands and agrees’. We thus ‘assume that white-
ness, beauty, and wrongness are characters in the objects and are presenting 
themselves alike to all of us’. Moreover, the effect of objectifying is reinforced 
by the fact that ‘however widely communities may differ about moral issues, 
within the limits of a given community practically everyone does agree about 
them’ (p. 108).
Objectification is further strengthened by different authorities. Here, moral edu-
cation and socialisation carry a particular importance: ‘From our earliest child-
hood we are taught that certain acts are right and that others are wrong’ (ODMI, 
p. 14; ER, pp. 50–51). The most important factor in individual moral development 
‘is, all the time, the presence of other persons’, such as parents and other authori-
tative individuals in the child’s social environment (ER, p. 51). In upbringing and 
education, moral issues are emphasised ‘in a much higher degree than any other 
subjective facts’, and we are allowed to have our private aesthetic likes, ‘but we 
are not so readily allowed to have our private opinions about right and wrong’ 
(ODMI, p. 14). Second, besides the authority of particular persons, people are 
very susceptible to conforming to the authority of public opinion, custom and 
law. They all contribute to giving morality an objective appearance. Third, great 
moral and religious teachers in human history have played an important role in 
maintaining the belief in objective moral truths. Fourth, objectification is further 
supported by the belief in an all-powerful god through which general moral rules 
appear as the expressions of divine will. Finally, besides these external authori-
ties, there is also the influence of conscience, the internal sense of obligation, 
which gives moral experience felt authority (ER, p. 51; also ODMI, p. 14). As a 
result of these factors, people tend to see their moral beliefs as part of the natural 
and objective order of things, as something independent of their emotions. I will 
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return to objectification in Chapter 7 when discussing Westermarck’s relation to 
Hume.
The interplay between the individual and the social
The above remarks on the origin and nature of moral emotions, the different ways 
in which emotions are transmitted from one person to another, the habitual and 
emotional foundations of social customs and the objectification of emotions as an 
essentially social phenomenon, illuminate the essential role of social context in 
Westermarck’s thought. In order to better understand these main features of West-
ermarck’s theory of morality, it is useful to look more closely at his conception 
of the individual-society relationship and Emile Durkheim’s influential critique 
of his work.
As Timothy Stroup (1982a) puts it, the moral emotions are, for Westermarck, 
‘individual, in the sense that it is only individual people who feel such emotions’. 
At the same time, ‘they are social, because without the social context there would 
be no scope for moral emotions to develop’ and manifest themselves the way 
they do. Westermarck’s description of the ‘interplay between individual and soci-
ety provides an explanation of how private emotions become public morals’ and 
‘how internal feelings are objectified into standards for whole communities’. At 
the same time, he sought to demonstrate ‘how community standards then can in 
turn be determinative of individual feelings’ (p. 173). Moreover, our emotions 
of moral approval and disapproval exist in the first place because they are part 
of human social nature and evolved by natural selection to help our ancestors to 
survive as part of small-scale social communities.
The interaction and tension between the individual and social components of 
morality become visible in the process where customs and laws are subjected to 
pressure for change when they no longer, for a sufficient number of people, reflect 
their moral conceptions. Moral standards may change when ‘individuals’ or moral 
‘rebels’ begin criticising ‘the moral ideas prevalent in the community [. . .] on 
the basis of their own individual feelings’ (ODMI, pp. 20, 122, emphasis added). 
This occurs inevitably because moral emotions, like all human emotions, ‘vary in 
intensity almost indefinitely’. In consequence, ‘it may be fairly doubted whether 
the same mode of conduct ever arouses exactly the same degree of indignation 
or approval in any two individuals’ (ODMI, p. 13; ER, p. 218). The various cog-
nitive factors influencing moral judgements add to this fact. Importantly, these 
individual emotions gain their force and felt authority from the fact that they pos-
sess the same characteristics of disinterestedness, impartiality and generality – in 
other words, ‘[t]he emotions from which their opposition against public opinion 
springs may be, in nature, exactly similar to the approval or disapproval felt by 
the society at large’ (ODMI, p. 122, emphasis added). Because customs and laws 
have ultimately an emotional basis, they also change in relation to moral emotions 
prevalent in society.
Emile Durkheim was Westermarck’s contemporary and main scientific rival. 
They followed each other’s work and dealt with similar topics, especially in 
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regard to morality, religion, marriage and family (Roos, 2008; Sanderson, 2012; 
Lagerspetz & Suolinna, 2017). In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim 
presents his famous argument that social phenomena, by which he means ways 
of acting, thinking and feeling that possess external coercive power over the indi-
vidual, have a very special nature. Social phenomena or ‘social facts’ constitute 
a distinct realm of reality that cannot be understood or explained in terms of psy-
chological or biological facts. By psychological explanations, Durkheim means 
above all explanations in terms of individual mental dispositions and characteris-
tics. Social phenomena could only be explained by other social facts (Durkheim, 
[1895] 1982).
In his lectures on moral education and his paper ‘The Determination of Moral 
Facts’, Durkheim applies these ideas to the problem of origin and nature of moral 
rules. In his view, morality is a social fact consisting of rules of action that people 
regard as authoritative and binding on the one hand, and as something to which 
they desire to adhere on the other. These elements of morality are the result of 
the self-transcending experiences of attachment to social groups and shared ideas 
and emotions (Durkheim, [1925] 1961, [1906] 1953). For Durkheim, violation of 
moral rules inevitably leads to ‘sanctions’ in the form of ‘blame or punishment’ 
inflicted by the social environment. He openly admits that ‘I do not as yet know 
the origin or explanation of this link’. There are also positive sanctions, and acts 
that conform to the rules of morality ‘are praised and those who accomplish them 
are honoured’ (Durkheim, [1906] 1953, pp. 42–44).17 Durkheim views social 
sanctions and associated emotional reactions as ‘synthetically’ related to various 
acts, which means that their occurrence requires the existence of a pre-existing 
rule. In addition, moral facts are socially determined so that ‘each society has in 
the main a morality suited to it’ and ‘all moral systems practised by peoples are 
a function of the social organization of these peoples, are bound to their social 
structures and vary with them’ (Durkheim, [1906] 1953, pp. 43, 56).18
Durkheim reviewed the first volume of the Moral Ideas immediately after its 
publication in L’Année sociologique. His main criticism was that, according to 
Westermarck, the sources of morality are ‘essentially a very simple matter, con-
sisting merely of very general sentiments that anyone can discover in himself 
through introspection’. For Westermarck, ‘there is no such thing as qualitatively 
different types of morality, in harmony with equally different social milieux’. 
Instead, according to Westermarck, ‘there is one single morality, engraved upon 
the congenital nature of man’ (Durkheim, [1907] 1979, pp. 43, 50). Durkheim was 
17 Westermarck would have considered the latter interpretation as fundamentally flawed, since peo-
ple are never praised and honoured merely because they conform to moral rules by refraining from 
doing things that are forbidden. Instead, according to Westermarck, we feel moral approval and 
hold people as praiseworthy when they act according to a generally acknowledged moral principle 
in a situation where most people would probably have acted otherwise.
18 For further discussion of Durkheim’s sociology of morality, see Lukes (1973); Hall (1987); Isam-
bert (1993). Schmaus (2010) provides a detailed account of the relationship between psychology 
and sociology in Durkheim’s oeuvre.
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opposed to such an approach for two reasons. First, he argues in his review of 
Westermarck’s History of Human Marriage that psychological dispositions such 
as emotions, sentiments, or instincts are too simple and general to account for 
the enormous diversity of human social arrangements (Durkheim, 1895, p. 609). 
I will return to this topic in the next two chapters. Second, it is not uncommon 
that allegedly universal psychological characteristics ‘are either entirely absent 
in certain social conditions’, or else they ‘result from collective organization, far 
from being its basis’ (Durkheim, [1895] 1982, pp. 131–132). The fundamental 
difference between these two early sociologists is summed up by Paul Fauconnet, 
one of Durkheim’s closest disciples and collaborators. He concludes his review of 
the Moral Ideas by emphasising that moral standards and rules cannot originate 
in the kind of emotional tendencies Westermarck was talking about because his-
tory shows that ‘human nature is largely unknown, and this is especially because 
human nature is mostly of social origin and can only be understood when we see 
it as something social’ (Fauconnet, 1910, p. 276).
Echoing Durkheim, many sociologists and anthropologists have assumed 
that Westermarck was trying to explain social and moral phenomena in terms 
of individual psychology without paying attention to various social causes and 
influences. A case in point is provided by Erik Allardt, one of the leading Nordic 
sociologists in the latter part of the twentieth century. In his view, Westermarck’s 
explanations are ‘based on a Darwinistic individual psychology’ (Allardt, 2004, 
p. 232) and he ‘interpreted all beliefs and actions as originating in the individ-
ual conscience’ (Allardt, 2000, p. 304). Thus, Westermarck’s reasoning ‘was not 
far from the marginal economists who constructed their view of society on how 
individuals choose between different options’ (Allardt, 1997, p. 29). Similarly, a 
widely read book on the history of Finnish sociology claims that Westermarck’s 
psychological and biological approach neglects the importance of social sanctions 
(Haavio-Mannila, 1973, p. 61). In reality, rewards and punishments that emerge 
spontaneously in the interaction of individuals with certain psychological make-
ups are at the very core of Westermarck’s theory of morality.
Like Durkheim, Westermarck recognises the binding and coercive character 
of morality in many ways. Similarly, his analysis of social reality as structured 
by customs as supra-individual rules of conduct, supported by collective moral 
disapproval, actually comes close to Durkheim’s understanding of social facts 
(Pipping, 1984, p. 323). However, Westermarck’s sociology of morality is char-
acterised above all by the effort to go beyond analysing moral standards and rules 
at the social or collective level, to highlight their sociopsychological and psy-
chological constituents, and to trace the emotional origins all the way back to 
animal behaviour and, further, to elementary behavioural patterns common to the 
widest possible range of living organisms.19 In addition, Westermarck’s approach 
19 Finnish philosopher Rolf Lagerborg, one of Westermarck’s closest friends, notes that Westermarck 
saw his moral theory as providing a deeper and broader analysis of morality than Durkheim’s 
sociology could offer (Lagerborg, 1951, pp. 185–187). Lagerborg was himself a Durkheimian and 
Westermarck’s mature account of morality 61
is broader than Durkheim’s because he does not link the expressions and man-
ifestations of moral emotions solely with moral rules. While emphasising that 
morally relevant customs regulate social life in all human societies, Westermarck 
argues that the processes of modernisation have loosened the traditional connec-
tion between customs and morality so that moral emotions are frequently evoked 
by behaviours that have nothing do to with moral rules or customs.
From Westermarck’s point of view, Durkheim and his followers had not paid 
enough attention to the fact that ‘all the different ethnic groups belong to the same 
animal species and therefore must present resemblances which have a deeper 
foundation than all differences which are the effects of the social environment’. 
At the same time, even the social environment itself cannot be fully understood 
‘without taking into account the mental characteristics of the human species’ 
(HHM I, pp. 17–18). For Westermarck, one of these fundamental psychological 
characteristics of major sociological relevance is our capacity to share the feelings 
and emotions of others. Sympathy as a key element of Westermarck’s moral and 
social theory warrants further investigation.
defended his doctoral thesis on the social nature of moral facts in Paris in 1903 with Durkheim as 
a member of the jury. See Lagerborg (1953) for his account of the rivalry between Westermarck 
and Durkheim.
In the previous chapter, we saw how Westermarck uses sympathy to explain the 
origin and nature of moral emotions. This chapter focuses on the role of sympathy 
in two other central topics in Westermarck’s writings, the evolution of affilia-
tive social behaviour and the circle of persons to whom moral rules are applied. 
I begin by showing how sympathy serves as the cornerstone of Westermarck’s 
theory of family and kin relationships as the evolutionary origin of human social 
and emotional bonds. The section also explores Durkheim’s critique of Wester-
marck’s History of Human Marriage. Next, I reconstruct Westermarck’s argument 
on the expansion of sympathetic emotions beyond close kin, which is linked to 
his view of society as the ‘birthplace’ of moral emotions discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. I conclude by examining Westermarck’s key thesis that the range 
of sympathy determines the circle of persons on whose behalf we feel moral 
disapproval – in other words, the limits of moral community.
Sympathy and the theory of family
Like retributive emotions, Westermarck views sympathetic emotions as qualities 
humans have inherited from our primate ancestors and share with many other 
species. According to Westermarck, there is ample evidence that sympathy plays 
a major and constitutive role in animal sociality and cooperation. Among social 
animals, ‘sympathetic resentment is felt towards the enemy of any member of 
the group’, and mutual defence against predators ‘undoubtedly involves some 
degree of sympathetic anger’ (ODMI, p. 112). Like humans, group-dwelling ani-
mals ‘defend each other, help each other in distress and danger; perform various 
services for each other’ (ODMI II, p. 197). He also raises anecdotal cases where 
sympathetic reactions occur between animals belonging to different species. ‘In 
all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments in some form or other’, 
Westermarck explains, ‘we may be sure to find sympathetic resentment as their 
accompaniment’ (ODMI, pp. 111–112; also ER, pp. 98–100).1
1 It is today well known that affective or emotional empathy, which is equivalent to the kind of emo-
tional sharing discussed by Westermarck, is widespread among social animals (Preston & de Waal, 
2002; de Waal, 2008).
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Evolutionary roots and expansion
Sympathy in Westermarck’s sociology (I) 63
Westermarck links the most primordial form of sympathy to maternal care. His 
view of the evolutionary origin of sympathy comes very close to the argument 
of contemporary biologists that ‘the selection pressure to evolve rapid emotional 
connectedness likely started in the context of parental care long before our species 
evolved’ (de Waal, 2008, p. 282). In a chapter entitled ‘The Origin and Develop-
ment of the Altruistic Sentiment’, Westermarck describes maternal affection as the 
‘form of the altruistic sentiment which man shares with all mammals and many 
other animals’ (ODMI II, p. 186). The characteristic manifestations of maternal 
sentiment include a mammalian female that ‘is as hostile to the enemy of her 
young as to her own enemy’ (ODMI, p. 112; ER, p. 98). Secondly, in some spe-
cies sympathy occurs also in connection with paternal attachment which prompts 
the male to participate in the protection and care of the offspring. Thirdly, and 
closely related to this, in some species natural selection has favoured attachment 
and sympathy ‘between individuals of different sex, which [induce] male and 
female to remain with one another beyond the mere act of propagation till after 
the birth of the offspring’ (ODMI II, pp. 189–191). This is what Westermarck calls 
marriage ‘in the natural history sense of the term’ (HHM, pp. 6, 19–20; ODMI II, 
pp. 191, 364).
Because in humans the number of offspring is comparatively small and, on the 
other hand, the period of infancy and the need for nurture is long, Westermarck 
suggests that ‘[p]aternal affection and the instinct which causes male and female 
to form somewhat durable alliances, are [. . .] useful mental dispositions, which, 
in all probability, have been acquired through the survival of the fittest’ (HHM, 
pp. 20–21). The evolutionary rationale behind paternal affection and monoga-
mous attachment is that in such circumstances, offspring have better chances to 
survive and reproduce than they would have if the protection and nurture would 
be left solely to the mother (HHM, pp. 20–21; ODMI II, pp. 190–191; HHM 
I, pp. 35–38, 53–54). Thus, for Westermarck, the pair bond has been a fitness-
enhancing mechanism, because parental investment is inversely associated with 
infant mortality (van den Berghe, 1979, pp. 30–31).2
Besides these basic emotional dispositions associated with parenting, Wester-
marck observes that sympathetic emotions also occur beyond parenthood. Recog-
nising the role of grandparenting in the human family formation, he suggests that 
the ‘same stimuli as call forth kindly emotions towards a person’s own children 
evoke similar emotions towards his grand- and great-grandchildren’ (ODMI II, 
p. 193). Sympathy also manifests itself through children’s affection for their par-
ents. Besides generational relationships, ‘we find among all existing races of men 
altruism of the fraternal type, binding together children of the same parents [and] 
relatives more remotely allied’ (ODMI II, pp. 194–195). These emotions provide 
the basis for Westermarck’s theory of human family formation.
2 In Mothers and Others. The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding, Sarah Hrdy (2009) 
extends the parental care-model by emphasising the crucial role of cooperative parenting, or the 
so-called alloparents, in the evolution of emotional empathy.
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According to Westermarck, ‘family, consisting of parents, children, and often 
also their next descendants, is a universal institution among existing peoples’. It 
is also probable that ‘among our earliest human ancestors, the family formed, if 
not the society itself, at least the nucleus of it’ (HHM, pp. 14, 42). Westermarck 
assumed that our early human ancestors lived mainly in small family groups 
rather than larger communities. This speculative view was partly based on the 
very limited information that was available at the time about primate social life. 
Being under the impression that the primates most closely related to humans live 
in small families, he inferred that this probably applied also to early humans that 
descended from a common ancestor with these primates (ODMI II, pp. 189–190, 
195; HHM, pp. 14–15; HHM I, pp. 36–37, 53–54, 68–69). Even when early 
humans started forming larger social groups composed of several families, altru-
istic interactions between close kin continued to stand out from the wider webs of 
social relations. Westermarck was convinced that there never ‘was a time when 
the family was quite absorbed in the tribe’, and related to this, ‘[e]verywhere we 
find the tribes or clans composed of several families, the members of each fam-
ily being more closely connected with one another than with the rest of the tribe’ 
(HHM, pp. 41–42, 50). As we saw above, Westermarck’s emotional theory of 
the family also recognises the spontaneous formation of various extended family 
arrangements.
Although Westermarck emphasises kinship and family formation as the basis 
of fundamental emotional and social bonds, his view stresses the interaction 
between biological, psychological and social influences. Emotional ties between 
kin develop through social proximity and interaction, and when kinship is ‘unsup-
ported by local proximity’, it ‘loses much of its social force’ (ODMI II, p. 202). 
One can even say that the integrative force of kinship ‘is ultimately derived from 
near relatives’ habit of living together’ (HHM I, p. 255), because extended close 
proximity and interaction give rise to feelings of solidarity regardless of biologi-
cal relatedness. This argument bears a kinship to Westermarck’s explanation of 
incest avoidance. And conversely: ‘If in modern society much less importance is 
attached to kinship than at earlier stages of civilisation, this is largely due to the 
fact that relatives, except the nearest, have little communication with each other’ 
(ODMI II, p. 204).
Criticism of Westermarck’s History of Human Marriage
Durkheim published a long review of The History of Human Marriage right after 
its French translation appeared in 1895. One of Durkheim’s main objections was 
that family and kin relationships display almost infinite historical and cultural 
variability, and consequently they cannot have the kind of emotional or instinc-
tual foundation Westermarck seemed to be suggesting. Durkheim also argues that 
Westermarck was unable to demonstrate that paternal attachment, monogamous 
affection and sexual jealousy – the key emotions shaping and maintaining mar-
riage in Westermarck’s naturalistic sense – would have existed in all social and 
cultural environments. Finally, for Durkheim, Westermarck’s whole theoretical 
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foundation was flawed, because ‘[t]o rest sociology on Darwinism is to establish 
it on a hypothesis, which is contrary to all good method’. Instead, according to 
Durkheim, marriage and kinship are essentially social and legal institutions, based 
on rules and sanctions, and can only be explained by other social facts (Durkheim, 
1895, pp. 608–615, 621–622). Westermarck responded to Durkheim only briefly 
in an article published in the Revue internationale de sociologie. ‘Durkheim criti-
cises me for having based my research on an unproven hypothesis’, he writes, 
and this ‘objection must sound strange to the ears of anyone who is even slightly 
aware of the immense progress that biology has made on the basis of Darwinism’ 
(Westermarck, 1897c, p. 452).
Like Durkheim, many later social scientists and historians have accused West-
ermarck of universalising and defending the conventional monogamous family 
(Jones, 1980; Coward, 1983; Hawkins, 1997: Lamanna, 2002; Leck, 2018). West-
ermarck (1934, pp. 333–334) forcefully denied accusations of moral and politi-
cal motivations, and he was also well aware of the prevalence and importance 
of extended family networks in preindustrial societies. Most of Westermarck’s 
commentators have neglected his extensive examination of various demographic, 
economic, social and psychological factors favouring the different forms of mar-
riage. Since the early 1900s, Westermarck distinguished more clearly between the 
natural-historical view of marriage and marriage as a ‘social institution’. In the 
latter sense, marriage is a ‘union regulated by custom or law’ (ODMI II, p. 364), 
or, according to his full definition, ‘a relation of one or more men to one or more 
women which is recognised by custom or law’, involving various rights and obli-
gations between the parties involved and between parents and children (HHM I, 
p. 26). The link between Westermarck’s theory of morality and theory of marriage 
shows that the wide variety of rules and customs regulating different marriage 
practices ‘are essentially expressions of moral feelings’ (ODMI II, p. 364). As 
we shall see in the next chapter, Westermarck also addressed the issue raised by 
Durkheim about why it is that conjugal relations are subjected to social and moral 
regulation in the first place.
Based on his historical and cross-cultural comparisons, Westermarck views 
monogamy and polygyny (marriage between one man and two or more women) 
as the most common forms of marriage. Monogamy is, according to Westermarck, 
the only form of marriage that is allowed in all known societies and that always 
occurs side by side with other forms of marriage. In countries and communi-
ties where polygyny is allowed, it is usually practiced only by some part of the 
population. Polyandry, marriage between one woman and multiple men, is a very 
rare arrangement, and is usually a response to exceptional demographic and eco-
nomic circumstances. Because small-scale hunter-gatherer societies are generally 
monogamous, Westermarck concluded, supported by his Darwinian reasoning, 
that some sort of pair bond constituted also the earliest form of human marriage. 
The first edition of The History of Human Marriage (1891) emphasises the preva-
lence of monogamous marriage significantly more than the expanded version of 
the book that appeared thirty years later. However, the treatment of the causes of 
monogamy and polygyny is very similar in these works.
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For Westermarck, key factors promoting monogamy are a balanced sex-ratio, 
economic and social equality, resource barriers to keep several wives and female 
jealousy. Monogamy is also supported by the fact that, especially in hunter- 
gatherer societies, ‘a married woman often occupies a respected and influential 
position, and the relations between man and wife may be of very tender character’ 
(HHM III, pp. 84–86, 89, 97–101). Finally, Westermarck did not regard falling in 
love with one person as a recent cultural construct, but as a species-typical human 
characteristic with deep biological foundation. And ‘when love implies sympathy 
and affection arising from mental qualities’, it ‘leads to a monogamy that is endur-
ing’ (HHM III, pp. 101–104).
The other main form of marriage, polygyny, is greatly influenced by an 
unbalanced sex-ratio in favour of women and the accumulation and unequal 
distribution of wealth. Wars have also played a role in enabling polygyny due 
to increased male mortality. According to Westermarck, all these phenomena 
are, to a large extent, consequences of the Neolithic revolution. When these 
enabling conditions exist, polygyny is, firstly, linked to certain psychologi-
cal factors. Popular religious beliefs encourage abstinence from sexual inter-
course during menstruation, pregnancy and, in varying degrees, after childbirth. 
Another cause is male attraction to ‘female youth and beauty’ and the decrease 
in sexual interest within long-term relationships (HHM III, pp. 52, 64–67, 70, 
74). Besides sexual motives, the practice of polygyny is closely related to eco-
nomic and social circumstances, since family members may serve as a work-
force and in many societies a large family increases men’s social status (HHM 
III, pp. 74–76, 80, 82). While these socioeconomic and psychological factors 
tend to promote polygyny, Westermarck argues that the processes of modernisa-
tion in ‘the higher forms of civilization’ correlate with the spread of monogamy. 
This is because religious reasons for refraining from sex at certain times have 
disappeared, a large family has lost its economic and social significance, and the 
inducements and necessities for women to consent to polygyny have diminished 
(HHM III, pp. 104–105).
Reciprocity and the evolution of moral emotions
Westermarck links the expansion of sympathy beyond small family groups to 
‘the formation of larger communities’ (ODMI II, p. 195) and to circumstances 
where ‘sociality, being an advantage to man, became his habit’ (ODMI, p. 113). 
Besides the forms of sympathy discussed above, humans have altruistic senti-
ment and sympathetic emotions ‘binding together [. . .] relatives more remotely 
allied, and, generally, members of the same social unit’ (ODMI II, pp. 194–
195). For Westermarck, the expanding circle of sympathy beyond close kin 
can be explained by Darwinian benefits, because ‘[l]iving together in larger 
groups men could resist the dangers of life and defend themselves much bet-
ter than when solitary’ (ODMI II, p. 196). This is not necessarily or even pri-
marily a matter of defending against other human groups, since Westermarck 
assumed that simple hunter-gatherer societies were (and are) usually relatively 
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peaceable.3 In Westermarck’s theory of the evolution of human society, the 
extension of small family groups may have taken place in two different ways. 
First, there is adhesion in which other families or individuals unite with the 
group from the outside. Second, there is a ‘natural growth’ which Westermarck 
regarded as the common mode of social expansion. Here, too, biological kinship 
plays a key role because ‘the children, instead of separating from their parents, 
may have remained with them and increased the group by forming new families 
themselves’ (ODMI II, pp. 195–196).
In evolutionary behavioural sciences, the basic explanatory mechanisms for the 
evolution of altruistic behaviour are the degree of genetic relatedness and different 
forms of reciprocity (Hamilton, 1964, 1996; Trivers, 1971, 2002, 2006; Alexan-
der, 1987).4 From this perspective, it is noteworthy that Westermarck emphasises 
biological kinship and reciprocity as the most important factors underlying the 
evolution and spread of sympathetic emotions. The importance of what we would 
now call reciprocal altruism is reflected in the fact that in larger social groups, 
‘the members of the group display a feeling of affection for each other – defend 
each other, help each other in distress and danger, perform various services for 
each other’ (ODMI II, p. 197, emphasis added). Cooperation based on reciproc-
ity is the underlying principle for more wide-ranging sympathy to arise, because 
‘[s]ocial affection presupposes reciprocity’. For Westermarck, ‘social affection is 
itself essentially retributive’, that is, ‘it is not only a friendly sentiment towards 
another individual, but towards an individual who is conceived of as a friend’ 
(ODMI, p. 94). Consequently, social affection and sympathetic emotions are ‘not 
only greatly increased by reciprocity of feeling, but could never have come into 
existence without such reciprocity’ (ODMI II, p. 198). These emotional tenden-
cies bind individuals into society, and in small-scale societies, ‘all the members 
of the community are united with one another by common interests and common 
feelings’ (ODMI, p. 113).
Westermarck’s account of the evolution of sympathy in larger groups is based 
on the view of natural selection operating at the level of individuals. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, he emphasises that retributive emotions have evolved through natural 
selection because they have a ‘tendency to promote the interests of the individuals 
3 See HHM, pp. 465–466, 505; ODMI II, pp. 389–390; ODMI, pp. 333–335; Westermarck (1913). 
Westermarck’s view of warfare in foraging societies was reinforced by a comparative study on the 
anthropology of war conducted by his Finnish disciple Rudolf Holsti. Holsti chose the topic and 
prepared his doctoral thesis The Relation of War to the Origin of the State (1913) under Wester-
marck’s guidance, employing the holdings of the British Library. As summarised by Joan Vincent 
(1990), ‘[f]ar from warfare being universal in simple societies, [Holsti] found a lack of indiscrimi-
nate slaughter, low death rates from war, the killing only of adult males directly involved in combat, 
institutionalized inviolability of go-betweens or messengers between potentially hostile groups, and 
the prevalence of peace making and treaty keeping’ (p. 91). Douglas Fry (2009) addresses contem-
porary anthropological debates on these issues.
4 For a comprehensive review of kin altruism and reciprocity models in the evolutionary research on 
human altruism and cooperation, see West, Griffin & Gardner (2007); West, El Mouden & Gardner 
(2011); Kappeler & van Schaik (2006); Kurzban, Burton-Chellew & West (2015).
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who feel them’ (ODMI, p. 108). Similarly, when discussing the evolution of sym-
pathetic emotions in larger social groups, Westermarck suggests that in ances-
tral environments, the members of the same community are characterised by ‘the 
solidarity of interests’. They have ‘enjoyments in common’, ‘the same enemies to 
resist, the same dangers to encounter, the same difficulties to overcome’ (ODMI 
II, p. 197). These conditions of close-knit social groups provide also the basis 
for the evolution of moral emotions. Because in such environments the interests 
of the individual and the group were largely harmonious, natural selection could 
favour disinterested and impartial retributive emotions which were felt generally 
in the community.
Westermarck clearly acknowledged the potential conflicts between the inter-
ests of the individual and the interests of the group. The possibility of conflict 
in all human affairs is already inherent in Westermarck’s theory of retributive 
emotions. However, for Westermarck, intergroup conflicts seldom arose in envi-
ronments where the moral emotions emerged, because ‘acts which are beneficial 
to the agent are at the same time beneficial to his companions, and the distinc-
tion between ego and alter loses much of its importance’ (ODMI II, p. 197). 
Also more generally, it was typical of Westermarck that in his analysis of human 
action he did not operate on the simplistic distinction between egoism and altru-
ism. Instead, he argues that ‘in the motives of actions it is impossible to draw any 
sharp limit between the interests of self and the interests of others’. Likewise, 
‘[i]t is a mistake to suppose that every act has but one motive’, and ‘just as the 
motives of an act, so also the effects of it tend to be both egoistic and altruistic’ 
(ER, pp. 26–27).
These views are reflected in Westermarck’s analysis of reciprocity in small-
scale societies. When we ‘look below the surface’, we see that people ‘may be 
induced to do good to their fellow-creatures not only by kindly feelings towards 
them, but by egoistic motives’ (ODMI, p. 560). Thus,
The Basutos say that ‘the knife that is lent does not return alone to its 
master’ – a kindness is never thrown away. Of the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe, 
Mr. Dorsey states that ‘nothing is given except with a view to a gift in return’. 
[. . .] In his description of the Greenlanders, Dr. Nansen observes that all the 
small communities depend for their existence on the law of mutual assis-
tance, on the principle of common suffering and common enjoyment. ‘A hard 
life has taught the Eskimo that even if he is a skillful hunter and can, as a rule, 
manage to hold his own well enough, there may come times when, without 
the help of his fellows, he would have to succumb. It is better, therefore, for 
him to help in his turn’. That similar considerations largely lie at the bot-
tom of the custom of mutual aid and charity both in uncivilised and more 
advanced communities, we may assume from the experience of human nature 
which we have acquired at home. And such motives must be particularly 
active in a society the members of which are so dependent on each other’s 
services and return-services.
(ODMI, p. 560, emphasis added and footnotes removed)
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In addition to kinship and reciprocity, Westermarck recognises that ‘the mem-
bers of the same social unit are tied to each other with various bonds of a distinctly 
human character’. These factors of social integration include ‘customs, laws, 
institutions, magic or religious ceremonies and beliefs, or notions of a common 
descent’ (ODMI II, p. 198). It is noteworthy that it is only after his account of kin-
ship, reciprocity, local proximity and ties formed by marriage that Westermarck 
adds that also ‘common worship may tie people together into social union’. How-
ever, because ‘a religious community generally coincides with a community of 
another kind’, he emphasises that it is ‘impossible exactly to distinguish the social 
influence of the common religion from that exercised by’ other integrating factors. 
In any case, for Westermarck anthropologists of the day had over-emphasised 
‘the importance of the religious bond, or at least of the totem bond’ (ODMI II, 
pp. 209–210). Westermarck did not marginalise the role of shared religious beliefs 
and sentiments for social integration, but they were not a primary component. 
This is yet another difference between Westermarck and Durkheim, whose last 
major work, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life ([1912] 1995), claims that 
totemistic beliefs and collective effervescence associated with religious rituals are 
the very foundation of primitive sociality.
The expanding circle of morality
One of the key features of Westermarck’s moral theory is that ‘the range of the 
moral emotions varies with the range of the altruistic sentiment’ (ER, p. 200; see 
also ODMI II, pp. 743–744). This means that the scope of sympathy defines the 
circle of people within which the infliction of injury is prohibited. This is reflected 
in the simple but crucial fact that acts against people or other living beings towards 
which one does not feel sympathy do not give rise to moral indignation. Due to 
this simple reason, the circle of moral concern has been historically restricted to 
the members of the same community:
Primitive peoples carefully distinguish between an act of homicide commit-
ted within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger: while 
the former is in ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most 
cases allowed. [. . .] And the same holds true of theft and lying and the inflic-
tion of other injuries. Apart from the privileges granted to guests, which are 
always of very short duration, a stranger is in early society devoid of all 
rights. And the same is the case not only among savages but among nations 
of archaic culture as well.
(ER, p. 197; also ODMI II, p. 743)
Following this logic, Westermarck suggests that ‘the expansion of the moral 
rules’ results from ‘the widening of the altruistic sentiment’. What lies behind 
this process, and the expansion of the ‘moral community’, is the growth in the 
size of social units and an ‘increased intercourse between different societies’ (ER, 
pp. 200, 202–203). As a result, we can see that ‘the nation has taken the place of 
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the tribe, and that the circle of persons within which the infliction of injuries is 
prohibited has extended accordingly’ (ODMI II, p. 743; ER, p. 197). Although 
Westermarck considered that there are innate individual differences in the human 
tendency to sympathise, he clearly believed that the scope of sympathy is largely 
determined by historical conditions and social learning; it is ‘acquired, not innate’ 
(Westermarck, 1897a, p. 123).
It is central to Westermarck’s overall argument that the expansion of sympa-
thy could be explained by biological evolution only to the level of small-scale 
hunter-gatherer societies. After this, the widening of sympathetic emotions does 
not arise from any kind of process of natural selection, but rather is a by-product 
of the expansion of the social units and the increasing peaceful social interac-
tions. In other words, once the psychological structures of emotionally modern 
humans were in existence, they could manifest themselves in wider contexts. In 
The Descent of Man, Darwin also addresses the issue of the widening of the circle 
of sympathy. It began with parent and child and moved outward from the family 
and close kin to the local community, the nation, and finally the whole of human-
kind and even to other species (White, 2013, p. 127). However, it is worth noting 
how radically different Westermarck’s theory is from Darwin’s. He differs from 
Darwin not only by rejecting group selection ideas, but also by discarding the role 
of reason in the process.
As noted in Chapter 2, Darwin believes that the origin and spread of moral 
qualities cannot be explained with natural selection operating at the level of indi-
viduals. This concerns especially emotional dispositions motivating altruistic 
behaviour, which give only ‘a slight or no advantage to each individual man and 
his children over the other men of the same tribe’. It is rather that the most sym-
pathetic and altruistic individuals who are willing to risk their lives on behalf of 
others would likely have fewer offspring than the selfish members of the group. 
However, for Darwin, this evolutionary puzzle could be solved if natural selec-
tion also takes place between groups or communities. Despite the individual 
costs, moral qualities would ‘certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe 
over the other’. Cooperative and altruistic groups ‘would be victorious over 
most other tribes; and this would be natural selection’. As human communities 
have always supplanted one another, ‘the social and moral qualities would tend 
slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the world’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, 
pp. 162–163, 166).5 In crucial respects, Darwin regards the expansion of sympa-
thy as a rational phenomenon. ‘As man advances in civilisation and small tribes 
are united into larger communities’, he concludes, ‘the simplest reason would tell 
each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all 
5 For a discussion on the role of community or group selection in Darwin’s account of morality, 
see Richards (1987, pp. 207–217; 2003); Ruse (1980, pp. 626–628); Borrello (2010, pp. 13–14). 
Darwin employed the idea of group selection originally in the Origin of Species when exploring the 
sterile castes of social insect colonies. In this connection, however, Darwin emphasised the biologi-
cal kinship of the community (Dugatkin, 2006).
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the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him’. After this, 
‘there is only an artificial barrier’, by which Darwin means suspicion towards dif-
ferent appearance and habits, ‘to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of 
all nations and races’ (Darwin, [1871] 1981, pp. 100–101, 103, emphasis added).
At the time of the Moral Ideas, Westermarck firmly believed in the continu-
ing expansion of human sympathies. He predicts that ‘the altruistic sentiment 
will continue to expand’, ‘those moral commandments which are based on it will 
undergo a corresponding expansion’ (ODMI II, p. 746) and ‘the notion of a human 
brotherhood will receive more support from the actual feelings of mankind than 
it does at present’ (ODMI II, p. 228). At the same time, despite the optimistic 
rhetoric, Westermarck emphasises that the ‘idea that one’s own people is the best 
is very deep-rooted in human nature’ (ER, p. 201; also ODMI II, pp. 170–174). 
Moreover, as people ‘generally are fond of that to which they are used or which is 
their own, they are also naturally apt to have likings for other individuals whose 
habits or ideas are similar to theirs’. Above all, the scope of sympathy is narrowed 
by social isolation, differences in appearance, language, habits and customs, as 
well as the human tendency towards suspicion and enmity (ODMI II, pp. 198, 
227–228). In the early 1930s, Westermarck writes that in-group favouritism mani-
fests itself especially in the attitudes towards war, national aggressiveness and 
patriotism (ER, p. 199).6
The same causes that narrow the sphere of sympathy-based moral disapproval 
between human communities also create intra-societal differences in its mani-
festation. For example, ‘[w]hen a social unit is composed of loosely connected 
sub-groups, the intercourse between members of different sub-groups resembles 
in many respects that between foreigners’. Similarly, in societies where class dis-
tinctions and conflicting interests are powerful, the different classes ‘have often 
little sympathy for each other’. This in turn leads to the deviating occurrences of 
moral emotions (ODMI II, p. 129). The fact that moral emotions are displayed 
asymmetrically in social hierarchy can be seen in that ‘persons belonging to a 
higher class are naturally apt to sympathise more with their equals than with their 
inferiors’. As a result, they show more indignation when their peer suffers injury 
than when a similar injury is inflicted on someone perceived as inferior. However, 
Westermarck believes that in a ‘progressive society’, ‘different classes gradually 
draw nearer to each other. The once all-powerful class loses much of its exclu-
siveness, as well as of its importance and influence. Sympathy expands’ (ODMI, 
p. 433).
6 Westermarck discusses patriotism in ODMI II, pp. 166–185.
One of the main questions in Westermarck’s ethics concerns the emotional foun-
dations of moral norms. His treatment of the topic is based on two main pillars: 
sympathy and emotional aversion. This chapter continues to examine the role of 
sympathy in Westermarck’s moral and social theory by looking at his account 
of the relationship between sympathy and certain fundamental moral rules that 
he interpreted as human universals. We have seen in the two previous chapters 
how Westermarck outlined a theory on the evolutionary origin of moral emotions. 
The present chapter shows how, according to Westermarck, these emotions play a 
vital role both in the process of formation of moral norms and in how these social 
institutions are upheld.
Recent commentators have argued that Westermarck failed to address this key 
question. Lagerspetz (2013) notes that although ‘Westermarck believes that moral 
emotions give rise to mores and customs’, ‘he is not very specific about the process 
or about the role of society in it’ (p. 920). According to Kronqvist (2014), West-
ermarck does not present a theory of ‘how expressed approval or disapproval are 
turned into customs that then take the shape of moral commandments’ (p. 132). 
We discussed some aspects of these issues in Chapter 3 when considering Wester-
marck’s views on social customs and the relationship between the individual and 
the social. In order to clarify this topic further, this chapter continues to explore 
the role of society in Westermarck’s thought. I begin by locating and analysing the 
basic components of Westermarck’s theory of moral norms. I then illustrate West-
ermarck’s account through his analysis of moral attitudes to the treatment of other 
people, actions affecting primarily the agent’s own well-being and human behav-
iour towards the dead and gods. Finally, I discuss Westermarck’s examination of the 
main underlying causes of variations in moral practices across cultures.
The structure of Westermarck’s theory of sympathy and 
moral norms
The gist of Westermarck’s position is that sympathetic emotions that arise via 
bodily, situational and verbal cues are the main source of fundamental moral 
norms and rules structuring and regulating interactions between human beings. 
Simply put, there are many forms of action that cause us to feel hostile towards the 
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agent even though we personally are not objects of those acts. They evoke moral 
disapproval because we vicariously experience negative feelings when observ-
ing such interactions between others. These emotional responses are crucial for 
Westermarck’s explanation of the emergence and maintenance of moral norms.
In the Moral Ideas, Westermarck discusses several rules of conduct whose 
existence he traces specifically and primarily to the human capacity for sympathy. 
It should be stressed that in all these instances, he provides various supplementary 
explanations as well. However, since my intention is to demonstrate the crucial 
role sympathy plays in Westermarck’s thought, I shall not examine these other 
factors here. Because the range of sympathy defines the limits of moral com-
munity, there has been great variation in the circle of people to whom these rules 
are applied. He was also well aware that similar moral rules may vary in their 
specific cultural-contextual details. However, according to Westermarck, there are 
no societies known in which the following classes of acts do not arouse moral 
disapproval: homicide and infliction of physical harm and injury; theft; offences 
against honour and reputation; impoliteness; lying and cheating; failure to recip-
rocate altruistic action in a social relationship where this is expected; the neglect 
of basic parental duties and self-neglect and self-harm. In addition, sympathy is 
involved in influencing the rules concerning the treatment of the dead and prac-
tices regulating human behaviour towards gods. No matter how deficient West-
ermarck’s ethnological data may be, his findings are very much in line with later 
anthropological comparisons. As summed up by Christopher Boehm (2012),
even though certain types of moral beliefs can vary considerably (and some-
times dramatically) between cultures, all human groups frown on, make 
pronouncements against, and punish the following: murder, undue use of 
authority, cheating that harms group cooperation, major lying, theft and 
socially disruptive sexual behavior.
(p. 34)1
Westermarck’s understanding of the foundations of moral norms is based on 
the analysis of two kinds of emotional responses. In the first place, the recipient 
of certain forms of action responds with painful feelings and disapproval towards 
the agent. In many cases Westermarck outlines both proximate psychological 
causes and ultimate evolutionary reasons for these reactions. However, the fact 
that the object of an act reacts in a certain way is not enough for moral norms to 
develop. To this, one must add what could be called the audience effect – other 
people who observe or hear about the action must sympathise with the person 
wronged and feel indignation towards the offender. It is in this sense that West-
ermarck construes moral emotions as ‘public emotions’ which given behaviours 
have a tendency to arouse in a given community. In this way, society, in a very 
concrete sense of the term, is an inseparable part of Westermarck’s moral and 
1 For further discussion of human universals, see Brown (1991); Kappeler & Silk (2010).
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social theory, representing simply the continuous presence of other people as 
spectators of human actions and interactions. In addition to these building blocks, 
moral rules and norms are supported and reinforced by their habitual basis and 
the human tendency to disapprove of actions that deviate from established behav-
ioural expectations.
This account provides a deceptively simple and clear description of how cer-
tain basic moral rules originate and how they are continuously maintained by 
human emotions. It succeeds in shedding light on the psychological and social 
causes behind some of the most fundamental aspects of the social world that are 
well known to exist but seldom explicated by sociologists and anthropologists. 
These social regularities are ultimately rooted in the simple fact that, according 
to Westermarck, humans are inherently emotional and social beings whose inter-
actions have always, in one way or another, interested spectators. To illustrate 
Westermarck’s approach, let us now take a closer look at how his theory of the 
sympathy-based moral norms manifests itself in the Moral Ideas.
Killing and other forms of harming
Westermarck recognises that all human groups have prohibitions against harming 
other members of the same community. In his view, ‘it seems extremely probable 
that sympathetic resentment felt on account of the injury suffered by the victim has 
from the beginning been a potent cause of the condemnation of homicide’ (ODMI, 
p. 331, emphasis added). Because people equally sympathise with the bereaved, 
homicide is also condemned ‘as an injury inflicted upon the survivors. It deprived 
[the victim’s] friends of his company, his family and community of a useful mem-
ber’ (ODMI, pp. 372–373). Similarly, prohibitions against the infliction of bodily 
injuries stem from ‘the principle of sympathetic resentment’, especially because 
a violent ‘interference with another person’s body not only causes physical pain 
but commonly entails disgrace upon the sufferer’ (ODMI, p. 524). Westermarck 
postulates that the differences in degrees of sympathy have an effect also on the 
moral evaluation of feticide and infanticide: ‘Considering that the same degree of 
sympathy cannot be felt with regard to a child not yet born as with regard to an 
infant, it is not surprising to find that feticide is practiced without objection even 
by some peoples who never commit infanticide’ (ODMI, pp. 413–414).
Theft
In Westermarck’s interpretation, some notion of ownership is recognised in all 
known human societies. According to his definition, ‘[t]he right of property 
implies that a certain person or certain persons are recognized as having a right to 
the exclusive disposal of a certain thing’. This suggests not only that the owner ‘is 
allowed, at least within certain limits, to use or deal with it at his discretion, but 
also that other persons are forbidden to prevent him from using or dealing with it 
in any manner he is entitled to’ (ODMI II, p. 1). Westermarck’s argument begins 
with an outline of the evolutionary origins of possessive behaviours. In his view, 
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the psychological basis of ownership lies in the ‘desire in the owner to keep and 
dispose of what he has appropriated or produced’ and in the related tendency to 
resist its abstraction. Because of the survival value of such behaviours, the evolu-
tionary roots of appropriation run ‘deep not only in human but in animal nature’. 
Examples of possessive behaviours in animals include the defence of territory, 
nest site or prey. As a result of these tendencies, both in human and animals, ‘it is 
dangerous for an individual to try to seize anything held by another of about equal 
strength’ (ODMI II, p. 51).
In early human communities characterised as being economically egalitarian, 
these facts ‘naturally led to the habit of leaving each in possession of whatever he 
had attained’. After this social habit was established, it ‘was further strengthened 
by various circumstances, all of which tended to make interference with other 
persons’ possessions the subject of moral censure’. One of the key reasons for 
the emergence of respect of property as a moral norm is the manifestations of 
sympathetic retributive emotions. In other words, ‘[r]esentment is felt not only 
by him who is deprived of his possession, but by others on his behalf’. The social 
recognition of the claim to property becomes visible, not merely by the ‘fact that 
individuals are in actual possession of certain objects’, but also in ‘the public 
disapproval of acts by which they are deprived of such possession’. Even when 
codified as legal rights, these practices are essentially expressions of moral emo-
tions (ODMI II, pp. 1, 51–52).
Westermarck highlights six widely recognised means for acquiring property, 
each of which is supported by sympathetic emotions. First, one can acquire prop-
erty by taking possession of something that at the moment belongs to nobody. 
Second, one can acquire property by keeping possession of what one has occupied 
for a certain length of time. Third, one has generally a right to the products of 
one’s labour. This stems from the fact that ‘[n]ot only do exertions in producing 
an object make the producer desirous to keep it and to have the exclusive dis-
posal of it, but an encroachment upon the fruit of his labour arouses sympathetic 
resentment in outsiders, who feel that an effort deserves its reward’. Fourth, one 
can acquire property by transfer from a prior owner. This is possible because 
‘in ordinary circumstances, there would be no moral disapproval of a voluntary 
transfer of property to another person’. Fifth, one can acquire property by inherit-
ance. Finally, ownership in a thing may directly follow from ownership in another 
thing, for example, the owner of a cow is generally regarded as the owner of 
her calf, the owner of a tree as the owner of its fruits, and so forth (ODMI II, 
pp. 35–50, 52–53). Inheritance and the ownership following from ownership in 
another object are made possible by moral disapproval towards a person who 
attempts to deprive someone of these rights.
Offences against honour and reputation
According to Westermarck, the offensiveness of many behaviours stems from a 
natural human desire to be respected by others and dislike of being looked down 
upon. Such acts and omissions are, above all, associated with insults against 
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honour and good name (ODMI II, p. 137). Westermarck explains that a ‘person’s 
“self-feeling” may be violated in innumerable ways, by words and deeds’ (ODMI 
II, p. 146). Its violation is also ‘an extremely common and powerful incentive to 
resentment’. Indeed, ‘[n]othing more easily rouses in us anger and a desire for 
retaliation, nothing is more difficult to forgive, than an act which indicates con-
tempt, or disregard of our feelings’ (ODMI, pp. 38–39).
As a result of these tendencies, people are commonly obliged to recognise the 
‘honour’ of their fellows, defined by Westermarck ‘as the moral worth [a person] 
possesses in the eyes of the society of which he is a member’. Other people are 
supposed ‘to acknowledge this worth and, especially, not to detract from it by 
imputing him, on insufficient grounds, such behaviour as is generally considered 
degrading’. Moreover, the rules of conduct related to honour and reputation are 
‘contained in the more comprehensive duty of showing deference, in words and 
actions, for his feeling of self-regarding pride’ (ODMI II, pp. 137–138).
These desires and emotions give rise to rules and laws prohibiting offences 
against honour because ‘[l]ike other injuries, an insult not only affects the feel-
ings of the victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and is con-
sequently disapproved of as wrong’. All of this has much to do with the ‘rules of 
politeness and good manners’. Even though associated customary practices ‘vary 
indefinitely in detail’, Westermarck emphasises that ‘[t]here is no people on earth 
which does not recognize some rules of politeness’ (ODMI II, pp. 140, 146). It 
is noteworthy that in Westermarck’s interpretation politeness is not a virtue but a 
duty. This means that politeness, in this elementary sense of the term, is not some-
thing that is regarded praiseworthy but that the lack of it has a tendency to arouse 
moral disapproval both in the person concerned and his or her fellow humans 
(ODMI II, p. 146). Westermarck does not discuss the various subtle forms of 
politeness and good manners going beyond the obligatory – that is, the basic level 
of politeness expected from anyone in a given society in similar circumstances. 
However, for Westermarck, such social conventions are not emotionally charged 
moral customs or norms, because their breach or omission does not usually arouse 
moral disapproval.
Lying and cheating
Another social regularity recognised by Westermarck is that human social interac-
tion involves expectations regarding truthfulness in speech and action. In West-
ermarck’s definition, the regard for truth implies that ‘we ought to abstain from 
lying, that is, a willful representation of facts, by word or deed, with the intention 
of producing a false belief’. It is closely associated with keeping one’s promise, 
all of which ‘seem to be universally recognized, though the censure passed on 
the transgressor varies extremely in degree’ (ODMI II, p. 72). First, Westermarck 
presents an individual psychological explanation for the indignation elicited by 
falsehood and deception. ‘Curiosity, or the love of truth’ is ‘an ultimate fact in the 
human frame’, and we are not ‘injured by a deception merely because we like to 
know the truth, but, chiefly, because it is of much importance for us that we should 
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know it’. The evolutionary rationale for these psychological tendencies is that 
‘[o]ur conduct is based upon our ideas; hence the erroneous notion as regards 
some fact in the past, present, or future, which is produced by a lie or false prom-
ise, may lead to unforeseen events detrimental to our interests’. Again, as in pre-
vious instances, the primary source of moral norms concerning truthfulness is 
traced to the emotional reactions of a social environment. In other words, ‘he who 
tells a lie, or who breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another 
person. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment, and becomes an 
object of moral censure’ (ODMI II, pp. 109–110).
Reciprocity as a moral obligation
Westermarck distinguishes reciprocity as an elementary feature of human social-
ity. Besides being a universal practice based on our retributive emotions that seek 
punishment or reward, he analyses reciprocity as a moral norm that arises from, 
and is supported by, sympathy and moral emotions. ‘To requite a benefit, or to 
be grateful to him who bestows it’, he writes, ‘is probably everywhere, at least 
under certain circumstances, regarded as a duty’ (ODMI II, p. 155). The binding 
force of reciprocity originates in the fact that it is not only ‘practiced habitually’, 
but also ‘because a failure to afford it will call forth sympathetic resentment on 
behalf of the sufferer’ (ODMI, pp. 559–560). More specifically, ‘among beings 
capable of feeling moral emotions the general disposition to be kind to a benefac-
tor will inevitably lead to the notion that ungrateful behaviour is wrong’ (ODMI 
II, p. 166, emphasis added). To explain why this is so, Westermarck looks at the 
benefactor’s emotions on the one hand, and spectators’ two kinds of sympathetic 
reactions on the other. The first suggests that the lack of gratitude ‘is offensive to 
the benefactor’. This in turn ‘tends to evoke in the bystander sympathetic resent-
ment towards the offender’. In addition, the spectator’s moral disapproval ‘is 
much increased by the retributive kindliness which he is apt to feel, sympatheti-
cally, towards the benefactor’. The bystander wants to see the benefactor’s ‘kind-
ness rewarded; and he is shocked by the absence of a similar desire in the very 
person who may be naturally expected to feel it more strongly than anybody else’ 
(ODMI II, p. 166).
Parental care
As anthropologist Bernard Chapais (2008) points out, ‘Westermarck reasoned 
that behaviors that are naturally avoided – mating with a close kin, having sex 
with another species, or killing one’s father – should give rise to proscriptive 
rules against incest, bestiality, and parricide’. These behaviours arouse vicarious 
negative feelings when we imagine or observe such interactions between others. 
All this relates to parental care because Westermarck’s reasoning ‘applies equally 
well to social interactions which are naturally felt as positive’. The case in point is 
that altruistic interactions between close kin are accompanied with corresponding 
prescriptive rules (pp. 84–86).
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Customs associated with parental care serve in Westermarck’s writings as para-
digmatic examples of how ‘instincts give rise not only to habits but also to rules of 
custom, or institutions’. He explains that [s]ocial beings endowed with’ instincts 
and sentiments associated to pair bond and parental care ‘would feel moral resent-
ment against a man who forsakes the woman with whom he has conjugal inter-
course and the offspring resulting from it’ (HHM I, p. 71). In other words, because 
the great majority of people respond negatively to an abusive or neglectful father 
on the basis of their own evolved emotional dispositions, there spontaneously 
arise moral rules that condemn such actions and omissions.
The role of society and sympathy becomes more visible in Westermarck’s treat-
ment of the subject in the Moral Ideas: ‘If a man leaves his wife and children 
without protection and support, the other members of the community will sympa-
thise with them, and feel resentment towards the neglectful husband and father’. 
This person is viewed ‘as the cause of their suffering, because he omitted to do 
what other men in his position would have done’. Due to our basic emotional dis-
positions and capacity for sympathetic identification, this man’s ‘conduct will be 
repulsive to everyone who himself possess those sentiments of which he proves 
destitute’ (ODMI, p. 533, emphasis added).2 The same seems to apply to maternal 
care. As Chapais (2008) puts it,
maternal caretaking is a major interactional regularity throughout the pri-
mate order and well beyond it. Applying Westermarck’s argument, one 
would expect maternal caretaking to have given rise to normative rules of 
conduct – whether they are legally enforced or merely consensual – that pre-
scribe maternal care and to other rules that prohibit behaviors contravening 
the principle of maternal care (for example, rules about child abuse).
(p. 86)
Self-neglect and self-harm
In the cases where one person physically or psychologically harms another, the 
spectators’ sympathies are intuitively appealing and easy to understand, particu-
larly when considering the altruistic overtones of Westermarck’s conception of 
sympathy. But how does sympathy relate to attitudes towards self-injury? Another 
2 Westermarck’s theory of the social regulation of parental care is clearly indebted to Adam Smith’s 
account of close kin relationships. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith suggests that we gen-
erally expect that ‘a suitable degree of affection should take place among’ close relatives. Similarly, 
we are shocked by the lack of such affection. As a consequence, ‘[t]he general rule is established, 
that persons related to one another in a certain degree, ought always to be affected towards one 
another in a certain manner, and that there is always the highest impropriety, and sometimes even 
a sort of impiety, in their being affected in a different manner’. This shows that a ‘parent without 
parental tenderness, a child devoid of all filial reverence, appear monsters, the objects, not of hatred 
only, but of horror’ (TMS, p. 220). However, Westermarck disagreed with the details of Smith’s 
view on the origin of family affection (see ODMI, p. 111).
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universal feature of the human condition recognised by Westermarck is that 
humans have duties towards themselves. He discusses behaviours affecting prin-
cipally an agent’s own well-being under the heading of ‘self-regarding duties’. 
Westermarck’s analysis of duty as a social phenomenon suggests that a failure to 
do what is in a given society or social group regarded as one’s duty has a tendency 
to arouse moral disapproval in other people. An essential feature of self-regarding 
duties is that they are ‘similar in kind to those which [people] owe to their fellow-
creatures’ (ODMI II, p. 265). By and large,
They are not only forbidden to take their own lives, but are also in some 
measure considered to be under an obligation to support their existence, to 
take care of their bodies, to preserve a certain amount of personal freedom, 
not to waste their property, to exhibit self-respect, and, in general, to promote 
their own happiness.
(ODMI II, p. 265)
These moral obligations originate, in the first place, from the fact that ‘no 
mode of conduct is exclusively self-regarding’. No human individual ‘is an 
entirely isolated being, hence anything which immediately affects a person’s 
own welfare affects at the same, in some degree, the welfare of other indi-
viduals’. This implies that the negligence of self-regarding duties tends to 
elicit moral disapproval in others because they sympathise with those who are 
affected by the agent’s conduct. Secondly, sympathy influences the moral evalu-
ation of self-inflicted harm because the person is seen as if divided into two 
parts, as the agent and the object of action. Thus, ‘the injury committed may 
excite sympathetic resentment towards the agent, although the victim of it is his 
own self’ (ODMI II, p. 266, emphases added). Westermarck strongly emphasises 
the historical and cultural variation in attitudes towards suicide, but in his view, 
both of these forms of sympathy are intrinsically linked to the moral condemna-
tion of suicide (ODMI II, pp. 261–263).
At the same time, the social importance of these moral expectations is much 
lesser than other-regarding duties. Referring to the first form of sympathy dis-
cussed above, Westermarck argues that this is because the influence self-regarding 
duties ‘exercise upon other persons’ welfare is generally too remote to attract 
much attention’. Moreover, regarding the second form of sympathy, the ‘compas-
sion which we are apt to feel for the victim of an injury is naturally lessened by 
the fact that it is self-inflicted’ (ODMI II, pp. 265, 267).
Attitudes towards the dead and the treatment of gods
Sympathy also plays a key role in Westermarck’s examination of the relations 
between the living and the dead. His starting point is that ‘[t]here is a general 
tendency in the human mind to assume that what has existed still exists and will 
exist’. Death commonly involves beliefs about the disembodied soul having more 
or less ‘the same mental capacities as its owner possessed during his lifetime’. 
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The soul ‘can see and hear and think, it has human passions and a human will, 
and it has the power to influence the living for evil or for good’. For Wester-
marck, such conceptions ‘determine the relations between the living and the dead’ 
(ODMI II, pp. 515–516).
Like basic self-directed duties, Westermarck emphasises that duties to the 
dead are similar to those people owe to their fellow human beings. According 
to common beliefs, one must avoid doing anything which might hurt the soul. 
Like living persons, ‘the dead are sensitive to insults and fond of praise; hence 
respect must be shown for their honour and self-regarding pride’. Since the dead 
are generally regarded as sentient beings, customary rules regarding their treat-
ment are ‘to a considerable extent based on the feeling of sympathetic resent-
ment’. To put it more clearly, for Westermarck attitudes towards the dead are, 
first and foremost, based on people’s sympathy with the potential indignation 
of a mistreated soul. There are also widespread beliefs that the dead should be 
kept pleased because they are capable of influencing the living either favour-
ably or adversely (ODMI II, pp. 516–517, 520, 528–529). It is thus a ‘mixture 
of sympathy and fear which is at the bottom of the duties to the dead’ (ODMI 
II, p. 548).
Finally, according to Westermarck, sympathy is one factor, although not the 
main factor, shaping certain key aspects of religious behaviour. Again, as with 
duties to the self and to the dead, human conduct towards gods ‘is in many 
respects determined by considerations similar to those which regulate his conduct 
towards his fellow men’ (ODMI II, p. 602). Even though related social customs 
vary substantially in content, Westermarck highlights several connecting threads 
in religious practices. They are ultimately based on the fact that ‘man attributes 
to his gods a variety of human qualities’ (ODMI II, p. 602). First of all, in normal 
circumstances it is prohibited to injure or kill gods. Second, their existence and 
comfort must be promoted positively (ODMI II, p. 610). Third, since supernatural 
beings are often considered to have material needs, ‘they also possess property 
like men, and this must not be interfered with’ (ODMI II, p. 626). And fourth, 
like the living, gods ‘are widely believed to have a feeling of their worth and dig-
nity. They are sensitive to insults and disrespect, they demand submissiveness and 
homage’ (ODMI II, p. 639).
What then accounts for duties of this sort? Westermarck suggests that they 
are, for the most part, ‘based on prudential considerations’. Supernatural beings 
must not be antagonised, because they are equally resentful as human beings, but 
‘owing to their supernatural powers, much more dangerous’. In addition, since 
divine punishments and rewards are often believed to come collectively, it is also 
a person’s duty to his or her fellows ‘to be on friendly terms with supernatural 
beings’. Lastly, moral rules prohibiting offences against gods or religion can be 
traced to the fact that moral disapproval or indignation attributed to gods is trans-
mitted to followers. Since ‘gods are regarded with genuine reverence by their 
worshippers [. . .] offences against religion naturally excite sympathetic resent-
ment in the latter’ (ODMI II, pp. 660–661).
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Variations in moral standards
What emerges from Westermarck’s examination is that social customs or moral 
norms can be divided into two kinds. They are, to a large extent, more or less 
arbitrary and changeable, stemming from the fact that a ‘habit may develop into a 
genuine custom simply because men are inclined to disapprove of anything which 
is unusual’ (HHM I, pp. 69–70). When a social habit, ‘however trivial it may be’, 
has developed into a custom, it constitutes a moral rule, and ‘the unreflecting 
mind has a tendency to disapprove of any deviation from it’ (ODMI, p. 159). On 
the other hand, in certain cases ‘the transition from habit to custom has undoubt-
edly a deeper foundation’ (HHM I, p. 70; also ODMI, p. 533). Westermarck refers 
here to basic obligations associated with parental care and marriage, but similar 
reasoning applies to his theory of sympathy-based moral norms. Ultimately, West-
ermarck strove to illustrate that they exist as an expression of ‘the general uni-
formity of human nature’ and especially human emotional constitution (ODMI II, 
p. 742; also 1908b, p. 29). In other words, for Westermarck, the altruistic and sym-
pathetic tendencies are part of human biological heritage and make us to react in 
relatively similar ways to similar behaviours, in particular when they are directed 
towards members of the same social group.
As we have seen, Durkheim criticised Westermarck for neglecting the question 
of moral variations. Similarly, later sociologists have held that Westermarck ‘was 
unable to describe differences originating in social conditions and varying moral 
climates’ (Allardt, 2000, p. 304). Others have argued incorrectly that he attempted 
to explain cultural differences by biological causes (La Vergata, 2009, p. 337). 
Such views ignore the fact that Westermarck was one of the first to systematically 
explore variations and differences in moral practices and to identify their under-
lying causes. In Chapter 3, we discussed this issue in relation to the relationship 
between social customs and moral standards. I will now expand on these points by 
looking at Westermarck’s wider perspective on moral differences.3
He attributes the variations in moral beliefs to three interrelated sources, which 
may be broadly described as environmental, cognitive and emotional. First, moral 
standards are greatly influenced by external circumstances. Examples of this can 
be found in the practice of infanticide that is conspicuously prevalent ‘among 
poor tribes and in islands whose inhabitants are confined to a narrow territory 
with limited resources’ (ODMI, pp. 399–401; ER, pp. 184–185). Environmental 
conditions may also lead to the practice of killing of aged parents, which is par-
ticularly common among nomadic hunter-gatherers, and which is connected with 
deficiencies in the food supply and the imperative need for directing the resources 
to the young and vigorous (ODMI, pp. 387–388; ER, pp. 184–185). Thus, ‘neces-
sity and the force of habit may deprive these actions of the stigma which would 
otherwise be attached to them’ (ODMI II, p. 742), even to the point where they are 
continued even when no longer necessary, purely out of habit.
3 For Westermarck’s philosophical arguments on moral differences, see Cook (1999).
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Secondly, moral variations stem from cognitive factors associated with differ-
ences in knowledge and beliefs. Westermarck highlights ‘the enormous influence’ 
which religious and supernatural beliefs have ‘exercised upon the moral ideas of 
mankind’ (ODMI II, p. 745). Examples can be found in the different moral atti-
tudes towards suicide, human sacrifice, and homosexuality, as well as in various 
taboos (ER, pp. 187–196). Similarly, as we shall see in the next chapter, psycho-
logical knowledge has radically changed views on the moral and legal responsi-
bility of animals, the mentally deficient and the mentally ill.
Finally, the most common moral differences derive from variations in the 
strength and range of sympathy. Despite the great similarities of the content of 
basic moral norms, there has been great variation in the circle of people to whom 
these rules are held to apply (ODMI II, pp. 742–743; ER, pp. 197–202). As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, the sphere of sympathy has expanded along with 
the human social linkages, but the distinction between in-group and out-group 
continues to appear on various occasions. In addition, naturally occurring vari-
ations in the strength of sympathy between different individuals with regard to 
their objects will always prevent moral judgements from being uniform (ODMI, 
pp. 11–12; ODMI II, p. 514; ER, pp. 207–213). This shows that people of the 
same social and cultural background may have fundamentally different views, 
for example, on how immigrants or animals ought to be treated. Because such 
conceptions and the application of moral rules reflect variations in altruistic and 
sympathetic feelings of each individual, argumentation or the same knowledge 
base does not as such lead to a consensus of opinions.
Westermarck considered moral responsibility as one of the main topics of ethical 
inquiry. In the Moral Ideas, nearly half of the thirteen chapters dealing with his 
‘general theory of the nature of moral consciousness’ (MML, p. 232) concern the 
practices of holding people responsible for their actions. Westermarck gives much 
attention to aggravating circumstances that increase the agent’s blame, mitigating 
circumstances that lessen responsibility and considerations that exempt the person 
altogether from moral blame. In Ethical Relativity, these examinations are sum-
marised in a single chapter. Westermarck recognised responsibility judgements as 
an essential part of human social life. In our everyday interactions, we are deeply 
sensitive to factors determining responsibility as well as to a wide variety of miti-
gating and aggravating circumstances. He was also very interested in how these 
attitudes come to be reflected in criminal legislation.
Westermarck’s theory of responsibility is built round the question of what is 
the subject of moral judgement. He agrees with the view that ‘[m]oral judgments 
are commonly said to be passed upon conduct and character’ (ODMI, p. 202; ER, 
p. 148). The first of his main objectives was to resolve human conduct system-
atically into its different morally coloured elements and manifestations. Typical 
of him, the goal was not only to describe how moral judgements are concerned 
with conduct and character, but, above all, to explain why this is so. In Wester-
marck’s view, the regularities in the ways people make moral judgements cannot 
be understood without taking into account what kind of emotions the moral emo-
tions are. For this reason, the study of conduct and character goes to the very core 
of Westermarck’s ethics. He believed that his whole theory of retributive emotions 
is supported by a detailed study of the elements of human conduct which evoke 
them (ODMI, p. 22; ODMI II, pp. 741–742; ER, p. 177).
This chapter begins by discussing Westermarck’s analysis of ‘conduct’. I exam-
ine his concepts of ‘act’, ‘intention’, ‘event’, ‘motive’ and the consequences and 
side-effects of action. I also explore his account of how people react to negli-
gence, heedlessness and inadvertence. In the next section, I show how Wester-
marck examines the influence of chance on moral judgements, which is called 
the phenomenon of moral luck. In the section that follows, I explain how Wester-
marck analyses the relationship between character and moral responsibility. I also 
outline his exploration of the role of ‘innate’ and ‘acquired character’ in moral 
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evaluation. In the final section, I focus on Westermarck’s answer to the problem 
of why moral judgements are directed towards the agent’s will and, on the other 
hand, why people in general are not considered accountable for actions that are 
beyond their control. Throughout this section, I also explore his examination of 
what kind of cognitive factors affect human conceptions of moral agency. Finally, 
I conclude by examining Westermarck’s argument on average conduct serving as 
a benchmark for moral evaluation.
What is conduct
The concept of act
Westermarck’s account of responsibility begins with an analysis of the term ‘con-
duct’. In the first place, conduct refers to acts. In Westermarck’s sense of the 
term, an act consists of an event and the agent’s intention to produce it (ODMI, 
pp. 203–204, 206; ER, p. 148). Intention is defined as ‘a volition or determination 
to realise the idea of a certain event’. Thus, what distinguishes an act from a ran-
dom event is that it has an ‘immediate mental cause’. The intended consequences 
of an act are either part of the act or ‘acts by themselves’. In the former case, the 
consequences are the event. The latter case implies that, analytically speaking, 
human action may be said to consist of several distinct acts which all have only 
one intention. Because intention refers to the agent’s will to bring about ‘a certain 
event’, there can be only one intention in one act (ODMI, pp. 203–204).
When we observe and evaluate the actions of others, Westermarck argues 
that our focus in not really on the event, but on the agent’s intention (ODMI, 
p. 205; ER, p. 149). The basic distinction between intentional and unintentional 
actions is an anthropological universal, although it is usual that in primitive 
societies external events have a greater impact on moral judgements. This is 
largely because an ‘unreflecting mind [. . .] does not press the question whether 
the harm was caused by the agent’s will or not’. Rather, it is inclined to assume 
that the event and the will are linked together. However, in clear-cut cases, 
people universally distinguish events that are intended from those that are unin-
tentional. Even a dog ‘distinguishes between being stumbled over and being 
kicked’ (ODMI, pp. 219–220, 237–238; ER, pp. 162–164, 167–168).1 Moral 
judgements are passed on intention because it expresses the person’s will. For 
this reason, intention may arouse moral disapproval even when it does not mate-
rialise in action. Even mere wishes for something to happen may be morally 
loaded. People may be approved or disapproved for their wishes because like 
 1 Like Westermarck, anthropologist Donald Brown (1991) emphasises that in all known societies 
people ‘see the person as responsible for his actions. They distinguish actions that are under con-
trol from those that are not. They understand the concept of intention’ (p. 135). For a review of 
current moral-psychological research on the relationship between intentionality and moral evalua-
tion, see Malle (2006); Malle & Guglielmo (2011).
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intentions, wishes are volitions; they express the agent’s will (ODMI, pp. 205–
206; ER, pp. 148–150).
Responsibility extends further than the act itself. It covers the ‘consequences of 
an act as are foreseen by the agent, and such incidents as are known by him to be 
involved in his act’. These foreseen side-effects of action refer to cases in which a 
person performs an act intended to bring about one effect, but is aware that it will 
have other consequences as well. To retell Westermarck’s example, if a dissident 
sets a bomb in the platform where a dictator holds a speech, the dissident’s inten-
tion is to kill the ruler and the foreseen side-effect is the danger exposed to others. 
On the other hand, no one is held responsible for such consequences or side-
effects that he or she could not be aware of. Westermarck observes that in many 
cases, moral praise, in particular, refers rather to the act’s possible side-effects 
than the act itself. For example, the merit of an altruistic act often lies in the fact 
that the knowledge of the danger to which people exposed themselves did not 
prevent them from acting as they did. Similarly, ‘the merit of the charitable man 
really depends on the loss which he inflicts upon himself by giving his property 
to the needy’. There are also cases in which people are held praiseworthy because 
they do not want to avoid some foreseen side-effects of their action. The person’s 
merit, then, lies in the fact that he acts in a certain way, ‘though he knows that his 
deed will benefit someone who has injured him, and towards the average man in 
similar circumstances would display resentment’ (ODMI, pp. 212–214, 249; ER, 
pp. 156–158).
The motive of the act
Westermarck distinguishes between intention and motive. Motive is the underly-
ing cause of, or the reason for, the agent’s intention, in other words, ‘that which 
“moves” the will’ (ODMI, p. 207; ER, p. 150). As Blanshard (1961) puts it, West-
ermarck argues that we ‘pass judgments on what a man does, but we do so in 
the light of what he intended to do’, and, furthermore, ‘what moved him to do it’ 
(p. 111). Motives, however, are usually given less attention than intentions. This 
is because intention is normally apparent in the act itself, whereas the underlying 
motive is not. In practice, motives and intentions ‘are subjects of moral valuation 
not separately, but as a unity’ (ODMI, pp. 207–209, 283).
Motives influence moral evaluation in two ways. First, we need to make a dis-
tinction between motives that are intentions and motives that are non-voluntary 
and beyond the agent’s control. A motive belonging to the first category ‘obvi-
ously falls within the sphere of moral valuation’ (ODMI, p. 207; ER, p. 150). We 
do not feel gratitude if someone helps us merely in the hope of a reward. When 
we are being lied to, our feelings towards that person are very different depending 
on whether he or she is attempting to benefit from our expense or trying to save us 
from serious trouble (ODMI, pp. 316, 318). When the agent’s motive is an inten-
tion itself, it belongs to another but related act. This is because, for Westermarck, 
a single act can only have one intention. For example, when dissidents try to kill 
the dictator in order to save their country, we have two distinct but related acts. 
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Their intention to save the country is the motive of their intention to kill the dicta-
tor. There is no doubt that it affects many people’s opinions on the matter (ODMI, 
p. 207; ER, p. 150).
Secondly, motives that are involuntary impulses are not as such morally 
loaded, but they ‘may nevertheless indirectly exercise much influence on moral 
judgements’. This is because motives of this sort are generally considered as 
mitigating circumstances. When a person steals food to satisfy his or her hun-
ger, appetite as an involuntary impulse has no moral value in itself. No one is 
held blameworthy for his or her hunger. However, ‘other things being equal, the 
person in question is less guilty in proportion as his hunger is more intense’. It 
is thus clear that in this and many other cases, ‘moral judgment is modified by 
the pressure which the non-volitional motive exercises upon the agent’s will’ 
(ODMI, pp. 207–208; also ER, pp. 150–151). Similarly, we feel differently 
towards a person who injures us ‘under the influence of a non-volitional impulse, 
too strong for any ordinary man to resist’. The same applies to actions people 
are compelled against their will. Both in ordinary moral judgements and mod-
ern criminal legislation, acting under compulsion reduces or wholly eliminates 
responsibility (ODMI, pp. 283–284, 316).
Emotions, too, are held as mitigating considerations. Westermarck recognises 
that people may be so overwhelmed by anger or fear that they cannot resist 
acting in a certain way. More precisely, the question is of ‘the non-volitional 
conative element involved in an emotion’. Westermarck emphasises that the 
difference between deliberate injuries and the ones inflicted in overwhelm-
ing and uncontrollable anger is widely recognised in different cultures. It is 
very common that people are held less guilty if their actions are motivated by 
anger caused by a wrong done to themselves, and ‘both morality and law take 
into consideration the degree of provocation to which the agent was exposed’ 
(ODMI, pp. 208, 284, 294–298). Thus, ‘if any one commits a crime in a rage he 
is less blamable, and punished less severely, than if he commits the same crime 
in cold blood’ (ER, p. 151).
Negligence and carelessness
In addition to what people do, they are blamed for what they fail to do. West-
ermarck distinguishes between forbearances and omissions on the one hand, 
and between heedlessness and inadvertency on the other.2 Due to its intentional 
nature, forbearance from doing something ‘is morally equivalent to an act’. Omis-
sion, on the other hand, ‘is characterized by the absence of volition’. The blame-
worthiness thus lies in that a person omits to do something that ought to be done 
because he or she does not think of it. In such cases, moral disapproval is directed 
towards the person’s negligence. Because we disapprove not only of acts and 
forbearances, but also omissions, Westermarck highlights that moral judgements 
 2 Westermarck’s distinction is derived from the British legal theorist John Austin (1869).
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may ‘refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well’. The reason behind this 
is that the ‘power in a person which is called his “will” is regarded’ also as a cause 
‘of such events as we think that the person “could” have prevented by his will’ 
(ODMI, pp. 209–212, emphasis added; also ER, pp. 154–155).
Westermarck also pays attention to heedlessness and inadvertence. Heedless-
ness is closely related to negligence. A heedless person is disapproved for doing 
something he should omit to do, ‘because he does not consider its probable or 
possible consequences’. While negligence is marked by the ‘absence of acting’, 
in the case of heedlessness, ‘there is acting’. Finally, people may be blamed for 
inadvertence or rashness. In this case, the agent is aware of the harm that may 
follow, but he or she is disapproved for not being attentive enough. What negli-
gence, heedlessness and inadvertence have in common is that moral disapproval 
is directed upon the total or partial lack of attention, in other words, upon ‘not-
willing’ (ODMI, pp. 211–212; ER, pp. 154–155). That is to say, we hold people 
responsible for any consequences of their behaviour that ‘we attribute to want of 
due attention’ (ODMI, p. 249). The related moral emotions are also reflected in 
modern legislation. The agent is generally held ‘liable for harm caused by him 
through want of ordinary care and foresight’, although ‘it depends on the nature 
of the case whether he will have to pay damages or to suffer punishment’ (ODMI, 
p. 308).
There are also cases in which the absence of volition may give rise to moral 
praise. We praise someone who refrains from doing something, ‘beneficial to him-
self but harmful to others, which, in similar circumstances, would have proved 
too great a temptation for any ordinary man’. This may evoke moral praise even 
though the alternative to act differently did not come to a person’s mind, because 
the fact that they did not think of it signals the nature of their will. As noted, there 
are also cases in which people evoke moral approval because, even though the 
beneficiary is a personal enemy, they do not want to avoid the beneficial conse-
quences of their action (ODMI, pp. 213–214; ER, pp. 157–158).
All this notwithstanding, there is a significant attitudinal difference between 
action and the absence of action. Moral indignation ‘is much more easily aroused 
by action than by the absence of it’, and this is because a ‘person who commits a 
harmful deed is a more obvious cause of pain than a person who causes harm by 
doing nothing’. In this case, too, the emotional difference between causing harm 
by acting and not-acting manifests itself in modern criminal legislation. It draws 
much more attention to positive acts than forbearances and omissions, ‘and one 
reason for this is that they evoke little public indignation’ (ODMI, p. 303).
To sum up, Westermarck analyses human conduct as the subject of moral judge-
ment into different manifestations:
By a man’s conduct in a certain case is understood a volition, or the absence 
of a volition in him – which is often, but not always or necessarily, expressed 
in an act, forbearance, or omission – viewed with reference to all such cir-
cumstances as may influence its moral character.
(ODMI, p. 214)
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To put it more clearly, moral judgements may be passed upon (1) volitions 
expressed in acts and forbearances, as well as (2) volitions that do not actually 
materialise in action. Examples of the latter are the cases where people are dis-
approved for forming a certain intention without performing the corresponding 
action. For the same reason, distinct wishes may arouse retributive emotions 
because wishes are volitions, expressions of the person’s will. Besides volitions, 
moral judgements may refer to (3) ‘the absence of volition’, or ‘not-willing’. Such 
behaviours include negligence, heedlessness and inadvertence.
This classification structures the bulk of Westermarck’s Moral Ideas. The com-
parative parts of the work are devoted to the most ‘important modes of conduct 
with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned’. The largest section 
is devoted to ‘acts, forbearances, and omissions’ that ‘directly concern the inter-
ests of other men’. The second section concerns ‘acts, forbearances, and omis-
sions’ affecting principally the agent’s own welfare. The third group of chapters 
deals with sexual morality. Human conduct towards animals is also of moral con-
cern, likewise people’s relations with the dead. Finally, a large and last section is 
devoted to people’s ‘conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard 
as supernatural’ (ODMI, pp. 327–328).
The influence of consequences of action on moral judgements
Although Westermarck emphasises that moral judgements are typically passed 
on intention, he observes that the actual results or effects of action have a great 
influence on our retributive emotions. This shows not only in how people react 
to actions that fail to produce the intended effects, but also in human reactions 
towards negligence and accidents. In this context, Westermarck discusses the 
influence of chance on moral judgements, which contemporary philosophers call 
the phenomenon of moral luck (Williams, 1982; Nagel, 1979). Westermarck’s 
account of moral luck is much indebted to Adam Smith.3 He refers to Smith’s 
observation that everyone in theory ‘agrees to the general maxim’ according to 
which the agent should be praised and blamed only for ‘the intention of the heart 
from which he acted’. Smith argues that the ‘self-evident justice’ of this maxim 
is ‘acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a dissenting voice among all 
mankind’ (ODMI, pp. 237–238; TMS, pp. 92–93, 104–105). However, Smith and 
Westermarck observe that when we come to particular cases, our emotions mani-
fest themselves differently.
Like Smith, Westermarck argues that despite the agent’s bad intention, if the act 
fails to produce the intended effect, our indignation towards the agent is dimin-
ished. This is apparent also in criminal law as a wrongdoing that fails is normally 
 3 For discussion on Smith on moral luck, see Russell (1999); Flanders (2006); Hankins (2016). 
Thomas Nagel (1979) identifies the kind of moral luck discussed by Smith (and Westermarck) as 
‘consequential luck’. As we shall see, Westermarck examines also the kind of moral luck Nagel 
calls ‘constitutive luck’, referring to innate personal characteristics outside of person’s control.
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punished much less severely than an accomplished act. From Smith’s and Wester-
marck’s perspective, this is due to the simple fact that a failure arouses much less 
moral disapproval than a successful crime. The same applies to good acts. Like 
Smith, Westermarck observes that despite the agent’s good intention, if the act 
fails to produce the intended effect, our gratitude or approval towards the agent is 
diminished. As Westermarck puts it, ‘good intentions without corresponding deeds 
meet with little applause even when the failure is due to mere misfortune’ (ODMI, 
pp. 237–241, 247; TMS, pp. 97–99).4 In other words, the agent’s intention is not 
all that counts in moral evaluation. In practice, Westermarck quotes Smith, the 
‘world judges by the event and not by the design’ (ODMI, p. 238; TMS, p. 104).
A related indication of these moral-psychological regularities is that people’s 
reactions are often disproportionate to the harm or benefit caused. The agent’s 
guilt is easily ‘exaggerated on account of the grave consequences of his act’; 
and, correspondingly, ‘the benefits which result from a good act easily induce us 
to exaggerate the goodness of the agent’ (ODMI, pp. 240, 247). Similarly, Smith 
observes that when human actions cause substantial damage or benefit, our grati-
tude or resentment tend to be ‘beyond what is due to the motives or affections 
from which they proceed’. Even when there is nothing in the agent’s intention 
‘that deserved either praise or blame’, the good or bad consequences ‘often throw 
a shadow of merit or demerit upon the agent’. For this reason, an innocent mes-
senger may be subjected to outbursts of joy or anger (TMS, p. 101).
The influence of chance on moral evaluation shows also how people react to 
negligence. If no harmful consequences follow, we usually feel little or no moral 
disapproval. In such cases, the person also ‘generally escapes all punishment’ 
(ODMI, pp. 240–241, 308). On the other hand, the psychological importance of 
actual consequences comes up in human reactions towards accidents. In many 
cases, the agent is held responsible and must one way or another compensate the 
damage caused, even though it was unintended and ‘even though no foresight 
could have reasonably been expected to look out for it’ (ODMI, pp. 308–309).
Finally, the importance of the consequences of action shows how people react 
to unfulfilled intentions. As Westermarck points out, people are not generally 
‘punished for intentions unaccompanied by external deeds’. While it is true that 
intention alone may arouse moral disapproval, ‘an outward event is generally 
needed for shaking him [“the average man”] up’ (ODMI, pp. 244–246). Again, 
Smith makes a similar remark on intentions that are not put into practice (TMS, 
pp. 99–100). There are, however, cases where the outward event is not necessary 
for strong emotional arousal. If an act has a tendency to give rise to ‘extreme hor-
ror, the very intention may give such a shock to the public imagination as to call 
for punishment’ (ODMI, p. 245). Similarly, Smith observes that there are crimes 
that arouse such strong resentment in mankind that a ‘mere attempt to commit 
it’ is severely punished. In ‘smaller crimes’, however, a mere attempt ‘is almost 
always punished very light, and sometimes is not punished at all’ (TMS, p. 100).
 4 Instead of Smith, Westermarck cites here Hume (E, p. 228).
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From conduct to character, and the other way around
After discussing the different aspects of human conduct, Westermarck argues that 
when we look more closely at how people make moral judgements, it comes out 
that they are not actually passed on intentions or volitions ‘in the abstract, but 
on the persons who have them; they are held blamable or worthy of praise’ (ER, 
p. 152). We feel moral emotions, ‘not with reference to certain modes of conduct 
per se, but with reference to persons on account of their conduct’ (ODMI, p. 310). 
One can even say that it is alien to human experience ‘to dissociate the act from 
the agent’ (ER, p. 153; see also pp. 85–86; ODMI, pp. 92–93). For Westermarck, 
this fundamental feature of moral behaviour stems directly from the nature of 
moral emotions. Like other retributive emotions, moral emotions are reactive atti-
tudes of mind towards living beings regarded as the cause of pleasure or pain. 
However, people are not praised or blamed only for what they do, but also for 
what they are. This brings us to character. As Westermarck puts it, there is ‘an inti-
mate connection between character and conduct as subjects of moral valuation. 
When judging of a man’s conduct in a special instance, we judge of his character, 
and when judging of his character we judge of his conduct in general’ (ODMI, 
p. 215; ER, p. 159).
The relationship between conduct and character is fundamental to Wester-
marck’s ethics because it lies at the heart of the problem of moral responsibility. 
The gist of Westermarck’s position is that ‘[w]e impute a person’s conduct to 
him only in so far as we regard it as a result or manifestation of his character, 
as directly or indirectly due to his will’ (ER, p. 159; also ODMI, p. 214). In his 
definition, character is ‘a person’s will regarded as a continuous entity’, or (fol-
lowing Samuel Alexander) ‘simply that of which individual pieces of conduct 
are the manifestation’. For this very reason, when we pass moral judgements, we 
conceive people’s character as the cause of their conduct (ODMI, pp. 214–215, 
310–312; ER, pp. 158–159).
Westermarck’s view of responsibility and character is derived directly from 
Hume. According to Hume, as cited by Westermarck,
Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they 
proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person 
who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor 
infamy, if evil [. . .] the person is not answerable for them; and as they pro-
ceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of 
that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become 
the object of punishment or vengeance.
(E, p. 98; ODMI, pp. 214–215, emphasis added; 
also T, p. 411; ER, p. 159)
Hume stresses that in order for any action to give rise to moral praise or blame, 
it is ‘only as a sign of some quality or character’. A person’s action ‘must depend 
upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, 
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and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from 
any constant principle [. . .] are never consider’d in morality’ (T, p. 575; also 
T, p. 477).5 Like Hume, Westermarck emphasises that even when it seems that 
‘moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the agent’s 
will as a whole’, that is, the person’s character (ODMI, pp. 310–311).
In order to vindicate his Humean thesis of responsibility, Westermarck lays out 
three facts of moral behaviour. The first concerns the logic of forgiveness. People 
tend to feel moral indignation ‘as long as its cause remain unaltered’, and the 
will of the offender ‘ceases to be offensive only when he acknowledges his guilt 
and repents’. In other words, remorse is regarded as a sign of the alteration of 
the will. Because retributive emotions are directed towards the agent’s will, ‘[b]
adness can only be forgiven, and moral forgiveness can be granted only on con-
dition that the agent’s mind has undergone a radical alteration for the better, that 
the badness of the will has given way to repentance’ (ODMI, pp. 85–86, 311). 
Similarly, for Hume, ‘repentance wipes off every crime, especially if attended 
with and evident reformation of life and manners’ (T, p. 412; also E, p. 99). As 
Paul Russell (1995) puts it, Hume suggests that the change of our moral senti-
ments ‘is produced by showing that the agent repents of his action and has sub-
sequently altered his character in this respect’ (p. 103). Westermarck even sees 
the desire to produce repentance as an inherent feature of moral indignation. 
When we feel moral indignation we want to remove the cause that aroused the 
emotion – the agent’s bad will – and this can take place only ‘by bringing about 
repentance in the offender’ (ODMI, p. 84). Quoting Smith, Westermarck argues 
that the object of moral resentment is not so much to cause suffering to the guilty 
but to make him conscious that we feel it because of his past action, ‘to make 
him repent of that conduct, and to make him sensible, that the person whom he 
injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner’ (TMS, pp. 95–96; ODMI, 
p. 88, emphasis added).
Second, people tend to distinguish between morally bad behaviours committed 
in cold blood and those performed in the heat of passion. In Westermarck’s view, 
we feel more strongly about actions that are performed carefully and deliberately, 
because they are held as truer expressions of the agent’s character than actions 
performed impulsively and uncontrollably. These emotional tendencies are also 
reflected in criminal legislation (ODMI, pp. 206, 294, 311). Similarly, Hume 
observes that since actions that are performed ‘hastily and unpremeditatedly’ do 
not express the agent’s whole character equally well as the ones that ‘proceed 
from thought and deliberation’, we are inclined to react more strongly to the last 
mentioned (T, p. 412; E, pp. 98–99). Finally, the consideration of the agent’s char-
acter underlies the common practice of punishing convicted criminals who repeat 
their offences more severely than first times (ODMI, p. 311). Because reoffending 
is considered as a sign of one’s character, there is a general tendency to think that 
repeat offenders also deserve a more severe punishment.
 5 For detailed examination of Hume’s theory of responsibility, see Russell (1995).
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Emotions and opinions
People are often disapproved of for their emotions. Westermarck observes that 
anger that is perceived as unjustified commonly arouses moral disapproval in oth-
ers. Similarly, envy and malicious delight are common incentives to moral blame. 
However, even in the cases where moral disapproval seems to, on the face of it, 
concern a person’s emotions, the actual subject of moral judgement is character. 
The order of things is that we interpret the agent’s emotions as expressions of 
character, and therefore we disapprove of the person who feels them (for exam-
ple, in a wrong situation). People also interpret the absence of emotions in the 
same way. We may disapprove of persons who are not affected by the plight of 
their friend; and conversely, people who manage to control their emotions and 
act impartially in a personally difficult and emotive situation evoke moral praise 
(ODMI, p. 215; ER, pp. 159–161).
Also, opinions are often subjects of moral judgement. For Westermarck, one of 
the distinctive features of moral behaviour is how easily opinions that differ from 
our own give rise to moral disapproval. In Ethical Relativity, Westermarck says 
more clearly that the disapproval of opinions refers not so much to the opinion 
as such as the idea of its realisation in practice, or the consequences it is sup-
posed to lead. Therefore, strictly speaking, the subject of moral disapproval is 
the act of pronouncing or propagating certain ideas (ODMI, pp. 116, 215–216; 
ER; pp. 107, 161). Thus, moral blame refers ‘to the cause of the opinion within 
the will’ (ODMI, p. 216), that is, what kind of a person holds an opinion that we 
regard as morally problematic. Then we are again back in character. In the light of 
Westermarck’s analysis of opinions and moral emotions, the frequent occurrence 
of argumentum ad hominem is no surprise. Due to the nature of the moral emo-
tions, the strong tendency to criticise the person behind claims and arguments – 
whether moral, political, religious or even scientific – whom we personally find 
unappealing is an inseparable part of human moral behaviour.
Innate and acquired character
So far we have been concerned with Westermarck’s account of how moral judge-
ments are passed on people’s will and character, assigned as the cause of their 
conduct. We have also seen that responsibility is lessened in proportion as the 
agent’s will is exposed to pressures and influences, whether internal or external, 
which are beyond personal control. Westermarck’s anatomy of responsibility, 
however, goes further than this. In his view, in the final analysis, our moral judge-
ments are passed on the agent’s ‘innate character’.
This is illustrated with two examples. The first is a ‘licentious man’ whose 
mindset and character have been shaped by an environment that is itself corrupt. 
Such a person is generally held ‘less blamable than an equally licentious man who 
has always lived under conditions favourable to virtue’ but who nevertheless sinks 
to evil. Another example is a pickpocket who has been kidnapped as a child by a 
band of robbers. According to Westermarck, most of us would hold the person’s 
The anatomy of moral responsibility 93
life-course as a mitigating circumstance. The influence of external circumstances 
upon the person’s character does not wholly eliminate responsibility, because it 
may be said that he or she could have, despite everything, resisted them (ODMI, 
pp. 324–325; ER, p. 178). However, as Westermarck puts it, most of us would 
agree that ‘the influences of environment and the circumstances of upbringing are 
not irrelevant to the degree of his guilt’ (ER, p. 178).
It is here that Westermarck’s notion of innate character comes into view. When 
we say or think that a person ‘is influenced by external circumstances’ which 
lessen his responsibility, or when someone’s life-course leads us to think that 
he was ‘subdued by fate’, Westermarck suggests that ‘we regard him as existing 
independently of that which influences or subdues him’. In other words, we tend 
to distinguish between the original and acquired character, between the person’s 
‘original self’ and the part of self which is ‘the product of external circumstances’. 
Simply put, ‘we attribute to him an innate character which is acted upon from 
the outside’ (ODMI, pp. 325–326; emphasis added; also ER, pp. 178, 181–182). 
Thus, in Westermarck’s reasoning, the innate character becomes more visible in 
persons who are exposed to good influences only during their maturation but who 
are nevertheless corrupt.
It seems evident that when we make moral judgements, ‘we do not know or 
cannot know, how far his character is due to education or environment and how 
far it is not’. Westermarck’s view of the formation of personality is interactionist. 
Individual development is marked by ‘a constant action and reaction between the 
external and internal conditions’, and it is impossible ‘to draw a hard and fast line 
between the two’. However, according to Westermarck, the view that the proper 
subject of moral evaluation is the innate character is supported by the fact that ‘our 
moral judgment might be different if we had such knowledge’ (ER, pp. 178–179).
Westermarck does not assume that character is unchangeable. However, in his 
view, it seems obvious that the changes of character in a person ‘are imputable to 
him only in so far as they are caused by his innate character’. Unfortunately, West-
ermarck does not elaborate on this complex notion. He merely cites and agrees 
with Schopenhauer that the innate character is the person’s ‘real core’ which ‘con-
tains the germs of all his virtues and vices’ (ODMI, p. 326). What Westermarck 
seems to argue is that we tend to think that people deserve praise or blame for the 
changes in character only insofar as these changes somehow reflect the innate 
parts of their self.
This leads to a paradox in the moral psychology of responsibility. On the one 
hand, the agent’s moral responsibility is affected by ‘the influences to which his 
innate character has been subjected from the outside world’. But on the other 
hand, it is obvious that our innate character is a ‘product of something outside 
ourselves’. No one has control over their innate character. The gist of Wester-
marck’s theory of responsibility is that these considerations have not in the least 
influence on our retributive emotions. We simply approve and disapprove of peo-
ple for what they are like, ‘and beyond that’ our moral emotions ‘cannot go’ (ER, 
pp. 179–182). To illustrate his point, Westermarck draws a parallel between moral 
and aesthetic experiences. Our moral emotions are not ‘concerned with the origin 
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of the innate character’, any more than ‘the aesthetic emotions are concerned with 
the origin of the beautiful object’ (ODMI, p. 326; ER, p. 182). We do not consider 
the origin of innate character, any more than ‘when we enjoy the music of a violin, 
we do not consider that it is produced by the rubbing of hairs from a horse-tail 
against the dried intestines of sheep’ (Westermarck, 1939, p. 150).
Westermarck’s account of innate character and responsibility is very similar 
to Thomas Nagel’s analysis of what he calls ‘constitutive moral luck’. This spe-
cies of moral luck concerns ‘the kind of person you are, where this is not just a 
question of what you deliberatively do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and 
temperament’. Like Westermarck, Nagel recognises that one’s morally problem-
atic personal characteristics are ‘largely a matter of constitutive bad fortune. Yet 
people are morally condemned for such qualities, and esteemed for others equally 
beyond the control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like’ (Nagel, 
1979, pp. 28, 33). Westermarck’s approach to responsibility bears a close resem-
blance also to P. F. Strawson’s (1962) ‘naturalistic turn’ on the problem of free will 
and responsibility. As McKenna and Russell (2012) put it, Strawson’s strategy 
‘involves turning away from conceptual issues about the analysis of “freedom” 
and “responsibility” and taking a closer look at what actually goes on when we 
hold a person responsible’. Like Westermarck, Strawson focuses on our ‘reac-
tive attitudes and feelings’ and argues that ‘ordinary life carries on unaffected 
and unconcerned’ by the philosophical disputes about free will and responsibility 
(p. 5). As Westermarck points out, the same is true for professional philosophers, 
because retributive emotions towards human agents ‘are felt by determinists and 
indeterminists alike’ (ER, p. 180; also ODMI, pp. 321–322).
The emotional determination of moral responsibility
As we have seen, Westermarck attached much weight to Hume’s account of respon-
sibility and character. Despite this, Westermarck argues that Hume ignored the more 
fundamental question, that is, why our sentiments of moral approval and disap-
proval are directed towards the agent’s will. Kant allotted the question much atten-
tion and suggested that nothing but the will can be morally good.6 More specifically, 
Kant argues that ‘the good will is not good because of what it effects or accom-
plishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end’. Instead ‘it is good 
only because of its willing, i.e. it is good of itself’ (Kant, [1785] 2012, pp. 9–10). 
However, from Westermarck’s perspective, Kant merely states the existing state of 
affairs without any attempt to provide an answer to the crucial question, why is this 
so?7 Westermarck declares that ‘[w]e cannot content ourselves with the bare fact 
that nothing but the will is morally good or bad’. Instead ‘[w]e must try to explain’ 
this fundamental moral-psychological phenomenon (ODMI, p. 314).8
 6 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19.
 7 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19.
 8 For Westermarck’s analysis and critique of Kant’s ethics, see ER, pp. 264–291.
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Westermarck’s explanation of why moral judgements centre around the agent’s 
will looks back on Adam Smith. This does not, however, come out from the relevant 
sections of his published writings where Westermarck makes only a few insignifi-
cant references to him. In his lectures, on the other hand, Westermarck gives Smith 
credit especially in this respect. It is in this context that Westermarck states that ‘the 
retributive nature of moral emotions throws light on the deepest shafts of the moral 
consciousness, and that is mainly why I appreciate Smith’s work so high’.9
Westermarck’s answer to the question of why moral judgements are passed on 
‘conduct and character’, or the person’s will as it manifests in actual conduct, is 
strikingly simple. He traces the solution directly back to what kind of emotions 
the moral emotions are. Moral judgements are passed on ‘conduct and character’, 
or the agent’s will,
because such judgments spring from moral emotions; because the moral emo-
tions are retributive emotions; because a retributive emotion is a reactive atti-
tude of mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or something 
looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a cause of pleasure or 
as a cause of pain; and because a living being is regarded as a true cause of 
pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will.
(ODMI, p. 314; also ODMI II, p. 741; ER, p. 172)
The gist of Westermarck’s argument is that we hold people responsible for their 
actions only if we feel retributive emotions towards them. This in turn is inextri-
cably linked to the question about the kind of entities that can be the subjects of 
these emotions. The essential points to emerge from the foregoing are that, first, 
we must consider the object as the cause of pleasure or pain (which we may expe-
rience first-hand or vicariously). Second, the object must be a living and sentient 
being. For example, we do not disapprove of damages caused by natural disasters. 
Third, the object must be a willing or volitional being, because retributive emo-
tions are reactions to pleasure and pain caused by the agent’s will.
Let us now look at what Smith says about what kinds of objects are held respon-
sible for their actions. Smith discusses the matter by means of what kind of things 
are in ordinary life the subjects of our sentiments of gratitude and resentment. For 
something to be a ‘complete and proper object’ of gratitude or resentment, (1) it 
must be the cause of pleasure or pain; (2) it must be capable of feeling them and 
(3) it must have produced pleasure or pain intentionally. If any of these qualifica-
tions is missing or incomplete, we feel less or no gratitude or resentment towards 
the object (TMS, p. 96).
Thus, Smith and Westermarck present a sentimentalist theory of moral respon-
sibility. First of all, retributive emotions are always directed towards the cause of 
pleasure or pain. In addition to this, retributive emotions are felt towards living 
and sentient beings. Smith and Westermarck observe that our resentment may be 
 9 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 18–19.
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momentarily directed also to inanimate things. Everyday experience shows that we 
may curse and kick a chair or stone that hurts us, ‘we thus behave as if the offending 
object were capable of feeling our resentment, we for a moment vaguely believe 
that it is alive’ (ODMI, p. 262). However, ‘our anger disappears as soon as we 
reflect that the thing in question is incapable of feeling pain’ (ODMI, p. 315). Smith 
uses the same example and points out that ‘the least reflection, indeed, corrects this 
sentiment, and we soon become sensible, that what has no feeling is a very improper 
object of revenge’ (TMS, p. 94). By the same token, Westermarck follows Smith in 
arguing that we may feel some kind of gratitude or affection for inanimate objects 
which have given us great pleasure. Westermarck says, quoting Smith, that ‘a man 
grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use 
of, and conceives something like a real love and affection for them’. However, both 
of them observe that gratitude proper can be felt towards such objects only that are 
themselves capable of feeling pleasure (ODMI, p. 318; TMS, p. 94).
Because retributive emotions are felt towards sentient beings, animals are more 
suitable objects of these emotions than inanimate things. According to Wester-
marck, one can even say that ‘there is a general tendency’ to treat animals as if 
they were ‘proper objects of moral censure’. This shows, for example, that when 
a dog or a horse ‘obstinately refuses to submit to its master’s will’, it arouses 
‘resentment which almost claims to be righteous’. Moreover, quoting Smith, 
Westermarck explains that if animals cause human death, ‘neither the public, nor 
the relations of the slain, can be satisfied, unless they are put to death in their turn, 
nor is this merely for the security of the living, but, in some measure, to revenge 
the injury of the dead’ (ODMI, p. 251; TMS, pp. 94–95, emphasis added). These 
emotional reactions are basically akin to how human wrongdoers are punished for 
their shocking acts. The animal or the human individual has ‘to suffer on account 
of the indignation it aroused’ (ODMI, p. 257).
Westermarck argues that in light of this, it is not surprising that at different times 
and in different cultures animals have been treated as responsible agents. When 
this is the case, it is mostly due to the fact that animals are believed to be more or 
less human-like beings. Similarly, cognitive factors affecting conceptions of moral 
agency are reflected in the fact that when people do not have such beliefs, animals 
are not regarded as responsible agents (ODMI, pp. 251, 254, 258, 260; also ER, 
pp. 168–170). When responsibility is not assigned to animals, it is due, above all, 
to the fact that people understand that ‘they are incapable of recognising any act of 
theirs as right or wrong’. As we have seen, one of the regularities of moral respon-
sibility judgements is that agents are held responsible for the consequences or side-
effects of their actions only in so far as they can be aware of them. Consequently, 
‘it is obvious that no act is wrong which the agent could not know to be wrong’ 
(ODMI, p. 249). This is the main reason we do not regard animals as moral agents.10 
10 Similarly, Smith observes that although animals are sentient beings, they ‘are still far from being 
complete and perfect objects, either of gratitude or resentment; and those passions still feel, that 
there is something wanting to their entire gratification’ (TMS, p. 95).
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For the same reason, people do not generally feel the desire to punish small children 
or the mentally ill. The necessary prerequisite for this is the psychological insight 
and understanding of ‘their inability to judge of the nature of their acts’. If so, small 
children and the mentally ill are not held as responsible agents (ODMI, p. 316; see 
also ODMI, pp. 264–277, 298–299).
Finally, Smith and Westermarck observe that in order for resentment or grati-
tude to arise – and for us to hold human agents praiseworthy or blameworthy – 
they must have produced pleasure or pain intentionally. Conversely, we do not 
feel these emotions when another person harms or benefits us unintentionally. 
Provided the person is not guilty of excessive negligence, we do not feel anger 
or indignation if someone hurts us by accident. We do not feel gratitude or moral 
praise towards a person who does us good by pure chance. Similarly, because 
retributive emotions are directed at the agent’s will, ‘our anger abates, or ceases 
altogether’, if we find that the person ‘who injured us acted under compulsion’ or 
under the influence of some other involuntary impulse, ‘too strong for any ordi-
nary man to resist’. In such cases, the agent’s behaviour does not reflect ‘his real 
self’ (ODMI, pp. 314–318).
To sum up, in Westermarck’s theory of moral responsibility, a ‘moral agent’ is 
a ‘sentient and volitional entity’ who is capable of understanding the nature of his 
or her actions and foreseeing their consequences. When knowledge and reflective 
thought play a sufficient role in moral judgements, people do not feel moral indig-
nation towards animals, small children, the mentally deficient or the mentally ill. 
In such conditions, these agents are ‘totally or partially exempted from moral 
blame and legal punishment’ (ODMI, pp. 92–93, 249, 269, 316, 319).
Moral neutrality and the average person
While Westermarck focuses largely on moral disapproval or indignation, he 
observes that most behaviours are morally neutral, arousing neither approval nor 
disapproval in other people. As long as human beings live roughly up to the cus-
toms of a society or social group in which they belong, their actions and motives 
are not viewed in more detail, ‘and when we call their actions right we neither 
blame nor praise them’ (ER, p. 153; see also ODMI, pp. 154–157). Westermarck 
outlines a theory of praise and blame in which a sort of ‘average’ actions – an 
intuitive, socially learned understanding of how people typically behave in similar 
circumstances – serve as a benchmark for moral evaluation. In his view, ‘[w]e 
praise, and, especially, we regard as deserving praise, only what is above the aver-
age, and we censure what is below it’ (ODMI, p. 151; ER, p. 140). This observa-
tion gets a variety of manifestations in his writings.
First, no one deserves praise for abiding by moral rules that are generally obeyed 
and which transgression gives rise to moral disapproval. We do not praise people 
for performing their duties, that is, for doing something which omission tends to 
evoke moral disapproval (ODMI, pp. 136, 150; ER, pp. 125, 139). However, the 
agent is held praiseworthy ‘on account of an act which, from a strict point of view, 
is his duty, but a duty which most people, under the same circumstances, would 
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fail to comply’ (ODMI, p. 151, emphasis added; also ER, pp. 124–125, 140). We 
have also seen that to forbear from doing something may evoke moral approval. 
People assign moral praise to a person who refrains from doing something that 
would benefit him but inflict harm to some other person or to others, ‘which in 
similar circumstances would have proved too great a temptation to any ordinary 
man’ (ODMI, p. 213; ER, p. 157, emphasis added).
Second, although less commonly, there are also situations in which we assign 
moral praise to people for not wanting to avoid some consequences of their action. 
The agent’s merit, then, lies in the fact he acts in a certain way, ‘although he 
knows that his deed will benefit someone who has injured him, and towards whom 
the average man in similar circumstances would display resentment’ (ODMI, 
p. 214; ER, p. 158, emphasis added). Third, similar considerations are involved 
in evaluating negligence. Both ordinary moral standards and modern legislation 
presume that people should in their actions abide by ‘ordinary care and foresight’. 
Conversely, such negligence arouses moral disapproval that is below the level of 
ordinary care which people are obliged to follow. For this reason, human beings 
are held responsible for unintentional injuries that result from a want of ‘due’ or 
‘proper’ foresight (ODMI, pp. 208, 235, 308, 317–318, emphasis added). Finally, 
Westermarck employs the idea of the average person when examining human 
motivations. Our indignation lessens if we find that the person who injured us 
acted under coercion, or was influenced by an emotion ‘too strong for any ordi-
nary man to resist’. In these cases, the agent is also partially or totally exempted 
from moral blame (ODMI, p. 316; ER, p. 174; see also ODMI, p. 284; ER, p. 151).
Like many other aspects of Westermarck’s study of moral responsibility, his 
account of average behaviours draws on Adam Smith. ‘That seems blamable’, 
Smith says, ‘which falls short of that ordinary degree of proper beneficence which 
experience teaches us to except from every body’. Similarly, only ‘that seems 
praise-worthy which goes beyond it’. Smith also pays attention to morally neutral 
behaviour, suggesting that the ‘ordinary degree itself seems neither blamable nor 
praise-worthy’. This shows that a father, a son, or a brother ‘who behaves to the 
correspondent relation neither better nor worse than the greater part of men com-
monly do, seems properly to deserve neither praise nor blame’. But when people 
show kindness or unkindness that is ‘extraordinary and unexpected’, they seem 
‘praise-worthy in the one case, and blamable in the other’ (TMS, p. 80). Moral 
neutrality is a key part of the virtue of justice, which Smith identifies with refrain-
ing from harming another. A person who refrains from harming others, but shows 
no special benevolence, deserves neither moral praise nor blame. Justice is for 
Smith indispensable for any sort of human social life, and ‘[w]e may often fulfil 
all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing’ (TMS, p. 82).
Throughout his writings, Westermarck readily recognises his debt to ‘the moral-
ists of the emotional school’ (ER, pp. 117–118). As he puts it in the preface of 
the Moral Ideas, ‘the reader will easily find how much I owe to British science 
and thought – a debt which is greater than I can ever express’ (ODMI, p. vi). This 
chapter provides an overview of Westermarck’s perspective on the formation of 
the philosophical tradition linking morality to sentiments or emotions. The first 
part of the chapter discusses his relation to ‘the moral sense school’ (ER, p. 35), 
whose most prominent representatives were Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl 
of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746). The second 
part of the chapter focuses on Westermarck’s debt to David Hume. In Wester-
marck’s published writings, references to his predecessors are largely of minor 
significance, but his lectures contain detailed accounts and critical assessments 
of their contributions to the development of the sentimentalist theory of moral 
judgement.1
Westermarck on the moral sense
The sentimentalist line of thought in British moral philosophy originates in the 
early eighteenth-century theories of the moral sense, which developed in reac-
tion to two positions. One was the Hobbesian view that human nature is funda-
mentally selfish and antisocial, and that our moral judgements are based entirely 
on self-interest. The other was moral rationalism, the view that moral distinc-
tions are derived from reason alone (Gill, 2010; Turco, 2003). The concept of the 
moral sense was introduced in philosophical discourse by Shaftesbury’s ([1711] 
1999) Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. While Westermarck 
 1 Westermarck lectured on British, especially Scottish, moral philosophy for the first time in the 
mid-1890s. Between 1912 and 1932 he lectured on the British Enlightenment regularly in Finland. 
Westermarck’s survived lectures on Shaftesbury and Hutcheson contain a reference to the year 
1931, but he most likely utilised them also in his earlier teaching. His lectures on Hume, delivered 
in 1913 at the University of Helsinki, consist of forty typewritten pages and cover Hume’s episte-
mology, philosophy of religion and moral philosophy. For general account of the moral and social 
thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, see Berry (1997); Broadie (2009).
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recognises Shaftesbury’s significance as a forerunner of moral sentimentalism, 
he emphasises that Shaftesbury’s ‘primary task was not to investigate the origin 
and nature of moral judgements, but to establish the objective characteristics of 
virtue’.2 However, by grounding ‘the nature of virtue’ in the study of ‘human 
nature’ Shaftesbury detached virtue and moral goodness from the Christian doc-
trines and paved the way for secular ethics. Westermarck explains that Shaftes-
bury’s view of virtue is inextricably linked to his conception of the universe as 
a large harmonious whole with a myriad of interdependent parts. All living crea-
tures are adapted to pursue their own good, but they also contribute to the good 
of the species and the larger natural systems of which they are part. This great 
interdependence is depicted in endless harmony and beauty, and ‘all creatures are 
only constituents of a large infinite unity’.3
In contrast to Hobbes, Shaftesbury argues that humans are also endowed with 
other-regarding affections that make us naturally social and tend to the public 
good. In Westermarck’s words, human beings are, for Shaftesbury, ‘by nature 
endowed with both selfish and social instincts’; they naturally pursue their own 
interests, but they are equally ‘benevolent towards others’. According to Shaft-
esbury, virtue consists in a harmony or balance of these ‘egoistic and altruistic 
tendencies’. It is usually the selfish tendencies that are excessive, but also the 
social ones may be too strong. However, when these instincts or tendencies are 
in balance, a specific reflective feeling arises in us, and Shaftesbury calls this 
‘reflex affection’ the moral sense. Westermarck concludes that, for Shaftesbury, 
‘our moral judgements are thus based on a faculty that enables us to find and 
perceive the harmony which comprises virtue’. As the eye discerns colours and 
proportions and the ear distinguishes sounds, the moral sense detects the ‘har-
monious’ and the ‘dissonant’ in our dispositions. It is essentially an ‘emotional 
faculty’, as Westermarck emphasises in various occasions. When the moral sense 
is properly cultivated, it perceives eternal and immutable moral truths that exist 
independently of all human minds. As a result, moral judgements would coincide 
in everyone with a sufficiently developed moral sense.4
When Westermarck proceeds to examine ‘the scientific value of Shaftes-
bury’s ethics’ he reveals something essential about his approach to the history of 
moral philosophy. It is the perspective of an empirically oriented scholar seeking 
descriptive claims and hypotheses on moral psychology and behaviour which can 
be exposed to critical examination and further development. Above all, Wester-
marck regards the idea of balance between the egoistic and altruistic dispositions 
as a vague starting point for the study of moral evaluation. Shaftesbury suggested 
that we approve of their harmony, but ‘the notion of harmony implies a certain 
 2 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 12.
 3 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 175–176. For thor-
ough discussion of Shaftesbury’s ethics, see Gill (2006); Darwall (1995). Donald Levine (1995) 
outlines a more sociological account of Shaftesbury’s place in the development of British social 
theory.
 4 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 176–178, 189.
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judgement already in itself’. ‘What is the harmony between egoism and altruism 
that characterises virtue?’ Westermarck asks and continues: ‘How much should 
I suppress my egoistic dispositions and how much of my altruistic dispositions?’ 
This is the gist of Shaftesbury’s theory of virtue, but for Westermarck, a clear and 
definite answer cannot be given by means of the notion of ‘harmony’.5
In addition, Shaftesbury gave the benign and altruistic side of human nature 
considerably more weight than the self-interested tendencies. Westermarck argues 
that considering Shaftesbury’s main focus was upon virtue, this is understandable 
insofar as ‘we attach epithets “good” or “virtuous” primarily to altruistic actions – 
a circumstance which in my opinion is due to the fact that the moral emotions 
which are the basis of moral values are retributive emotions of approval or disap-
proval’. We experience these emotions mainly ‘when a person performs an action 
that affects the lives and interests of others, whereas we are not as concerned with 
actions which affect the agent’s own interests alone’. However, while Shaftesbury 
spoke of the harmony of affections, he failed to show why the egoistic tendencies 
would influence morality in such a minor degree. Recall also Westermarck’s view 
that moral disapproval or indignation plays a much more dominant and active role 
in morality than moral approval. These are the facts Shaftesbury failed to grasp in 
his ‘moral optimism’ and ‘overestimation of the altruistic nature of human beings’.6
Hutcheson’s moral sense theory
Where Shaftesbury referred to the moral sense ‘without special emphasis’, West-
ermarck emphasises that Hutcheson made the moral sense the cornerstone of his 
moral philosophy. As Westermarck points out, Hutcheson’s notion of the moral 
sense is connected with his overall doctrine of human senses. Hutcheson proposes 
that, in addition to the five senses of sight, hearing, taste and so on, there are vari-
ous ‘internal senses’.7 These senses denote the way in which the mind receives 
ideas independently of the will and through which we experience the feelings of 
pleasure and pain (Hutcheson, [1728] 2002, p. 17). Westermarck’s lectures focus 
on Hutcheson’s posthumous A System of Moral Philosophy, where he suggests 
that humans are endowed with the sense of beauty and harmony, the sympathetic 
sense, the social sense, the conjugal and parental sense, the sense of honour, the 
senses of decency and dignity, the religious sense and the moral sense.8
Each of these internal senses, Westermarck continues, implies a certain ‘deter-
mination of the will’. By this, Hutcheson refers to our basic desires for our own 
happiness and that of others. In Westermarck’s words, ‘[i]n human nature, there 
 5 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 180.
 6 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 180–181, 187.
 7 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 188–190. In the 
descriptive part of his lecture on Hutcheson, Westermarck draws largely on Leslie Stephen’s 
(1876) History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
 8 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 189; Hutcheson 
([1755] 2015, pp. 15–21, 24–29, 33–37).
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are thus both selfish and altruistic instincts, as we would put it, and they are 
fully independent of one another’. Also these desires are for Hutcheson ‘inter-
nal senses’, as well as other psychological phenomena that Westermarck would 
rather call ‘instincts or emotions’. All these senses and tendencies make the 
human nature a kind of machine which innumerable purposeful structures affirm 
the existence of the divine designer.9 As Luigi Turco (1999) puts it, pleasures and 
pains we receive through ‘the bodily senses are given to us in order to survive as 
individuals’, whereas ‘the pleasures and pains of the internal senses are given to 
us by the wise Author of nature in order to survive as members of a community’. 
Self-love or self-interest ‘is the ultimate principle that governs the individual in 
order to ensure his own survival. Benevolence is an ultimate principle that gov-
erns us as members of the social body’ (pp. 80–81).
As noted, one of these internal senses is the moral sense. How, then, does the 
moral sense operate? It is a fully independent faculty that cannot be resolved 
into simpler elements. The moral sense is sui generis and cannot be explained by 
means of other psychological facts.10 As Westermarck puts it, Hutcheson argued 
that ‘we approve of a good action and disapprove of an evil action. The good 
action arouses in us immediate pleasure and the evil action arouses immediate 
pain’. In other words, ‘due to our moral sense, we immediately feel pleasure when 
observing virtuous actions and pain when observing evil actions’. We approve 
and disapprove regardless of the effects these actions have on ourselves, as well 
as without any thought of divine rewards and punishments. The moral sense per-
ceives vice and virtue as the eye perceives light and darkness, and is thus inde-
pendent of experience, habit and education.11 Importantly, actions that give rise 
to the feeling of moral approval are motivated by benevolence and promote the 
happiness of others. Consequently, for Hutcheson, ‘our moral sense proves that 
the essence of virtue consists in benevolence’ (ER, p. 36).
According to Westermarck’s reconstruction, Hutcheson assumed that ‘the 
moral sense approves only of actions that promote the general welfare, and 
disapproves of those that conflict with the general welfare’. The moral sense 
evaluates human actions in accordance with the happiness they produce, and 
Hutcheson initiated the utilitarian doctrine ‘that action is the best which pro-
cures the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Westermarck concludes 
that because the Hutchesonian moral sense approves of actions that spring from 
benevolent tendencies and affections, the object of moral assessment is always 
the agent’s character. This shows that we do not attach moral praise to useful 
actions that are performed out of selfish motives. Thus, strictly speaking, the 
moral sense approves only of benevolent dispositions and disapproves of selfish 
dispositions.12
 9 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 189–190.
10 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 190; Westermarck 
(1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 12.
11 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 190–192.
12 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 191–192.
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Westermarck believes that Hutcheson ‘developed ethics a step forward’, above 
all, by emphasising ‘the distinction between the moral sense and reason’. This 
refers to the series of arguments by which Hutcheson sought to prove that moral 
judgement is affective. In stressing the connection between moral judgements and 
the feelings of approval and disapproval, Hutcheson ‘introduced new elements 
to moral philosophy, which proved to be important for David Hume and Adam 
Smith’.13 However, when Shaftesbury and Hutcheson argued that ‘the morality or 
immorality of conduct is discriminated by a special sense “implanted” in us for 
this purpose’ (ER, p. 35), they were making the moral sense a ‘mysterious’ and 
‘metaphysical construction’.14 Westermarck also mentions the often-expressed 
view that the whole term is misleading because ‘this supposed “faculty” not only 
lacks a bodily organ, but its perceptions lack the uniformity which characterises 
our perceptions under similar physiological conditions’ (ER, p. 36).
In Westermarck’s appraisal, Hutcheson failed to realise that the moral sense 
is nothing but ‘our tendency to experience the moral emotions of approval and 
disapproval’. The functions of the moral sense ‘fall thoroughly to the domain 
of feeling’, which was the case also with Shaftesbury. Hutcheson attributed our 
virtue and vice related pleasures and pains to the moral sense, but Westermarck 
argues that these moral approvals and disapprovals are emotions. In other words, 
they differ from the feelings of pleasure and pain in that they are ‘mental states in 
which the conative element comprises the essential constituent’. This means that 
these emotional reactions involve at least some desire to reward or punish another 
person. This is a point emphasised by Hutcheson’s disciple Adam Smith, who 
thereby ‘took moral psychology a long step forward’.15
Another shortcoming of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy is the view that approval 
and disapproval of the moral sense are irreducible and cannot be analysed into 
simpler constituents. As we have seen, for Westermarck, moral disapproval and 
approval form a special class of emotions that can be called the moral emotions. 
However, the former is a species of ‘resentment’ and akin to anger and revenge, 
and the latter is a species of ‘retributive kindly emotion’ and akin to gratitude. 
This proves that the moral emotions have their roots in mental phenomena that 
fall outside the sphere of the special ‘moral sense’ postulated by Hutcheson.16 
Thus we are back to Westermarck’s naturalistic explanation of moral emotions, 
showing their links to nonmoral retributive emotions and, further, similar phe-
nomena in other animal species.
Hume’s moral psychology
Westermarck’s (1925) biographical writings reveal that he developed enthusiasm 
for David Hume as an undergraduate in the early 1880s. In particular, Westermarck 
13 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 188, 192.
14 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 192.
15 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), pp. 192–193.
16 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 193.
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commended Hume’s epistemology, but he acknowledged Hume’s achievements 
also as a founder of political economy, comparative religion and cultural histo-
ry.17 It is often noted that the main influences on Westermarck’s moral theory are 
David Hume, Adam Smith and Charles Darwin.18 G. H. von Wright argues that 
with respect to the history of British moral thought, it is not an exaggeration to say 
that ‘Westermarck rediscovered Hume and Smith after a century dominated first 
by utilitarian and then by evolutionary ethics’. As Von Wright points out, Wester-
marck’s views on moral objectivism and the truth-value of moral judgements, in 
particular, reveal ‘far-reaching and often striking similarities’ to Hume’s Treatise 
of Human Nature (von Wright, 1982, p. 48).19
Westermarck placed great value on Hume’s conception of ethics as a descrip-
tive enterprise. Instead of conducting a normative project, Hume ‘seeks to explain 
and understand [moral] phenomena as shaped by human psychological nature’. 
Thus, for Westermarck, Hume’s approach belongs to ‘psychological’ or ‘scientific 
ethics’. In his lectures on Hume, Westermarck also uses moral philosophy inter-
changeably with ‘moral psychology’. At the same time, he points out that efforts 
to explain moral beliefs rather than to lay down rules for action are also found in 
the work of Hume’s sentimentalist predecessors.20
Second, according to Westermarck, Hume deserves great credit for ground-
ing moral judgements in sentiments or feelings. Hutcheson paved the way for 
Hume by proposing that ‘our moral concepts are derived from the fact that cer-
tain actions produce in us immediately pleasure and others immediately pain’. 
Accordingly, ‘we feel pleasure when we contemplate a virtuous action and pain 
in the contemplation of a vicious action’. But where Hutcheson ascribed these 
feelings of approval and disapproval to the special moral sense, Hume rejected 
this postulate. In Hume’s moral theory, ‘the moral sentiments are not attributed to 
some specific faculty of the soul’, which indicates a ‘major advance’. Related to 
this, Hume argues that the moral sentiments are based on our sympathy with the 
feelings of others. Westermarck follows Hume’s lead in this regard, but there are 
also significant differences between them. Finally, Hume saw that morality has 
evolved as part of human social life and that our capacity for self-evaluation is 
impossible without the social context.21
17 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 48, 50, 83.
18 See e.g. Stroup (1982a, pp. 126–127); von Wright (1982, pp. 29, 48–49) Edel (1982, pp. 79–80); 
Wolf (1995, p. 509).
19 On these themes in Westermarck, see Stroup (1981). As regards von Wright’s comment on Wester-
marck’s ‘rediscovery’ of Hume’s moral philosophy, James Harris (2005) summarises the reception 
of Hume’s moral theory in British moral philosophy by noting that ‘little of interest is said about it 
in the nineteenth century’. During that period, ‘Hume is taken to be an early architect of utilitarian-
ism, and so is applauded by later exponents of that doctrine, and criticized by their enemies. He 
is sometimes praised for having shown that egoism and utilitarianism are distinct doctrines; he is 
regularly attacked for having failed to recognize the centrality to the moral life of actions done for 
the sake of duty alone’ (pp. 314–315).
20 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 74, 80.
21 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 81.
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Besides these considerations explicitly acknowledged by Westermarck, Hume’s 
influence is evident in Westermarck’s treatment of objectification of emotions as 
a major element in moral experiences. He must also have been very impressed 
by Hume’s attempt to trace deep similarities in the psychological and especially 
emotional structure between humans and other animals.22 Moreover, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, Westermarck placed much value on Hume’s account of 
moral responsibility. At the same time, for Westermarck, Hume’s moral psychol-
ogy contains two major flaws. The first concerns the prominent role Hume gives 
to considerations of social utility in how people make moral judgements. The 
second shortcoming is Hume’s insufficient analysis of the nature of the moral 
sentiments on which our moral judgements are based.23
In what follows, I first discuss Westermarck’s examination of Hume’s psychol-
ogy of action which provides the basis for Hume’s theory of moral judgement. In 
the second section, I outline Westermarck’s perspective on Hume’s moral subjec-
tivism and his thesis of objectification. In the next section, I discuss the role of 
sympathy in Hume’s theory of the moral sentiments and compare Hume’s account 
with Westermarck’s position. In the section that follows, I examine Hume’s and 
Westermarck’s views on self-evaluation. The end of the chapter concentrates on 
the points in Hume’s moral theory that Westermarck considered the weakest. In 
this regard, I explore Westermarck’s critique of Hume’s emphasis on social util-
ity. I also illustrate how similar outlooks are manifest in Westermarck’s published 
writings. Finally, I conclude by re-evaluating Westermarck’s reading and critique 
of Hume’s account of the moral sentiments.
Feeling, volition and human action
According to Westermarck, Hume’s moral philosophy is based on a ‘thorough 
examination of human affections, passions, and acts of will’. For Hume, these 
constitute one province of the mind, while the other consists of sensations and 
ideas familiar from Hume’s theory of knowledge. Westermarck explains that 
in the same way as Hume traces the operations of thought into impressions or 
sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain constitute the basic elements of the 
emotional and volitional aspects of human psychology. Hume derives a whole 
range of affections and passions from these basic feelings. Thus, by charting 
‘the simple elements’ that help to ‘explain more complex phenomena’, Hume 
‘wanted to provide a natural history of affections and passions’.24 As discussed 
22 See T, pp. 176–179, 324–328, 397–398; E, pp. 104–108. For discussions of Hume’s comparisons 
between humans and animals, see Pitson (1993); Beauchamp (1999).
23 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 82.
24 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 54, 74–75. In the descriptive part of his lec-
ture on Hume’s moral philosophy, Westermarck draws heavily and often verbatim on Falckenberg 
([1886] 1893) and Høffding ([1894] 1900). These works featured in the curriculum in philosophy 
at the University of Helsinki since their publication and remained there also during Westermarck’s 
professorship (The Central Archives of the University of Helsinki: Curricula 1878–1928).
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in Chapter 3, a similar procedure can be seen in Westermarck’s theory of retrib-
utive emotions.
Pleasure and pain are for Hume ‘the ultimate mainsprings of all human 
action’. Westermarck highlights the importance and originality of Hume’s thesis 
concerning the emotional basis of volition or willing. In Hume’s view, ideas and 
thoughts can motivate action only when associated with emotional experienc-
es.25 Here, Westermarck is referring to Hume’s famous argument that ‘reason 
alone can never be a motive to any action of the will’, and reason alone ‘can 
never oppose passion in the direction of the will’ (T, p. 413). Hume claims to 
prove, as phrased by Barry Stroud (1977), that ‘in order to perform any action, 
or to be moved to perform it, we must be “affected” in some way or another by 
what we think the action will lead to’. In other words, ‘we must in some way 
want or prefer that one state of affairs obtain rather than another if we are to be 
moved to bring about that state of affairs’ (p. 156). Hume attacks the idea of the 
combat between reason and passion by making use of his distinction between 
calm and violent passions. All passions can be violent or calm. When passions 
motivating us ‘are calm and cause no disorder in the soul’, we readily misjudge 
our actions as governed by reason, although in reality it is the calm passions that 
are at work (T, p. 417).26
Westermarck’s position on the relationship between feeling and volition bears 
a close resemblance to Hume’s. By examining this topic, it is also possible 
to shed light on Westermarck’s relation to certain utilitarian assumptions. G. 
H. von Wright (1965) points out that when Westermarck argues that retribu-
tive emotions are directed towards the causes of pleasure or pain, these feel-
ings serve as the ultimate foundations of moral judgements. According to von 
Wright, since Westermarck did not pay enough attention to this issue, it is not 
completely clear how his ethical theory relates to different utilitarian and hedon-
istic doctrines.
As discussed in previous chapters, Westermarck considered pleasure and 
pain as fundamental psychological facts. Broadly speaking, these feelings 
denote the agreeable or disagreeable ways in which different sensations and 
ideas affect the individual. In Westermarck’s view, ‘the feeling of pain or 
pleasure, however faint it may be, always lays the foundation for volition’. 
This is because our volitions are always related to ideas or images of what we 
want. These ideas or images, in turn, are associated with feelings that are either 
pleasant or unpleasant. Consequently, feelings that we actually and presently 
experience produce volitions because our thoughts are always more or less 
emotionally coloured. Like Hume, Westermarck argues that although cogni-
tive processes are often considered as nonemotional, the emotional component 
is always involved since feelings may be faint and unnoticeable.27 Similarly, 
25 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 75.
26 For further discussion on Hume’s account of passions and the will, see Penelhum (2009).
27 Westermarck (1915) (Box 80: Lectures, Psychology II), pp. 149–150.
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Westermarck explains in his sociology lectures that when we act intentionally, 
the aim of the act is not a prospect of pleasure or avoidance of pain, but an idea 
or image. Human action is influenced by pleasure or pain associated with the 
idea of an end, because our thoughts always involve some kind of experience 
of these basic emotional reactions. However, Westermarck emphasises that this 
position differs from the utilitarian doctrine that we are always motivated by 
the thought of gaining pleasure, or avoiding pain, in prospect (Westermarck, 
1894, pp. 34–35).
Westermarck’s way of using pleasure and pain in his mature theory of moral 
emotions bears similarity to Hume’s account of the passions. As noted, Hume 
argues that all passions arise from the experiences of pleasure or pain. Similarly, 
as we saw in Chapter 3, Westermarck regards these feelings as constitutive ele-
ments of all emotions, including the retributive emotions in which his moral 
theory is built. In addition, pleasure and pain are at the heart of Westermarck’s 
account because our retributive emotions are ‘always reactions against pain or 
pleasure felt by ourselves’ (ODMI, p. 108; ER, p. 96). For this reason, ‘[i]n our 
moral consciousness pleasure and pain certainly play a dominant role, in so far 
as moral approval is a friendly attitude of mind towards a person as a cause of 
pleasure, and moral disapproval a hostile attitude of mind towards a person as a 
cause of pain’ (ER, p. 260).
However, Westermarck’s view on the significance of pleasure and pain in how 
moral emotions arise ‘has nothing whatever to do with the psychological question 
of pleasure and pain as motives of action’. In order to clarify his position, West-
ermarck points out that ‘the doctrine of psychological hedonism’, which assumes 
that ‘volition is always determined by pleasure or pain actual or prospective’, is 
erroneous. He explicitly rejects the hedonistic theory of motivation, which claims 
that ‘the motive of all action is the desire to feel pleasure or avoid pain’ (ER, 
pp. xiv, 259–260, emphasis added). Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the utilitar-
ian philosophy and psychology, believed that all human action is motivated by 
pleasure and pain ‘in prospect’. In this view, action is always based on imagined 
expectations about the future (Bentham, [1823] 1907; Crimmins, 2014). But for 
Westermarck, it is obvious that an ‘act may be desired though it is not known 
by the agent to be attended with pleasure’ (ER, p. 259). Although Westermarck 
believes that pleasure and pain provide the basis of volition, he argues on a looser 
and less deterministic position than Bentham. These feelings influence human 
behaviour via cognitions, but this does not mean that people always and in all 
circumstances seek pleasure and avoid pain.
Moral subjectivism and objectification
Hume’s psychology of action is, according to Westermarck, of direct importance 
for his moral theory, because it contains an answer to the question whether moral 
judgements are based on reason or feeling. For Hume, the operations of reason 
are confined to discovering relations of ideas and matters of fact. This means that 
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moral judgement arises only when an observation or idea of an action gives rise 
to an emotional reaction.28 Thus, Westermarck says,
It is only because our feelings have been set in motion that we call anything 
good or evil. The moral qualities such as good and evil are thus valid only 
from the standpoint of sentient beings, just as sense perceptions only possess 
validity from the standpoint of sensing creatures.29
Consequently, moral judgements lack objective validity. By this, Westermarck 
means that they do not represent a mind-independent state of affairs, but are anal-
ogous with sense perceptions which do not ‘correspond any objective circum-
stances’ in the external world.30 In the Treatise, Hume makes clear that goodness 
or evilness is not in the act itself, any more than colours, tastes or smells are 
qualities of objects. Instead we consider acts good or evil, virtuous or vicious, 
only because they produce in us a certain kind of sentiment (T, pp. 468–469). An 
essential part of Westermarck’s understanding of Hume’s moral subjectivism is 
that this does not in any way deprive morality of its value and importance to the 
human condition. As Westermarck puts it, ‘[i]n practice we use the moral valua-
tions with as much confidence as we avail ourselves of our sensations. Neither of 
them expresses any objective circumstances, but we ascribe objectivity to them, 
and practically speaking we can hardly fail to do so’.31
Echoing Hume, Westermarck argues in the Moral Ideas that just as the human 
mind is structured so that we hear sounds, see colours and perceive the tempera-
ture, we have evolved to experience human action and interaction morally. For 
this reason, it is impossible to step outside morality:
Our moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution, which we can-
not change as we please. We approve and we disapprove because we can-
not do otherwise. Can we help feeling pain when the fire burns us? Can we 
help sympathising with our friends? Are these phenomena less necessary, less 
powerful in their consequences, because they fall within the subjective sphere 
of experience?
(ODMI, p. 19, emphasis added)
This brings us back to Westermarck’s thesis of objectification discussed 
in Chapter 3. His account is conspicuously indebted to Hume (Stroup, 1981, 
1984).32 Hume argues famously that ‘the mind has a great propensity to spread 
28 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 75.
29 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 75–76.
30 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 76.
31 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 76.
32 John Mackie, too, recognises Westermarck as the successor of Hume’s theory of objectification 
(Mackie, 1980, pp. 71–72). Elsewhere, Mackie (1967) praises the ‘radical importance’ of West-
ermarck’s appeal to objectification, ‘for it undermines all attempts to support ethical objectivism 
Development of moral sentimentalism 109
itself on external objects’ (T, p. 167) and that we ‘gild’ and ‘stain’ actions and 
character traits ‘with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment’ (E, p. 294). 
Thus, Hume says,
when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean noth-
ing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or senti-
ment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may 
be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern 
philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.
(T, p. 469)33
Like Hume, Westermarck compares moral emotions to sensations which are 
also attributed as the qualities of objects. People pronounce ‘certain acts to be 
good or bad on account of the emotions those acts aroused in their minds’, just as 
they call ‘sunshine warm and ice cold on account of certain sensations which they 
experienced’ (ODMI, p. 4). Similar objectification takes place in aesthetic judge-
ments. Quoting Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Westermarck states on 
various occasions that beauty is no quality in things themselves, but exists merely 
in the mind which contemplates them (HHM, p. 257; ODMI, p. 8; ER, p. 48).
Sympathy and the moral sentiments
As we have seen, one of the central issues in Westermarck’s ethics concerns the 
nature and characteristics of moral emotions. Not surprisingly, he pays attention 
to the same question in Hume. First, Westermarck asks, what kind of feeling or 
sentiment constitutes the basis of moral judgement? According to Hume, moral 
judgements are based on a pleasing and disinterested sentiment of approbation. 
What, then, are the ‘actions or qualities’ that arouse in us the sentiment of moral 
approbation? These qualities or actions all share a common feature: they are 
directly or indirectly useful to the agent or to others. Taking into account Hume’s 
full argument, Westermarck adds that there are also qualities that arouse approval 
because they are agreeable to the person possessing the trait or to others.34 These 
useful or agreeable qualities are what Hume calls ‘virtues’, defined simply as any 
quality of mind or character that ‘gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation’ (E, p. 289).
Westermarck strongly emphasises that in Hume’s view, the main determi-
nants of our moral approval are qualities that are useful to the agent or to 
others. Thus, ‘pleasure and utility are, for Hume, the criterion of moral merit’. 
by appealing to the meaning of moral terms and incidentally reveals Westermarck’s firm grasp of 
essentials that are often obscured by the current preoccupation with the use of ethical language’ 
(p. 285).
33 For further discussion of objectification in Hume, see Stroud (2000); Kail (2007).
34 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 76.
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Also, qualities that are agreeable or useful to the person who has them obtain 
their moral significance from the fact that they arouse approbation in other 
people even though these traits do not benefit them in any way. The disinter-
ested character of moral approval shows that we admire traits and deeds of our 
enemies even though they are hurtful to us. For Hume, Westermarck concludes, 
these facts prove that the sentiment of moral approval does not spring from 
self-interest.35
As is well known, Hume explains the origin of moral sentiments by means of 
sympathy. Westermarck expresses this by saying that ‘an inductive study of the 
sphere of moral phenomena’ reveals the crucial role of sympathy in moral judge-
ments. In Hume’s moral theory, ‘[s]ympathy is the actual foundation of morality’ 
because it ‘induces us to feel pleasure in something which contributes the hap-
piness of others and distress for something which inflicts harm’. Importantly, for 
Hume, ‘this pleasure and pain are the same as moral approval and disapproval 
insofar as they relate to actions and characteristics’.36 This is a succinct way to 
express Hume’s view that we feel these sentiments only towards people’s qualities 
and actions as signs of these traits. As we saw in Chapter 6, this is an important 
resemblance between Hume and Westermarck.
From Westermarck’s perspective, one of Hume’s great achievements was to 
ground the moral sentiments in sympathy. Westermarck points out that one of the 
main goals of his Moral Ideas was to show that our emotions of moral approval 
and disapproval are, in a very substantial degree, connected with our capacity to 
sympathise with others.37 In order to see how Westermarck’s understanding of 
sympathy stands in relation to Hume’s, we must briefly consult Hume’s Treatise 
and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
In the Treatise, sympathy refers to a psychological mechanism through which 
all kinds of passions and sentiments are communicated from one individual to 
another. According to Hume, when we observe emotional expressions in others, 
our minds spontaneously form an idea of this passion or sentiment. This idea is 
then turned into a feeling similar to what the other person is experiencing. We may 
also witness the situational causes that generally produce certain passions and 
infer through them the other person’s emotional state (T, pp. 316–317, 575–576). 
‘No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its con-
sequences, than that propensity we have to sympathise with others’ (T, p. 316). 
Our capacity to sympathise takes us ‘out of ourselves’ and makes human minds 
‘mirrors to one another’ (T, pp. 365, 579). Hume and Westermarck also share the 
view that sympathy is not unique to humans. As phrased by Hume, passions such 
as grief, fear, anger, courage and many others ‘are frequently communicated from 
one animal to another, without their knowledge of that cause, which produc’d the 
35 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 77.
36 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 77.
37 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 81. Forget (2003) discusses the different mani-
festations of sympathy in the eighteenth-century human and natural sciences.
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original passion’ (T, p. 398).38 In his later work Enquiry, Hume adopts a more 
straightforward approach to sympathy, but his account of sympathy remains 
substantially the same (Abramson, 2001; Vitz, 2004, 2016). Here, in addition to 
sympathy, Hume uses the terms ‘fellow-feeling’ and ‘humanity’ to refer to our 
capacity to share the feelings of others. He maintains that ‘[i]t is needless to push 
our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with 
others’. Because the examination of causes must stop somewhere, it was for him 
enough to note that ‘[n]o man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery 
of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This 
every one may find in himself’ (E, pp. 219–220).
As noted above, Hume argues that the sympathetic feelings arise when we per-
ceive or imagine the expressions of emotions in another person’s appearance and 
behaviour. Westermarck too considered this as one of the main sources of sym-
pathy. First, he observes that feelings of pleasure and pain may be transmitted 
from one person to another as a result of the ‘close association that exists between 
these feelings and their outward expressions’. Using the same example as Hume, 
Westermarck explains that a ‘sight of a happy face tends to produce some degree 
of pleasure in him who sees it’ and ‘the sight of the bodily signs of suffering tends 
to produce a feeling of pain’ (ODMI, p. 109; ER, p. 96). Like Hume, Wester-
marck’s view of the underlying psychological process is based on naturally occur-
ring mental associations. The sympathetic ‘feeling of the spectator is due to the 
fact that the perception of the physical manifestation of the feeling produces the 
feeling itself on account of the established association between them’ (ER, p. 96; 
also ODMI, p. 109). Sympathetic feelings may also arise via another kind of men-
tal association: ‘Sympathetic pleasure or pain may be the result of an associa-
tion between cause and effect, between the cognition of a certain act or situation 
and the feeling generally produced by this act or situation’ (ODMI, p. 109; ER, 
p. 96, emphasis added). This is clearly akin to Hume’s argument on witnessing the 
causes of other people’s feelings and emotions.
Before taking a closer look at Hume’s account of the moral sentiments, it is 
worth recalling that Westermarck distinguishes emphatically moral emotions 
from nonmoral retributive emotions. Like Hume, he stresses the disinterested 
character of moral approval and disapproval. This applies equally to first- 
person and observer perspectives. Simply put, moral emotions have the appear-
ance of disinterestedness, because we feel that we would approve or disapprove 
the agent’s action quite independently of its effect on our personal interests 
(ODMI, p. 101; ER, p. 90). In the first-person position, retributive emotions are 
disinterested when a person feels that ‘his condemnation is not due to the particu-
lar circumstance that it is he himself who is the sufferer’, but ‘that his judgment 
would be the same if anybody else in similar circumstances had been the victim’ 
38 Westermarck discusses this kind of emotional contagion in animals in ODMI, p. 114 and ER, 
p. 106. For his accounts of sympathetic emotional reactions in animals, see ODMI, pp. 111–114; 
ODMI II, pp. 197–198; ER, pp. 98–103.
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or the beneficiary (ER, p. 90). The same applies to moral praise. In reality, the 
feel of disinterestedness may be mixed with unconscious biases. To illustrate his 
point, Westermarck quotes Hume’s remark that it is very common that we regard 
our enemy or rival vicious and blameworthy because our evaluations are influ-
enced by the opposition of our interests (ER, p. 91; T, 472). As for the spectator 
perspective, due to sympathy, we are also capable of experiencing vicarious and 
disinterested retributive emotions when another person is benefitted or injured 
(ODMI, pp. 108–110; ER, pp. 95–97).
In the Treatise, Hume argues that the sentiment of moral approbation is a kind 
of pleasure, but that there are many different kinds of pleasure. Listening to music 
or drinking wine produces different kinds of pleasure, ‘[n]or is every sentiment of 
pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, 
which makes us praise or condemn’ (T, pp. 471–472). As many Hume scholars 
have pointed out, he distinguishes moral praise and blame, approval and disap-
proval, from our more personal reactions to the characters and actions of others 
(Cohon, 1997; Korsgaard, 1999; Brown, 2008). Our moral judgements are based 
on the moral sentiments, and we feel these sentiments only when we contem-
plate a person’s character traits ‘in general, without reference to our particular 
interests’ (T, p. 472). Moral sentiments arise when we consider the agent’s char-
acter and action from a ‘general point of view’, which refers to the perspective of 
the person or persons most directly affected by the agent’s character and action 
(T, pp. 581–582, 602–603).39 As Norton and Kuehn (2006, p. 967) point out, for 
Hume, disinterestedness is the key element in moral approval and disapproval, 
and it is the principle of sympathy that makes vicarious and disinterested pleasure 
and pain possible.40
Later on in the Enquiry, Hume illustrates this moral sphere of social reality even 
more clearly. When someone calls another person ‘his enemy, his rival, his antag-
onist, his adversary’, Hume explains that ‘we readily understand that he speaks 
39 For further discussion on the general point of view in Hume, see Sayre-McCord (1994); Korsgaard 
(1999); Brown (2001, 2008).
40 Hume’s most explicit remarks about why we adopt the general point of view are of direct socio-
logical interest. Hume held the general point of view as fundamental to human social intercourse. 
Because ‘every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others’, it would be impos-
sible to ‘converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and 
persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view’ (T, p. 581). Every day we ‘meet with 
persons, who are in a different situation from ourselves’, and it would be ‘impossible men cou’d 
ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, 
from which they might survey their object’ (T, pp. 591, 603). In order ‘to prevent those continual 
contradictions’ and to arrive at mutual understanding and cooperative interactions, ‘we fix on some 
steady and general points of view, and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever 
may be our present situation’ (T, pp. 581–582). It is our capacity to sympathise that enables us to 
take up the general point of view: ‘The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conver-
sation, makes us form some general inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove 
of characters and manners’ (T, p. 603; E, p. 229). For further discussion on this matter, see Sayre-
McCord (1994, pp. 213–220).
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from the self-interested viewpoint’. We are capable of realising when a person 
expresses passions that are ‘peculiar to himself, and [that arise] from his particular 
circumstances and situation’. However, when someone describes another person 
with ‘the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he [. . .] expresses sentiments, 
in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him’. In order to feel 
moral sentiments, we must ‘depart from [our] private and particular situation’ and 
choose a ‘common point of view’ (E, p. 272).
In addition to disinterestedness, moral emotions for Westermarck are character-
ised by the appearance of impartiality and certain generality. With these features, 
Westermarck seeks to show that the moral emotions have the peculiar feel relat-
ing to how anyone ought to be treated. Hume and Westermarck are talking much 
about the same thing, but they seem to approach the issue from somewhat differ-
ent perspectives. According to Westermarck, we feel moral emotions in a variety 
of situations, and the generalised viewpoint related to morality results from the 
nature of these emotions. Hume’s position is less clear. At the beginning of Trea-
tise, Hume says that moral sentiments can be experienced independently of the 
general point of view. Later on, however, Hume emphasises that in order to feel 
moral sentiments and to make moral judgements we must first adopt the general 
point of view (Gill, 2009, p. 588).41
Self-evaluation
Westermarck emphasises that sympathy plays a key role also in Hume’s account 
of self-evaluation. For Hume, the habitual tendency to judge the actions of others 
gives rise to another habit of considering our own actions from the viewpoint of 
their effects on others. In Westermarck’s reading of Hume, we are able to evalu-
ate our own actions because ‘we have learned through sympathetic feelings’ to 
approve of actions promoting the good of others and to disapprove of the contrary 
kind. Westermarck stresses the importance of Hume’s notion that ‘conscience that 
teaches us the moral value of our own actions is thus not something which occurs 
originally in the individual, but is rather a product of sympathetic feelings which 
have their prerequisites in social life’.42 Thus, for Hume, conscience is a habitual 
tendency to view our own actions through the real or imagined reactions of others.
Westermarck’s comment refers to Hume’s account of pride, humility and repu-
tation. As Paul Russell (1995) points out, Hume highlights on various occasions 
that ‘our self-evaluations depend very largely on the judgments of others’. Pride 
is a pleasant passion, humility or shame is painful, and their importance for social 
and moral life derives from their role in self-evaluation. Pride and humility are 
self-directed passions linked to how our own characteristics and actions appear 
in the eyes of others (pp. 155–156, 165). Our self-directed moral judgements, in 
particular, ‘are strongly affected by society and sympathy’ (Hume, [1757] 2007, 
41 For differing emphases on this issue, see Brown (2001); Garrett (2001).
42 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 77–78.
114 Development of moral sentimentalism
p. 14), which denotes our sympathy with the praise and blame of our associates 
(T, pp. 316, 320–321). The desire to be approved by people with whom we have 
contact and whom we appreciate, and the dread of their disapproval, are great 
motivations in human life:
By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in 
the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, 
and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard 
us. This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps 
alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a 
certain reverence for themselves as well as others.
(E, p. 276, emphasis added)
In all this Westermarck found much to agree with Hume. In his view, Hume was 
fully correct in suggesting that in the development of the individual, self-evaluation 
is preceded by the more elementary phenomenon of passing judgements on oth-
ers. Westermarck reads Hume as holding that our first judgemental reactions 
are not directed towards ourselves but towards other people. In this way, Hume 
rightly held self-evaluation as a ‘product of sympathetic feelings which have their 
prerequisites in social life’.43 In other words, we are dealing here with our capac-
ity to sympathise with feelings and emotions we ourselves evoke in other people. 
This suggests that the capacity for self-evaluation can develop only through social 
interaction and that self-directed moral emotions are impossible without the social 
context. When these remarks are read in the light of Westermarck’s published 
writings, it becomes clear that in his view, the temporal primacy of the other-
directed retributive emotions applies also to the evolutionary history of human 
moral emotions.
Westermarck stresses that ‘the moral consciousness’ is not ‘at its origin engaged 
in self-estimation’ (ODMI, p. 123; ER, p. 113). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, 
for Westermarck, the moral emotions are ‘of extreme antiquity in the human 
race’ and among early humans, they were ‘felt unanimously by a body of men’ 
or ‘society at large’. Because ‘the earliest moral emotions were public emo-
tions’, he argues that ‘the original form of the moral consciousness cannot, as is 
often asserted, have been the individual’s own conscience’ (ODMI, pp. 117–118, 
123–124; also ER, pp. 109, 112–113). Instead, Westermarck assumes that during 
human evolution, the capability for self-evaluation developed ‘circuitously [. . .] 
through a prior critique upon our fellow-men’. The emotions of self-approval and 
remorse are impossible ‘unless the idea of morality had been previously derived 
from another source’, through observing and feeling retributive emotions towards 
other people (ODMI, pp. 123–124; ER, pp. 112–113). Westermarck is surpris-
ingly silent about the possible evolutionary logic behind self-directed retributive 
emotions. However, given his account of the origin of retributive emotions, we 
43 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 77–78, 81.
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may assume that he viewed emotions related to self-evaluation as contributing to 
the regulation of one’s own behaviour in order to avoid costly social punishment 
in the conditions of close-knit social groups characterised with strong mutual 
dependence.
The importance of social utility for moral judgements
As we saw above, Hume proposed that the moral sentiments arise from our sym-
pathy with the pleasant or unpleasant effects the agent’s actions and characteris-
tics have on others or the agent herself. In Westermarck’s words, it is specifically 
through the ‘sympathetic feelings’ that Hume’s focus in the study of moral evalu-
ation ‘shifts from the individual to society’. Hume’s ethical investigations focus 
on the social virtues and especially on justice. According to Hume, Westermarck 
continues, social virtues are based on the fact that ‘we consider such actions as 
right which promote the good of the society as a whole’. In Hume’s moral theory, 
the main determinant of moral judgements is not the ‘good of the individual’ but 
the ‘good of the society’. People largely approve of what they consider useful 
to society, and it is through our sympathetic feelings that we take interest in the 
good of society. Correspondingly, human beings largely disapprove of what they 
consider harmful to common good or society.44
Hume stresses the importance of social utility more strongly in the Enquiry 
(Rosen, 2003). In his view, the ‘characters which engage our approbation are 
chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society’, and ‘the 
characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and 
disturbance’ (E, p. 102). Simply put, social virtues are qualities in persons that 
‘produce pleasure, because they are useful to society’ (E, p. 261). Thus:
It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility, in all subjects, 
is a source of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all 
moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the 
sole source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, 
and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, 
generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, 
that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to 
mankind and our fellow creatures.
(E, p. 231)
As we have seen, according to Hume, our capacity to sympathise is the source 
of our moral approval and disapproval of the effects virtuous and vicious charac-
ter traits and actions have on others, whether members of our own community or 
people of distant ages and remote countries. In this way, sympathy or humanity 
enables us to express ‘a general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame 
44 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 78–79.
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of what is dangerous and pernicious’ (E, p. 266). This leads us to Hume’s view of 
the role of reason in moral evaluation. Westermarck specifies that although sym-
pathy provides Hume the basis of moral judgement, it is through reason that we 
realise what kinds of actions are beneficial for society.45 As Hume puts it, because 
‘characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the 
peace and security of human society’, whereas ‘characters which excite blame 
are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance’, it can be concluded 
‘that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflec-
tion of these opposite interests’ (E, p. 102, emphasis added). Reason alone ‘can 
instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial 
consequences to society and to their possessor’. But reason alone cannot produce 
a moral judgement (E, pp. 285–286).
Finally, Westermarck states that, according to Hume, what people consider 
useful for society depends upon the prevailing social conditions. Although ‘the 
conceptions of morality vary among different peoples’, Hume suggests that these 
conceptions, ‘in each case, originate from the same principle’. According to 
Hume, Westermarck concludes, ‘what people consider and call good or evil is, for 
the most part, what they consider useful or harmful for the public, for the society’. 
This is the ‘principle of morals’ which ‘is the same everywhere’.46
Westermarck’s critique of Hume
Westermarck argues that Hume’s moral theory, despite its many merits, was seri-
ously weakened by his ‘psychological utilitarianism’.47 This concerns Hume’s 
view that people approve of characteristics and actions that benefit the agents 
themselves, some other person or persons or the society in general. In this regard, 
Westermarck stresses Hutcheson’s influence on Hume. As Westermarck puts it, 
Hutcheson proposed that ‘we approve of dispositions and actions that promote 
the general welfare, and we disapprove of those that conflict with the general 
welfare’.48 Also in his lectures on the moral-sense theorists, Westermarck high-
lights Hutcheson’s role as a ‘precursor of Hume and utilitarianism’. Hutcheson 
argued that ‘the criterion of right’ employed universally in moral evaluation is 
the ‘action’s tendency to promote the general welfare’ in accordance with the 
principle of ‘the great happiness for the greatest number’. Thus, according to 
Westermarck, although Hume wisely rejected Hutcheson’s moral-sense-based 
‘explanation of the origin of moral judgements’, he erred in adopting Hutcheson’s 
utilitarian ‘criterion of morality’.49
45 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 79.
46 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 79.
47 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 82.
48 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), pp. 80–82.
49 Westermarck (1931) (Box 79: Lectures, Philosophy of the Enlightenment), p. 194. A similar remark 
on Hume’s debt to Hutcheson is provided by Leslie Stephen (1876, pp. 61–62). Hutcheson’s 
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Westermarck was very unsatisfied with Hume’s view that we mainly approve of 
character traits and actions we conceive as beneficial for society, while disapprov-
ing of those we consider detrimental. By doing this, Hume overestimated the role 
of ‘human calculation’ in moral evaluation.50 Westermarck tells his students that
I recall vividly my silent opposition when I read Hume’s explanation of the 
origin of various concepts of virtue; he finds social utility everywhere, even 
when it is a matter of moral valuations that obviously are based on pure 
expressions of emotions without any thought of what is most beneficial to 
society, as is the case, e.g., with many issues which belong to the sphere of 
sexual morality.51
This reveals another important difference between Hume and Westermarck. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Westermarck believed that moral emotions are not 
always based on sympathy, because in many cases moral disapproval can be 
traced to emotional aversions. In his view, even when our moral disapproval 
stems from our sympathy with the person wronged, the question is rather about 
our immediate emotional reactions to the circumstance of that particular person, 
not considerations of the benefit of the society. ‘In this simple combination of 
resentment and sympathy we have a fact of extreme importance for the moulding 
of the moral consciousness, – infinitely more important than any calculation as 
regards social utility’ (Westermarck, 1898, p. 306, emphasis added). More specifi-
cally, Westermarck regards appeals to social utility as post hoc rationalisations of 
emotional responses, because people very often appeal to ‘utilitarian pretexts to 
support moral opinions or legal enactments which have originated in mere aver-
sions’ (ODMI II, p. 745). Similarly, when discussing institutional punishment, 
Westermarck argues that ‘it is not to be believed that, in practice, the infliction of 
punishment is, or ever will be, regulated merely by considerations of social utility’ 
(ODMI, p. 91). Rather,
The retributive desire is so strong, and appears so natural, that we can neither 
help obeying it, nor seriously disapprove of its being obeyed. The theory 
that we have a right to punish an offender only in so far as, by doing so, we 
promote the general happiness, really serves in the main as a justification for 
gratifying such a desire, rather than as a foundation for penal practice.
(ODMI, p. 91, emphasis added)
In his critique of Hume’s emphasis on social utility, Westermarck sides with 
Adam Smith. As Smith puts it, people often react with indignation to ‘the young 
influence on Hume is much debated among Hume scholars (Moore, 1995, 2007; Norton, 2005; 
Turco, 2007; Tolonen, 2013).
50 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 82.
51 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 82, emphasis added.
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and the licentious’ whose conduct seems to ridicule ‘the most sacred rules of 
morality’. However, although it is their ‘hatefulness and detestableness, which 
originally inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole 
reason why we condemn them’. We are reluctant to admit that we condemn them 
‘merely because we ourselves hate and detest them’. People tend to rationalise the 
emotional reactions that precede moral judgements, ‘and the consideration which 
first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from 
the universal prevalence of such practices’ (TMS, pp. 89–90). As Haakonssen 
(1981) points out, Smith maintains that even when people disapprove of actions 
that cause direct harm to others, ‘social utility is rarely thought of by the bulk of 
mankind’ (p. 88). For Smith, our moral sentiments are always passed upon the 
pleasant or painful effects actions have ‘upon particular individuals, not the more 
remote effects upon society at large’ (Raphael & Macfie, 1982, pp. 13–14).52
There are, however, three contexts where Westermarck gives social utility a 
more contributory role in social and moral practices. These are (1) the transfor-
mation of social customs into laws, (2) the replacement of private revenge and 
blood feud with formal systems of punishment and (3) the emergence of property 
rights. In the first case, Westermarck argues that when customs are transformed 
into laws, they become ‘expressly formulated’ and ‘enforced by a more definite 
sanction’. For Westermarck, ‘[i]t seems that the process in question arose both 
from considerations of social utility and from a sense of justice’ (ODMI, p. 165).
In the second case, Westermarck suggests that conceptions of public utility have 
influenced the gradual process leading to the emergence and institutionalisation of 
judicial and executive powers. His starting point is the idea that ‘[f]or every soci-
ety it is a matter of great consequence that there should be peace between its vari-
ous members’. In private revenge and blood feud the agents are either personally 
involved in the conflict or belong to the immediate circle of the person wronged, 
so the retributive emotions motivating revenge tend to be strong. For this reason, 
punishment has a tendency to exceed the limits fixed by custom, which in turn 
prompts a counter-retaliation. In other words, these practices have ‘a tendency to 
cause disturbance and destruction’, which is, in the long run, ‘injurious both to 
the families implicated in the feud and to society as a whole’. Therefore, ‘some 
method of putting a stop to the feud will readily be adopted’ and one solution is 
to let an independent body determine the appropriate punishment. In this way, ‘by 
slow degrees [. . .] revenge has yielded to punishment, and the private avenger has 
been succeeded by the judge and the public executioner of his sentence’ (ODMI, 
pp. 182–183).
Finally, a reflection of common interest or social utility is one of the circum-
stances which have made ‘interference with other persons’ possessions the subject 
of moral censure’. Besides the psychological causes discussed in Chapter 5, West-
ermarck raises three overlapping factors underlying the genesis of moral norms 
52 For Smith’s critique of Hume’s account of utility as the foundation of moral evaluation, see Raph-
ael (1972–1973); Haakonssen (1981, pp. 67–74); Martin (1990); Rosen (2000).
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against theft. First, there is the effect of child rearing: ‘From both prudential and 
altruistic motives parents taught their children to abstain from such interference, 
and this, by itself, would readily give rise to the notion of theft as a moral wrong’. 
Prudential motives refer to an understanding of the potentially dangerous conse-
quences of such actions, both to the offspring and the family. Altruistic motives, 
on their part, refer to the parents’ affection and solidarity towards other members 
of the community. Second, ‘[s]ociety at large also tried to prevent acts of this 
kind, partly in order to preserve peace and order, partly out of sympathy with the 
possessor’. Here, the collective attempt to preserve peace and order within the 
community is the closest Westermarck gets to the considerations of public good. 
Collective sympathy refers again to the Smithian argument regarding the immedi-
ate emotional reactions to the victim’s emotions, that is, that ‘[r]esentment is felt 
not only by him who is deprived of his possession, but by others on his behalf’ 
(ODMI II, pp. 52, emphasis added).
What kind of sentiments are the moral sentiments
According to Westermarck, the most serious flaw in Hume’s moral psychology is 
his inadequate analysis of the moral sentiments. Contrary to what Hume seems to 
suggest, Westermarck stresses that moral approval and moral disapproval are not 
merely feelings of pleasure and pain. Instead, they are reactive emotions aroused 
by acts of will and whose essential characteristic is the desire to reward or punish 
the person they are directed at. Despite Hume’s insurmountable achievements in 
epistemology, Westermarck holds that as ‘moral psychologist’, he was overshad-
owed by his younger friend Adam Smith. This is largely because Hume ‘did not 
analyse the moral emotions with sufficient sharpness or profundity to discover 
their retributive nature, which at once throws light on many of the otherwise dark 
corners of the moral consciousness’.53
Westermarck’s account of Hume’s theory of the moral sentiments does not 
necessarily do full justice to Hume’s thinking. Hume states already in the intro-
duction to the Enquiry that his aim is to expose the qualities of mind or charac-
ter which make a person ‘an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred 
and contempt’ (E, pp. 173–174, emphasis added). At the same time, Hume is 
explicit that in the Enquiry, he does not treat the nature of the moral sentiments in 
more detail (E, p. 317). As we have seen, Hume believes that ‘moral distinctions 
depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure’ (T, p. 574; 
also pp. 471, 591). But unlike Westermarck assumed, Hume observes that the 
moral sentiments are something more than mere pleasures and pains. Following 
53 Westermarck (1913) (Box 78: Lectures, Hume), p. 82–83. In his review of the Moral Ideas, Sam-
uel Alexander (1906) draws attention to this difference between Hume and Westermarck. In Alex-
ander’s view, Westermarck ‘makes a real advance in insisting that the moral emotion is active, not 
a mere contemplative pleasure or pain at the sight of an act, but an impulse to resent injury and to 
support beneficence. This consideration is absent certainly from Hume’ (p. 538).
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Páll Árdal (1966, 1977), many Hume scholars have argued that Humean moral 
approval and disapproval are species of love and hatred.
Hume uses the terms love and hatred in a very general way. Love denotes a 
favourable feeling towards another person as a response to his or her character 
traits and actions. Hatred is the opposite of love and represents a hostile feeling 
towards another person. When we evaluate our own character traits and actions, 
our judgements depend on whether we feel pride or humility (shame) towards 
ourselves (Árdal, 1966, pp. 8–11, 18, 34). Hume and Westermarck share the view 
that many of the prerequisites of human moral sentiments are found in animal 
emotional life. In addition to sympathetic responses, Hume argues that all sen-
tient animals feel love and hatred towards members of the same species. Animals 
may experience love even towards members of other species. Similarly, pride and 
humility ‘are not merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole 
animal creation’ (T, pp. 326, 397–398).
An important distinction in Hume’s theory of the passions is between calm 
and violent passions. This is not a categorical distinction but concerns their usual 
intensity. Love and hatred are violent passions, but moral approval and disap-
proval are typically calm rather than violent. However, it was obvious for Hume 
that our moral sentiments may also be violent and intense, as when we face severe 
cases of cruelty or injustice (Árdal, 1977, pp. 409–413). In an important passage 
Hume says that the ‘pleasure or pain, which arises from the general survey or 
view of any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives 
rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imper-
ceptible love or hatred’ (T, p. 614, emphasis added and deleted). The passions of 
love and hatred, pride and humility, figure significantly in the parts of the Book III 
of the Treatise where Hume explores the emotional origin of moral judgements 
(T, pp. 473, 575).
In some passages, Hume links love and hatred even more firmly to the desire 
to reward and punish their object. This is because love and hatred are closely 
associated with benevolence and anger. When discussing the human conception 
that virtue deserves reward and vice punishment, Hume suggests that this is due 
to the fact that ‘love or hatred, by the original constitution of human passion, is 
attended with benevolence or anger; that is, with a desire of making happy the 
person we love, and miserable the person we hate’ (T, p. 591, emphasis added). 
As summarised by Árdal (1966),
the pleasure or uneasiness that the contemplation of tendencies of actions 
produces leads us to love or hate (approve of or disapprove of) the agent. 
These passions are, by nature, closely allied to benevolence or anger, and 
this is why we think that virtue deserves happiness, and vice deserves to be 
punished.
(p. 129; see also Árdal, 1977, p. 415)54
54 For Hume’s account of retribution, see Russell (1995, pp. 137–154).
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On the other hand, even if our moral sentiments are nothing more than calm 
forms of love and hatred (T, p. 614), love and hatred are not in themselves equally 
retributive passions as benevolence and anger. Instead, love and hatred are 
‘attended with benevolence or anger’ (T, p. 591). In the Dissertation on the Pas-
sions, Hume says the same by pointing out that the ‘passions of love and hatred 
are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger’ (Hume, 
[1757] 2007, p. 18, emphasis added). However, by suggesting that love always 
manifests itself together with the ‘desire of happiness to the person beloved’, 
and ‘hatred produces a desire of the misery, and an aversion to the happiness of 
the person hated’ (Hume, [1757] 2007, p. 19), Hume was considerably closer to 
Westermarck’s understanding of the nature of moral emotions than he assumed. 
In this regard, the main difference between them is that Westermarck’s account 
of the moral emotions is less complex. For Westermarck, moral approval and 
disapproval are not ‘attended with’, ‘followed by’ or ‘conjoined with’ some other 
emotions of a more retributive character, but they are in themselves retributive 
emotions. In this, as we shall see in the next chapter, he was following closely in 
the footsteps of Adam Smith.
So far, we have seen that Adam Smith played a crucial role in the formative period 
of Westermarck’s theory-building as well as his examination of moral responsibil-
ity. This chapter continues to examine Smith’s influence on the key elements of 
Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions. It is commonplace in the literature on 
Westermarck, both in his time and ours, to emphasise his debt to Smith. Similarly, 
for Westermarck (1900), Smith’s ‘ingenious hypothesis’ of moral consciousness 
was supported by his own ‘comprehensive study of the moral ideas of various 
nations and in various ages’ (p. 185). Later on, he included Smith among ‘the 
three writers who above all others have exercised an inspiring influence on my 
work in Sociology and Ethics’, the other two being Darwin and James Frazer 
(Westermarck, 1928, p. 190).
Westermarck emphasises that Smith followed in many respect the work of his 
sentimentalist predecessors, and especially David Hume. There are, according 
to Westermarck, three main affinities. First, Smith’s concern was to establish a 
descriptive and explanatory theory of morality along the lines of Hume’s science 
of human nature. Second, Smith followed Hume in rejecting Hutcheson’s doc-
trine of the moral sense. And third, like Hume, Smith analysed moral judgements 
as based on our sympathy with the emotions of others. Despite these affinities, 
Westermarck stresses that Smith was not reiterating ‘Hume’s moral psychology 
but advanced a theory of his own’.1 Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is, for 
Westermarck, ‘the most important contribution to moral psychology made by any 
British thinker’ (ER, p. 71), and he states that ‘I recognise with gratitude that of 
all moral philosophers or moral psychologists there is none from whom I have 
learned anything like as much as from Adam Smith’.2 Westermarck also laments 
how difficult it is to produce a summary which does the work full justice. As 
he puts it, The Theory of Moral Sentiments contains ‘a great number of extraor-
dinarily fine observations concerning the details’ that Smith uses, together with 
 1 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 11–13. For comparison between Hume 
and Smith in these respects, see Haakonssen (1981, chapters 1–3); Raphael (2007, chapters 1–4); 
Sayre-McCord (2015).
 2 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 21.
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the continuous flow of examples, to illustrate his main ideas. For this reason, he 
focuses only on the outlines of ‘Smith’s moral-psychological theory’.3
This chapter begins by looking at Westermarck’s view of the nature of Smith’s 
moral philosophy. Second, I examine Smith’s account of sympathy on which 
his moral theory is based, and analyse Westermarck’s conception of sympathy 
in relation to Smith’s. Third, I explore Smith’s account of moral judgement and 
show that Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions is based largely on simplify-
ing Smith’s work. In the section that follows, I analyse Westermarck’s interpreta-
tion of another key element of Smith’s moral theory, the notion of the impartial 
spectator. Finally, the chapter shows that Smith and Westermarck share a similar 
conception of the significance of emotions in scientific inquiry.
Nature of Smith’s moral theory
Westermarck (1900) viewed Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments as an attempt to 
formulate a moral-psychological theory on ‘the root-principles of the moral con-
sciousness’ (p. 185). While many Smith scholars today read The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments as a primarily descriptive project,4 this has not always been the case. 
As Knud Haakonssen and Donald Winch (2006) put it, ‘[f]or most of the two cen-
turies since The Theory of Moral Sentiments stopped being read on the premises 
of Smith’s contemporaries, the work has been seen as an exercise in normative 
moral psychology’ (p. 380; see also Berry, 2013, pp. 15–17). In their view, ‘the high 
point’ of the descriptive and empirical use of Smith was reached by Westermarck, 
‘who developed it into a detailed socio-psychological theory of morality that could 
account for all the major features of morality’ (Haakonssen & Winch, 2006, p. 382).
Westermarck admired Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (among other rea-
sons) because its key premises are compatible with the basic principles of Dar-
winian evolutionary theory. However, unlike some later scholars, Westermarck 
was not making Smith a proto-evolutionist of some kind. He emphasises that 
Smith believed in a providential God as the initiator of all things.5 It was rather 
that Smith’s deistic framework enabled him to look at human social behaviour in 
a way that makes sense also from the Darwinian perspective. There is no doubt 
that Westermarck would not agree with the contemporary scholars emphasising 
that ‘the mention of God or Providence is not necessary to the argument of any 
empirical claim in TMS’ (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 45).6
 3 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 11.
 4 See e.g. Campbell (1971, 2013); Raphael (2007); Haakonssen (1981, 2002); Barbalet (2005); 
Smith (2006); Broadie (2006); Philipson (2010). Other writers such as Griswold (1999) and Han-
ley (2009) emphasise the normative aspects of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and argue that 
Smith’s essential aim is the subtle promotion of virtuous and moral conduct.
 5 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 5–6. For discussions of ‘proto- 
evolutionist’ reading of Smith, see Hill (2001, pp. 17–18); Laurent & Cockfield (2007, 141–145).
 6 See also Haakonssen (1981, pp. 74–7); Macfie (1967, chapter 6). Smith’s views on religion and 
especially their implications for his moral-psychological and social scientific arguments have been 
disputed. For discussion, see Kleer (1995); Hill (2001); Kennedy (2013).
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More specifically, Westermarck appreciated Smith’s understanding of the adap-
tive significance of human passions and emotions. Smith observes that a variety 
of passions and emotions, both positive and negative, are shared between humans 
and animals (TMS, p. 28). These include the emotions of resentment and gratitude 
upon which Smith built his theory of moral judgement, consisting of what West-
ermarck (1900) regarded as ‘mental facts easily explicable as results of natural 
selection’ (p. 185). Westermarck also highlights Smith’s observation that, both 
in humans and animals, retributive emotions serve protective functions. ‘Exactly 
the same view’, Westermarck adds, ‘is taken by several modern evolutionists as 
regards the “end” of resentment, though they, of course, do not rest contented with 
saying that this feeling has been given us by nature, but try to explain in what way 
it has developed’ (ODMI, p. 41).
Another example of Smith’s naturalistic reasoning concerns parental altruism. 
As Westermarck puts it, Smith realised, ‘a hundred years before’ Darwin’s Origin 
of Species, that parental affection and altruism towards offspring’s are usually 
stronger than offspring’s altruism towards their parents. This makes evolutionary 
sense because, Westermarck quotes Smith, ‘the continuance and propagation of 
the species depend altogether upon the former, and not upon the latter’ (ODMI II, 
p. 194; TMS, p. 142). All this comes back to Smith’s nearly Darwinian-sounding 
premise that ‘self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great 
ends which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals’ (TMS, 
pp. 77–78). In all organisms we see ‘how every thing is contrived for advancing 
the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propaga-
tion of the species’ (TMS, p. 87). Westermarck’s interpretation of Smith antici-
pates the recent endeavours to examine The Theory of Moral Sentiments in the 
light of evolutionary and biological explanations of cooperation and morality.7 
The background to this tendency is that, as Samuel Fleischacker (2004) puts it, 
Smith’s ‘accounts of how natural processes arise and function can always be cast 
in the language of evolution by natural selection – not, of course, that Smith had 
that language yet explicitly available to him’ (p. 45).
Smith’s account of sympathy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments opens with an analysis of sympathy. Human 
beings are for Smith equipped with what Westermarck terms an ‘innate instinct’ 
to imitate the expressions and gestures of others. This shows, for example, that 
the facial expressions of joy and grief tend to produce similar expressions in the 
spectator. Similarly, when we see an acrobat balancing on a rope, we involuntarily 
 7 The most informative neo-Darwinian discussions of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments are Haig 
(2011); Smith (1998); Brosnan (2011). During the rise of sociobiology, The Theory of Moral Sen-
timents was commented favourably by Ghiselin (1974, pp. 256–257) and Coase (1976, pp. 539–
541; 1978, pp. 244–245). Much of the literature dealing with Smith’s work from the contemporary 
evolutionary framework revolves around the controversial group selectionist theory of ‘strong 
reciprocity’ (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2005; Clark, 2009; Elster, 2011).
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move and balance our bodies in the similar way as the acrobat does. Besides imi-
tating the facial and bodily movements of others, Smith suggests that we have a 
tendency to feel similar emotions as the people we observe.8
At the beginning of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith points out that in 
colloquial language, sympathy refers to pity or compassion, ‘our fellow-feeling 
with the sorrow of others’. Within the framework of his moral theory, however, 
Smith uses sympathy in a broad sense to denote ‘our fellow-feeling with any pas-
sion whatever’ (TMS, p. 10; also p. 42). Thus, for Smith, sympathy means sharing 
any kind of feeling or emotion another person is experiencing.9 In view of West-
ermarck’s theory of sympathy, it is important to note that Smith discusses two 
sources of sympathy or shared emotions. First, Smith observes that in some cir-
cumstances ‘sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emo-
tion in another person’. When grief and joy, for example, are ‘strongly expressed 
in the look and gestures of any one’, they ‘at once affect the spectator with some 
degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion’. Emotions may thus be transmitted 
from one person to another ‘instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of 
what excited them in the person principally concerned’ (TMS, p. 11). It is often 
noted that Smith probably has Hume’s view of sympathy in mind here. As West-
ermarck points out, for Smith, however, our sympathetic emotions are always 
fainter if we only observe emotional expressions in others without knowing their 
cause.10 Smith points specifically to anger and resentment, which are essential 
for his theory of moral sentiments, as passions which ‘excite no sort of sympathy 
[. . .] before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them’ (TMS, p. 11).
It is for this reason that Smith introduces the second and by far the most impor-
tant source of sympathy. Actually, sympathy ‘does not arise so much from the 
view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it’ (TMS, p. 12). 
Since Hume does not discuss the other person’s situation in more detail, Smith can 
be seen as broadening Hume’s view of how sympathetic emotions arise (Broadie, 
2006, p. 166). As emphasised by Fleischacker (2012), even when emotions such 
as joy or sorrow seem to be passed along infectiously, Smith insists that
the appearances are best explained by the fact that such facial expressions 
‘suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen 
the person’ wearing them (TMS I.i.1.6, p. 8). Even when we see a smiling 
face, that is, we come to feel cheerful only because it suggests something to 
us about the situation of the smiling person.
(p. 280)
 8 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 13.
 9 For more detailed account of Smith’s concept of sympathy, see Otteson (2002, pp. 17–18); Fleis-
chacker (2012).
10 In his lectures and the Moral Ideas, Westermarck quotes with approval Smith’s observation that 
‘general lamentations which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curios-
ity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than actual 
sympathy that is very sensible’ (TMS, p. 11; ODMI, p. 109).
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The gist of Smith’s theory of sympathy is that when we observe the emotions 
and actions of others, we spontaneously imagine what we ourselves would feel in 
the same situation. Consequently, Smith strongly emphasises the importance of 
imagination in the arousal of sympathy. His main focus is on sympathetic emo-
tions that ‘arise from an imaginary change of situation with the person principally 
concerned’ (TMS, p. 317, emphasis added; also pp. 9, 19, 21). Since we are able 
to place ourselves imaginatively in the situation of others, it is possible to have 
emotions sympathetically without detecting them in other people. Westermarck 
retells Smith’s example that we blush and feel shame for people who seem insen-
sible of their improper behaviour, ‘because we cannot help feeling with what con-
fusion we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner’.11
Westermarck’s view of sympathy
In his published works, Westermarck’s account of sympathy was originally pro-
vided in the chapter of the Moral Ideas titled ‘The Origin of the Moral Emo-
tions’. Although Westermarck does not bring out Smith’s account of the causes of 
sympathy, it serves as the implicit starting point for his exploration of how moral 
emotions arise. As we have seen, for Westermarck, sympathy refers to the feel-
ings and emotions, both positive and negative, that we feel as reactions to similar 
feelings and emotions in others. Westermarck deals with sympathy in connection 
with his analysis of why people feel retributive emotions on behalf of others. In 
other words, ‘[w]hy should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain calling forth indig-
nation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure calling forth approval because 
he is benefited’ (ODMI, p. 108; ER, p. 96)? The treatment of this question is part 
of his more wide-ranging attempt to examine the specific characteristics of moral 
emotions.
Westermarck discusses three sources of sympathetic emotions. First, he 
observes that feelings of pleasure and pain may be transmitted from one person 
to another merely by means of their bodily expressions. The perception of feel-
ing alone may thus arouse a similar feeling in the spectator (ODMI, p. 109; ER, 
p. 96). As discussed above, this is the first source of sympathy mentioned by 
Smith and the one that is central to Hume. Second, Westermarck suggests that 
the feelings of pleasure and pain may arise from observing acts and situations. He 
means that we, as spectators, anticipate the emotional reactions usually associ-
ated with certain acts or situations. Through this, Westermarck takes into account 
the situational aspects of sympathy much emphasised by Smith. Like Smith, 
Westermarck argues that it is through perceiving the situational context that we 
may sympathise with another without detecting a similar emotion in that person 
(ODMI, pp. 109, 114; ER, pp. 96, 106). In addition, Westermarck follows Smith 
when suggesting that our sympathetic emotions are intensified when both of these 
causes – the perception of emotional displays and their situational contexts – are 
11 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 14; TMS, p. 12.
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simultaneously producing the emotion (ODMI, p. 109; TMS, pp. 11–12). Third, 
we may be roused to retributive emotions by observing the signs of resentment 
or kindly emotions in others. It is typical that anger or resentment is transferred 
from one person to another without us being aware of the cause of the original 
emotion (ODMI, pp. 114, 117; ER, pp. 105–106, 108). In this respect, West-
ermarck differs substantially from Smith, who stresses that the behaviour of a 
furious person does not lead us to sympathise with his or her emotions ‘before 
we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them’. Unless we have knowledge 
of people’s situation, their fury and anger ‘serve rather to disgust and provoke us 
against them’ (TMS, p. 11).
Corrections to Smith’s theory of sympathy
Despite the affinities between Smith’s and Westermarck’s views of sympathy, 
there are at least two significant differences. The first concerns Smith’s notion that 
sympathy is founded upon the imaginative process where spectators put them-
selves in the other person’s shoes. Westermarck’s early theory of moral judgement 
was based on the idea of the imaginary change of places, but his mature writings 
suggest nothing like this. Instead, he analyses sympathy by way of mental associa-
tions. When we feel sympathetic pleasure or pain, these feelings are ‘the result of 
the association between cause and effect, between the cognition of a certain act 
or situation and the feeling generally produced by this act or situation’ (ODMI, 
p. 109; ER, p. 96, emphasis added). In other words, the perception of certain acts or 
situations alone causes us to associate them with certain emotional reactions, and 
thereby we feel them ourselves. As we shall see, this difference becomes more evi-
dent in Westermarck’s critique of Smith’s account of how moral judgements arise.
Another, even more noticeable difference concerns the nature and structure of 
sympathy. In his pioneering study Adam Smith’s Science of Morals, Tom Camp-
bell (1971) places Westermarck among those who have confused Smith’s sympa-
thy with pity or compassion, regarded as the motive of altruistic action. According 
to Campbell, ‘Westermarck thought Smith’s sympathy was “a conative influence 
to promote the welfare of others” ’ (p. 94). This is, however, definitely not the 
case. As demonstrated above, Smith’s treatment of the two sources of sympathy 
was the implicit starting point for Westermarck’s exploration of how sympathetic 
emotions arise. Campbell ignores that Westermarck makes a clear distinction 
between sympathy as the transfer of feelings or emotions and ‘what is generally 
understood by sympathy’ (ODMI, p. 109). It is only after his treatment of the 
sources of sympathy discussed above that he proceeds to deal with sympathy in 
the ‘ordinary’, ‘common’ (ODMI, pp. 110–111) or ‘popular sense of the word’ 
(ER, pp. 96–97). And it is here that Westermarck distances himself further from 
Smith’s description.
In Westermarck’s view, sympathy in the Humean or Smithian sense is not suf-
ficient for us to feel moral emotions on behalf of others. Westermarck develops 
their ideas of sympathy further by arguing that in order for moral emotions to 
arise, sympathetic emotional reaction ‘requires the co-operation of the altruistic 
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sentiment or affection’ (ODMI, p. 110; ER, pp. 96–97). As discussed in Chapter 3, 
for Westermarck, altruistic sentiment denotes a benign attitude towards other liv-
ing beings. Whenever Westermarck deals with the manifestations of moral emo-
tions through sympathy, he means sympathetic reactions that involve the influence 
of altruistic sentiment. As Westermarck’s concept of sympathy comprises both the 
sharing of other person’s feeling or emotion and the influence of altruistic senti-
ment, he comes closer to the contemporary meaning of sympathy as compassion.12
Moral sentiments and two kinds of moral judgements
After discussing Smith’s view of sympathy, Westermarck addresses what he calls 
Smith’s ‘theory of morality’. He explains that Smith uses sympathy to account 
for two kinds of moral judgements. These judgements are based on two distinct 
species of moral sentiments recognised by Smith. Smith’s starting point is that 
when we observe someone acting in a certain way, we have a tendency to place 
ourselves in that person’s situation. As a result, we experience the emotion we 
assume we would feel in the same situation. At the same time, we observe the 
agent’s frame of mind and form an idea of the emotion that motivates his or her 
action. According to Smith, we approve of the action when the emotion we imag-
ine we would feel in the same situation corresponds the agent’s emotion, that is, 
when we sympathise with the emotion. On the other hand, we disapprove when 
the emotion we imagine we would feel differs from the emotion that motivates 
the agent’s action.13 Smith identifies motives with emotions or passions which are 
involved in all human action. He also uses the terms ‘sentiment’, ‘feeling’, ‘pas-
sion’ and ‘emotion’ largely interchangeably.14
12 Westermarck’s account of altruistic sentiment relates to Smith also because in the same context, 
he criticises Smith’s argument on affections prompting altruistic interactions within the family or 
close kin. Their difference in view concerns the relationship between sympathy in Smith’s sense 
and the emotional tendencies termed by Westermarck as the ‘altruistic sentiment or affection’. 
Smith conceived our affections towards particular persons as the result of frequently felt fellow-
feelings. According to Smith, as quoted by Westermarck, ‘[w]hat is called affection, is in reality 
nothing but habitual sympathy’. Because family members are ‘usually placed in situations which 
naturally create this habitual sympathy, it is expected that a suitable degree of affection should take 
place among them’. That is to say, ‘[o]ur concern in the happiness or misery of those who are the 
objects of what we call our affections; our desire to promote the one, and to prevent the other; are 
either the actual feeling of that habitual sympathy, or the necessary consequences of that feeling’ 
(TMS, p. 220). As we have seen, Westermarck suggests that the altruistic sentiment or affection 
‘is not merely willingness to sympathize’, but, above all, ‘a conative disposition to promote the 
welfare of its object’ (ER, p. 97; also ODMI, pp. 110–111). There is a clear causal relationship 
between these psychological aptitudes, but for Westermarck, it is the reverse of what Smith sug-
gested. According to Westermarck, ‘affection is not, as Adam Smith maintained, merely habitual 
sympathy, or its necessary consequence’. Instead the altruistic sentiment ‘must be regarded rather 
as the cause than as the result of’ our willingness to sympathise (ODMI, p. 111).
13 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 14–15.
14 For discussion on Smith’s theory of action and its emphasis on emotions, see Campbell (1971, 
pp. 64–66); Barbalet (2008, pp. 132–133).
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These sentiments of moral approval and disapproval are the first species of moral 
sentiments recognised by Smith. They are the basis for moral judgements Smith 
calls the judgements of propriety and impropriety. As Raphael (2007) puts it, the 
question is of ‘the simple judgement that an action is right or wrong’, ‘appropriate 
or inappropriate, suitable or unsuitable, to the cause that has prompted the agent 
to do it’ (p. 14). In Westermarck’s words, Smith suggests that ‘we approve of an 
action when we sympathise with the agent’s motive, and we disapprove when 
we do not sympathise with his motive’. Westermarck emphasises that ‘it must be 
counted to Smith’s credit that he emphatically brought out the agent’s motive as 
the subject of moral judgement’. In Westermarck’s view, this is an important dif-
ference between Smith and Hume, who ‘fastened himself too much on the exter-
nal act and its consequences’.15
The judgements of merit and demerit
Besides analysing the spectator’s response to the emotions of the agent, Smith 
suggests that we place ourselves also in the position of the person acted upon. 
Through this, Smith analyses the spectator’s response to emotions of the recipient. 
He focuses on two kinds of emotional responses, gratitude and resentment. They 
belong among ‘the strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature’ (TMS, 
p. 200) and are common to humans and animals alike (TMS, p. 28). Resentment 
and gratitude are ‘counterparts to one another’ (TMS, p. 76) and fundamental and 
constitutive elements of human and animal social behaviour: ‘The causes of pain 
and pleasure, whatever they are, or however they operate, seem to be the objects, 
which, in all animals, immediately excite those two passions of gratitude and 
resentment’ (TMS, p. 94).
Gratitude is, for Smith, the ‘sentiment which most immediately and directly 
prompts us to reward, or to do good to another’. Resentment, in turn, is the ‘senti-
ment which most immediately and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil 
upon another’. What, then, constitutes the reward and punishment Smith is talk-
ing about? ‘To reward is to recompense, to remunerate, to return good for good 
received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to remunerate, though in a different 
manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done’ (TMS, pp. 67–68).16
Resentment and gratitude are the basis of the second kind of moral judge-
ments recognised by Smith. Besides the judgements of propriety or impropri-
ety discussed above, there are judgements of merit and demerit, which concern 
whether we think that the agent deserves praise or blame, reward or punishment. 
Westermarck explains that when we observe someone performing a benevolent 
act, we put ourselves imaginatively in the shoes of the recipient. This prompts us 
to experience the emotion of gratitude. What happens is that we, as spectators, 
sympathise with the agent’s emotion on the one hand and with the recipient’s 
15 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 14–15.
16 For Smith’s account of punishment, see Stalley (2012).
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gratitude on the other.17 According to Smith, in order for us to sympathise with 
the recipient’s gratitude, we must also sympathise with the emotion that moti-
vates the agent. It seems clear that if we do not approve the agent’s motive as 
right and proper, we cannot sympathise with the beneficiary’s gratitude. For 
example, if A helps B solely in order to benefit at their experience but B is 
not aware of this, we (knowing A’s true motives) do not sympathise with B’s 
gratitude.
But, as Westermarck points out, when we sympathise both with the agent 
and the person acted on, this kind of double sympathy leads to the final moral 
judgement. According to Smith, the moral approval we feel towards the agent 
strengthens because we sympathise also with the beneficiary’s gratitude. More 
specifically, Westermarck says, it is actually the question of experiencing a 
reflection of the gratitude we would feel if we were personally the subject of 
the agent’s act. Because we imagine ourselves in the recipient’s place, Smith 
argues that we may feel gratitude towards the agent even when the actual recipi-
ent feels none. In this way, the double sympathy provides the foundation of the 
judgement of merit, that is, the judgement that the agent is praiseworthy. On 
the other hand, when we, as spectators, sympathise with the resentment of the 
recipient, we also feel resentment towards the agent. This is the basis of our 
judgement of demerit, that is, the judgement that the agent deserves some kind 
of punishment.18
The judgements of merit and demerit are based on what Westermarck regarded 
as the most significant aspect of Smith’s moral theory. Referring to the second spe-
cies of Smith’s moral sentiments, Westermarck explains that our moral approval 
and disapproval arise not only from our sympathy or lack of sympathy with the 
agent’s motive, but also from our sympathy with the gratitude or resentment of the 
person acted upon. Because of this, Smith held moral approval and disapproval 
closely akin to the emotions of gratitude and resentment.19
In his lectures on British moral philosophy, Westermarck underlines in various 
contexts that Smith differs from Hutcheson and Hume in realising that the moral 
sentiments are not mere feelings of pleasure and pain. For Westermarck, Smith’s 
analysis of resentment and gratitude is of fundamental importance for the under-
standing of the nature of moral emotions. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is ‘the 
most important contribution to moral psychology made by any British thinker’, 
above all, because of ‘the emphasis it lays on the retributive character of the moral 
17 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 15–16.
18 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 15–16. In the same context, Wester-
marck points out that in the case of malevolent actions, the formation of spectator’s moral judge-
ment may be more complex. When a person hurts or offends another, we may approve the act as 
right and justified because we sympathise with the agent’s resentment. But we might, at the same 
time, sympathise with the person who is hurt, and this double sympathy complicates the moral 
evaluation. In Westermarck’s reading, Smith suggests that in such cases, our final moral verdict 
results from a kind of weighing between these two distinct sympathetic emotions.
19 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 16–17.
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emotions’ (ER, p. 71).20 Smith’s account of resentment and gratitude as ‘the root-
principles of the moral consciousness’ resonates with the basic tenets of Darwin-
ian evolutionism: it is ‘a circumstance all the more satisfactory to the student of 
psychical origins as anger towards an ill-doer and friendliness towards a well-doer 
are mental facts easily explicable as results of natural selection’ (Westermarck, 
1900, p. 185).
Smith calls this second species of the moral sentiments ‘the sense of merit’ and 
‘the sense of demerit’. They are a ‘distinct species of approbation and disapproba-
tion’ (TMS, p. 67) that arise, in one case, from our sympathy with the gratitude of 
the beneficiary, and, on the other, our sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer 
(TMS, pp. 74–75). As some commentators have pointed out, Westermarck was 
directly continuing Smith’s work by suggesting that moral disapproval is akin to 
resentment and moral approval to gratitude (Ginsberg, 1982, p. 8; Fletcher, 1971, 
p. 102). To put it more specifically, he developed Smith’s account further by argu-
ing that both gratitude and moral approval are forms of ‘retributively kindly emo-
tion’, whereas all negative retributive emotions are forms of ‘resentment’. In this 
respect, Westermarck’s debt to Smith is clear, but what have passed unnoticed are 
his substantial revisions of Smith.
Corrections to Smith’s account of the moral sentiments
When developing his theory of moral emotions, Westermarck, above all, simplified 
Smith’s account. Smith regarded the second species of moral approval and disap-
proval as ‘compounded sentiments’. This means that ‘the sense of merit’ is ‘made up 
of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and an 
indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions’. 
Similarly, the sense of demerit is a ‘compounded sentiment’ which is ‘made up 
of two distinct emotions; a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent; and an 
indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer’ (TMS, p. 74–5). In Wester-
marck’s view, the structure of moral emotions is much simpler. First, he combined 
Smith’s description of the two distinct species of moral approval and disapproval – 
the first of which applies to the propriety and impropriety, the second to merit and 
demerit – into a single unified theory of moral approval and moral disapproval as 
retributive emotions. Secondly, but related to the first point, Westermarck rejected 
Smith’s complex account of the sentiments of merit and demerit as composed of 
two distinct emotions. Instead, he construed moral approval and moral disapproval 
or indignation as individual emotions, the former being a type of retributive kindly 
emotion, and the latter being a type of resentment.
20 Both in his lectures and published writings, Westermarck alludes to Polybius and the eighteenth-
century philoshopher-psychologist David Hartley as the precursors of the theory of morality based 
on resentment and gratitude. However, it was Smith who made the retributive nature of the moral 
sentiments the cornerstone of his moral theory (Westermarck, 1914, Box 78: Lectures, Adam 
Smith, pp. 17–18; ODMI, pp. 42–43, 95; ER, pp. 69–71).
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These differences appear also in Westermarck’s lectures. It was precisely 
Smith’s notion of double sympathy – with on the one hand the motive of the 
agent and the resentment or gratitude of the recipient on the other – that was an 
unnecessarily complex description of how moral emotions arise. To begin with 
the former, Westermarck agrees with Smith in that ‘our retributive moral emotions 
are surely due in great measure to the motive we ascribe to the agent’. However, 
he rejects Smith’s theory of imaginative changing of places, arguing that ‘I can-
not believe that in general we put ourselves in his place and reproduce the act, 
with ourselves as the agent, in the complicated way Adam Smith seems to assume 
we do’. Second, according to Westermarck, Smith gave too much importance to 
the spectator’s sympathy with the emotions of the recipient. This is because the 
sympathetic origin does not cover the whole scope of moral emotions. As we have 
seen, one of the main points in Westermarck’s analysis of how people make moral 
judgements is that there are expressions of moral emotions where sympathy plays 
no role at all.21
Compared to Smith, Westermarck broadens the scope of morally relevant 
behaviour. This concerns especially the role of emotional disgust in morals. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these ‘disinterested antipathies’ or ‘sentimental aversions’ 
are equally important facts of moral psychology as our capacity for sympathy. 
It is not unusual that emotional aversions leading to moral indignation concern 
phenomena such as differences of taste, habit and opinion. Similarly, people may 
disapprove of anything unusual, new or foreign. In other words, the point West-
ermarck makes against Smith is that people feel very often the desire to punish 
another person even if no harm is caused. Westermarck has a point in that facts 
of this kind are difficult to explicate by means of Smith’s theory of moral judge-
ment, because it delimits the resentment-based retributive moral disapproval to 
the spectator’s sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer. Similarly, according 
to Westermarck, Smith ignored the role of ‘disinterested likings’, instantaneous 
positive reactions leading to moral approval without the influence of sympathy.
Finally, according to Westermarck, Smith neglected the exploration of the rela-
tionship between the moral sentiments and the moral concepts. In particular, ‘as 
far as the concept of duty is concerned he is not clear that it is grounded on the 
emotion of disapproval, not approval’.22 As we have seen, in Westermarck’s anal-
ysis of the notions of duty, failure to do what is, in a given society or in individual 
experience, regarded as one’s duty has a tendency to arouse moral disapproval 
in others or oneself (ODMI, p. 136; ER, p. 125). Smith writes more vaguely 
about the emotional basis of the moral concepts. ‘What is agreeable to our moral 
faculties’, he says, ‘is fit, and right, and proper to be done; the contrary wrong, 
unfit, and improper. [. . .] The very words, right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, 
unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases those faculties’ (TMS, p. 165, 
emphasis added).
21 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 21.
22 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 21.
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The impartial spectator
One of the central issues of Westermarck’s moral theory is the question of what 
distinguishes the moral emotions from nonmoral retributive emotions – moral dis-
approval from anger and revenge, and moral approval from gratitude. This ques-
tion is also at the heart of Westermarck’s interpretation of Smith. In his lectures, 
Westermarck argues that for Smith, moral approval is very similar to gratitude 
and moral disapproval to resentment, but they are not identical. As we have seen, 
Smith suggested that the moral sentiments linked to punishment and reward arise 
from our sympathy with the recipient’s gratitude or resentment. However, since 
we, as spectators, are not a party to the action judged, our resentment or grati-
tude towards the agent is ‘disinterested’ and ‘impartial’. Consequently, according 
to Westermarck, Smith argues that moral approval and disapproval differ from 
resentment and gratitude by their disinterestedness and impartiality. In addition, 
Smith derives these special characteristics of the moral sentiments from sympa-
thy. It is our capacity for sympathy that enables us to feel disinterested and impar-
tial resentment and gratitude on behalf of others.23
Westermarck’s interpretation of Smith’s account of the moral sentiments may 
be further illuminated by his interview granted to a British freethinker journal in 
1898. Here, Westermarck acclaims Smith because ‘he was the first to demonstrate 
how moral indignation is resentment raised to the level of impartiality’. West-
ermarck explains that we are, broadly speaking, inclined to consider such acts 
as wrong which in some way cause, or are supposed to cause, pain to another 
person. ‘When we see or imagine pain suffered by another’, he continues, ‘we 
feel the pain by sympathy, and we resent it in moral indignation. Our resentment, 
however, is not based on personal grounds; it is impartial’. Referring to our judge-
ments that the agent is praiseworthy, Westermarck states that ‘[i]n a similar way 
Adam Smith argued that our recognition of another’s merit was an impartial feel-
ing of gratitude’ (Gould, 1898, p. 186). In this way, as Westermarck argues in his 
lectures, Smith derives the impartial character of moral judgements directly from 
the nature of the moral sentiments.24
This account serves as an introduction to another key element of Smith’s moral 
theory, his conception of the impartial spectator. As several commentators have 
pointed out, by distinguishing disinterestedness and impartiality as the empirical 
characteristics of moral emotions Westermarck was significantly influenced by 
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator.25 However, insufficient attention has 
been given to how Westermarck actually interpreted Smith’s impartial spectator 
and how the notion figures in Westermarck’s theory of morality.
23 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19. For Smith’s distinction between non-
moral resentment and resentment as a moral sentiment, see Griswold (1999, pp. 117–118); MacLa-
chlan (2010).
24 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 20.
25 von Wright (1982, p. 48); Stroup (1982a, pp. 142–143); de Waal (2001, pp. 351–352, 386; 2006, 
p. 20); Arnhart (2001, p. 22); Hultberg (2012, pp. 251–252).
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In what follows, I first show that for Westermarck, Smith’s impartial spectator 
primarily represents how people in practice make moral judgements on others. 
More specifically, it is about what kind of emotions people feel when they observe 
the behaviour of others from the position of a non-involved bystander. Secondly, 
but related to the first point, I explain how Westermarck draws on Smith’s impar-
tial spectator in his notion that moral emotions involve certain generality, which 
is proposed in the Moral Ideas as the third characteristic of moral emotions, along 
with disinterestedness and impartiality. Lastly, I discuss how Westermarck’s 
account of the self-directed moral emotions shows clear allusions to the impartial 
spectator in Smith’s theory of self-evaluation.
Like Hume, Smith’s account of how moral judgements arise is built upon the 
spectator’s perspective. For Smith, the impartial spectator represents, first and 
foremost, the point of view from which moral judgements are made (Campbell, 
1971, pp. 127, 145; Raphael, 2007, pp. 16–17). This shows also in the many 
synonyms Smith uses for the term. As Campbell (1971) sums up, Smith speaks 
interchangeably of ‘spectator’, ‘spectators’, ‘bystander’, ‘a third person’, ‘every 
attentive spectator’, ‘every impartial bystander’, ‘every impartial spectator’, 
‘every indifferent person’, ‘every indifferent bystander’ or simply of how ‘we’ 
react when we are in the position of a non-involved spectator (pp. 134–135). In 
other words, ‘all of us are regularly Smithian impartial spectators’ (Frazer, 2010, 
p. 95). This was also Westermarck’s position. As he puts it, when we observe the 
actions of others without being personally involved, ‘we pass our judgements as 
impartial spectators’.26 Westermarck’s affinity with this line of interpretation is 
worth emphasising because more often than not, Smith’s notion of the impar-
tial spectator is associated solely with the workings of conscience.27 It is this 
sense of the phrase, not anything related to conscience, that Westermarck has in 
mind when he states that ‘Adam Smith made the resentment and gratitude of the 
“impartial spectator” a corner stone of his theory of the moral sentiments’ (ER, 
70; also ODMI, p. 43).
In Westermarck’s view, however, Smith’s idea of the impartial spectator does 
not completely succeed in describing the typical position from which moral judge-
ments are made. In the interview referred to above, Westermarck points out that 
‘the phrase is not strictly correct, for we, as spectators, are never quite impartial’. 
Like Smith, Westermarck believes that the moral emotions are distinctively ‘dis-
interested’, meaning that the person who feels them is not personally party to the 
26 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19. For different readings of Smith’s 
impartial spectator, see Haakonssen (1981, pp. 56–62); Otteson (2002, pp. 42–50; 2013, pp. 49–51). 
Despite some differences in emphasis, Haakonssen and Otteson suggest that when making moral 
judgements, we strive to achieve the viewpoint of the impartial third party, the perspective that 
goes beyond the personal interests and biases of everyone involved.
27 Examples on this are numerous. See e.g. Broadie (2006, pp. 179–186); Ross (2010, pp. 172–173); 
Schneewind (1998, p. 390); Muller (1993, chapter 8). Campbell (1971) is one of the few Smith 
scholars who, like Westermarck, gives equal attention to the both sides of Smith’s notion of the 
impartial spectator.
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situation, unlike the agent and the person acted upon. However, our moral emo-
tions vary considerably in intensity depending on whom the action we observe 
is directed to. In reality, our emotions are greatly influenced by the fact that our 
‘indignation is stronger when we see pain inflicted on some persons than in the 
case of others’ (Gould, 1898, p. 186).28 Similarly, Westermarck (1900) highlights 
the ‘generally overlooked’ fact that ‘the impartiality which a moral emotion pre-
supposes is not absolute, only relative, that is, impartiality within certain limits’ 
(p. 185). In his view,
Absolute impartiality, I understand, would concede to all sentient beings 
equal rights. But where is it to be found, and who would look upon it as 
equitable? The moral estimation recognises classes with different rights. It 
requires impartiality within the limits of each class, but those limit them-
selves may have been drawn with the greatest partiality. If, for instance, a 
savage censures as wrong a homicide committed upon a member of his own 
tribe, but praises as meritorious one committed upon the member of another, 
he attributes different rights to the members of the respective tribes, and his 
indignation and his approval possess not only that personal disinterestedness, 
but at the same time that relative impartiality, which is required by tribal 
morality.
(Westermarck, 1900, p. 185)
Perhaps for this reason, in Westermarck’s formulation, moral emotions are 
characterised by ‘apparent impartiality’, meaning that they are not ‘knowingly 
partial’ to the person who feels them (ODMI, pp. 103–104; ER, p. 93). In different 
contexts, Westermarck brings out that in reality our moral judgements regularly 
favour one party over another, but usually not consciously.
The gist of Westermarck’s interpretation of Smith’s impartial spectator is that 
it is by examining the reactions of the spectator that we can best understand 
and describe the nature of the moral emotions. According to Westermarck, 
Smith argues that the moral sentiments are simply the kind of emotions non-
involved spectators feel towards some other person when they sympathise with 
the resentment or gratitude brought about by that person’s action.29 Besides 
simplifying Smith’s account of the two distinct species of moral approval and 
disapproval, Westermarck provides a more systematic and detailed account of 
what distinguishes moral approval and disapproval from nonmoral gratitude 
28 For Westermarck’s account of the variability of sympathetic emotions, see ODMI, pp. 104, 120–
123, 373, 429, 433, 713–715; ODMI II, p. 129.
29 Campbell (1975) provides a similar account of the moral sentiments. He emphasises that for 
Smith, the moral sentiments are ‘those sentiments felt by the spectator of human behaviour, the 
spectator being the ordinary person when he is in the position of observing the behaviour of any 
person with whom he has no special connection and whose behaviour does not affect him any more 
than it affects anyone else. Such a spectator is impartial only in the limited sense that he has no 
personal involvement in the situation which he is observing’ (pp. 70–71).
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and resentment. As discussed in Chapter 3, moral approval and disapproval 
‘differ from kindred nonmoral emotions by their disinterestedness, apparent 
impartiality, and flavour of generality’ (ODMI II, p. 739, emphasis added). 
Westermarck analyses these features one by one, and, after this, attempts to 
explain these elements by tracing their psychological and social origins. To 
summarise Westermarck’s position, the moral emotions are characterised by 
‘disinterestedness’ – because they are felt as independent of any benefit to one-
self; ‘apparent impartiality’ – because we feel that we do not favour any of the 
parties involved, and ‘a flavour of generality’ – because we assume that the 
majority of people respond the same way. It was obvious to Westermarck that 
people feel the same moral emotions also when they are personally the subjects 
of good or bad actions.
The influence of Smith’s impartial spectator is also explicit in Westermarck’s 
notion that moral emotions have certain generality. This means that when a per-
son ‘pronounces an act to be good or bad, he gives expression to something more 
than a personal opinion, that his judgment has reference, not only to his own 
feelings, but to the feelings of others as well’ (ODMI, p. 105). The ‘flavour of 
generality’ refers to people’s assumption that their emotions and judgements 
would be shared by others whom Smith would call impartial spectators. As West-
ermarck puts it, moral emotion includes ‘some vague assumption that it must be 
shared by everybody who possesses both a sufficient knowledge of the case and 
a “sufficiently developed” moral consciousness’ (ODMI, pp. 104–105). In other 
words, we implicitly assume that ‘the act must be recognised as good or bad by 
everybody who possesses a sufficient knowledge of the case’ (ODMI, p. 6). By 
‘sufficiently developed moral consciousness’ Westermarck means nothing but the 
person’s subjective experience that his notion would be shared ‘by all those who 
see the matter as clearly as he does himself’ (ODMI, p. 123). Whether we feel 
moral indignation on behalf of others, or because we have been wronged our-
selves, our emotions derive their moral character from the fact that ‘we assume 
that any impartial judge would share our views’ (ER, p. 93, emphasis added; also 
ODMI, p. 104).
Self-directed moral judgements
Thus far we have discussed Smith’s account of how people pass moral judgements 
on others. It was, however, equally important for Smith to study how people judge 
themselves. This is evident already from the subtitle Smith added to the fourth and 
subsequent editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ‘An Essay towards an 
Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct 
and Character, first of their Neighbours, and afterwards of themselves’. The core 
of Smith’s argument is that moral judgements of oneself are formed in the same 
way as our judgements of others (TMS, pp. 109–110). He argues that when judg-
ing of others, there is always a real person into whose shoes we imaginatively 
place ourselves. However, when judging ourselves, we imagine ourselves in the 
position of a spectator, as another person who observes us at a distance (Broadie, 
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2006, pp. 179–180). As Westermarck puts it, ‘the impartial spectator appears also 
in Smith’s theory of conscience’.30
As discussed in the previous chapter, Westermarck held the view that the capac-
ity for self-evaluation develops through a temporal sequence during human child-
hood. He explains that Smith ‘agrees with Hume, and with good reason, that our 
first moral judgements do not concern ourselves but other people whose actions 
we observe as impartial spectators’.31 To clarify this point, Smith suggests that 
similarly ‘[o]ur first ideas of personal beauty and deformity are drawn from the 
shape and appearance of others, not from our own’. However, as a natural part of 
individual development, we begin to understand that other people equally observe 
and judge ourselves. As a result, Smith says, ‘[w]e become anxious to know how 
far we deserve their censure or applause’, and the only way to find this out is ‘to 
examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear 
to them, by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation’ (TMS, 
pp. 111–112). In other words, as Westermarck puts it, at some point we begin 
to observe and judge ourselves ‘as if we were external spectators of our own 
conduct’.32
Westermarck explains that, according to Smith, this process takes place by 
dividing ourselves into two persons, as the spectator and the agent. Similarly, 
when discussing his theory of moral emotions and sympathy in his lectures on 
ethics, Westermarck points out that ‘the being whose emotions I sympathise can, 
in a way, be I myself; I can put myself in the disinterested spectator’s position 
and observe my emotions as if they were emotions of another person’. This is, 
for Westermarck, the sociopsychological setting in which the self-directed moral 
emotions arise.33
More specifically, Smith argues that when we divide ourselves into two per-
sons, the first person is the ‘spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own 
conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation’. On the other 
hand, the ‘other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of’ is 
‘the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under 
the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion’ (TMS, 
p. 113).34 For Smith, our self-directed moral judgements are based on the imagi-
nary spectator’s sympathy or lack of sympathy with our emotions. In other words, 
I approve of my action if I, by adopting the spectator’s standpoint, sympathise 
with my emotions. If I do not sympathise, from the spectator’s perspective, with 
the emotion that motivates my action, the disagreement of emotions prompts me 
to disapprove of myself morally.
30 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19.
31 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19.
32 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19.
33 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 19–20; Westermarck (n.d.) (Box 80: 
Lectures, Ethics: fragmentary pages), no pagination.
34 In this respect, Smith’s conception of the impartial spectator foreshadows George Herbert Mead’s 
concept of the self (Costelloe, 1997).
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Westermarck emphasises that the impartial spectator in Smith’s theory of con-
science is only a representative of the actual external spectators. That is, self-
directed moral judgements represent our assumptions about how other people 
would respond to our actions. However, because the impartial spectator is a prod-
uct of our own imagination, the imagined spectator is better informed about our 
motives and intentions than actual observers.35 By this Westermarck alludes to 
Smith’s central idea that the judgements of conscience reflect the reactions of the 
imagined spectator who has the same information about our motives and inten-
tions as we have (TMS, pp. 113–116). This explains why the judgements of con-
science may have superior authority when they oppose the reactions of actual 
spectators. In human experience, Westermarck concludes, the impartial specta-
tor is the inner judge which we may invoke when others judge us unjustly and 
short-sightedly.36
Like Westermarck’s theory of the other-directed moral emotions, also his 
account of the self-directed moral emotions is distinctly indebted to Smith’s 
impartial spectator. For Westermarck, ‘besides being disinterested and apparently 
impartial, remorse and moral self-approval have a flavour of generality’ (ODMI, 
p. 107). Regarding self-evaluation, Westermarck simply takes the impartial spec-
tator as representing the human mental ability to observe and evaluate oneself 
from the perspective of others. Compared to Smith, Westermarck’s invocation 
of impartial spectator is very direct and general. He simply argues that moral 
approval and disapproval of oneself ‘is never at its best except when it is accom-
panied, in the consciousness which has it, with the knowledge or belief that it is 
also socially shared’ (ODMI, p. 107).37 Smith’s conception of the fundamentally 
social character of self-evaluation is forcefully echoed in Westermarck’s remark 
that ‘almost separable from the moral judgments which we pass on our own 
conduct seems to be the image of an impartial outsider who acts as our judge’ 
(ODMI, p. 107; ER, p. 95, emphasis added).
Emotions in scientific inquiry
Smith and Westermarck also share a view of scientific inquiry as a process based 
on, and structured by, emotions. Westermarck held in high esteem Smith’s ([1795] 
1980) account of surprise and wonder in his posthumous essay The Principles 
which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated by the History of 
Astronomy.38 These sentiments are at the core of what may be called Smith’s 
psychology of science. In this essay, Smith attempts to reveal the ‘principles’ or 
35 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 20.
36 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), p. 19. For an account of the development 
of Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator as conscience between the different editions of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, see Raphael (1975, pp. 87–94; 2007, pp. 32–42).
37 This is a quote from James Baldwin’s (1897) Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental 
Development.
38 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Adam Smith), pp. 3–4.
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regularities which ‘lead and direct’ philosophers or scientists in their enquiries. 
By philosophy Smith means ‘the science of the connecting principles of nature’ 
(Smith, [1795] 1980, p. 45), which we today would call the natural sciences. 
According to Smith, objects and events that are unfamiliar or unexpected prompt 
in us the sentiments of surprise and wonder. Surprise is an unpleasant mental 
state that disturbs the usual smooth state of imagination. It is followed by won-
der, which may manifest itself in ‘that staring, and sometimes that rolling of the 
eyes, that suspension of the breath, and that swelling of the heart’. These bodily 
reactions are ‘natural symptoms of uncertain and undetermined thought’ (Smith, 
[1795] 1980, pp. 33, 39–40).
Because surprise and wonder are disturbing mental states, they prompt the phi-
losopher or scientist to find explanations for those objects or events that are unfa-
miliar or unexpected. For Smith, successful explanations calm the mind and give 
rise to the pleasing and relieving sentiment of admiration (Smith, 1980 [1795], 
pp. 38–42).39 Philosophy, or science,
by representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed 
objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discord-
ant appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, 
when it surveys the great revolutions of the universe, to that tone of tranquil-
ity and composure, which is both most agreeable in itself, and most suitable 
to its nature.
(Smith, [1795] 1980, pp. 45–46)
While Smith saw hypotheses and theories as products of surprise and won-
der, Westermarck gives the same role to ‘logical feeling’. Following the Scot-
tish philosopher Alexander Bain and the Danish psychologist Alfred Lehmann, 
Westermarck suggests that mutually incompatible ideas of the same object or 
event give rise to a feeling of pain (ODMI II, p. 109). This feeling is the ‘driving 
force’ prompting researchers to establish hypotheses, and in the history of science 
we can see repeated attempts to reconcile ideas that have seemed incompatible. 
The unpleasant logical feeling also guides the research process. If new observa-
tions or results are not consistent with the initial hypothesis, the disturbing feeling 
prompts the researcher to alter or reject it and to formulate a new one guiding 
the research. The fact that scientists may end up with results that will contribute 
to human knowledge is largely thanks to the logical feeling guarding them from 
jumping into conclusions. This is because incompatibility between the hypoth-
esis and observations gives rise to the unpleasant and disturbing feeling that 
prompts researchers to change their assumptions.40 Smith’s and Westermarck’s 
39 For more detailed accounts of Smith’s view of science, see Campbell (1971, chapter 1); Fleis-
chacker (2004, chapter 2); Berry (2006).
40 Westermarck (1914) (Box 78: Lectures, Psychology), pp. 178a; Westermarck (1915) (Box 80: Lec-
tures, Psychology II), pp. 168–171.
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accounts bear a resemblance to the pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce’s theory 
of inquiry, according to which scientific work, both at the individual and the col-
lective level, is characterised by the alteration between the states of doubt and 
belief.
As Alexander Broadie (2009) puts it, for Smith, surprise, wonder and admira-
tion are not only basic to science, for it is a sequence of sentiments ‘that we all live 
through perhaps many times daily – we are surprised at something, we wonder 
what the explanation is for what surprised us, and we are relieved to discover the 
explanation’ (p. 228). Similarly for Westermarck the logical feeling is of funda-
mental importance to human (or even animal) existence. All human thought and 
action ‘are based on the premise that an object is what it is as long as the same 
conditions prevail, that A cannot be A, and not-A at the same time’. The inconsist-
ent observations of the same object or event give rise to emotional responses that 
lead organisms to direct attention to potential threats in the environment. In this 
way, for Westermarck, the logical feeling is an outgrowth of elementary emotional 
reactions to what is strange and unfamiliar.41
41 Westermarck (1915) (Box 80: Lectures, Psychology II), p. 169.
The beginnings of Westermarck’s study of morality were characterised by Dar-
win’s writings on social instincts and the moral sense. Although Westermarck 
soon diverged from Darwin’s approach, many of the emotional and social ten-
dencies Darwin linked with the social instincts appear in his mature theory of 
morality. Both of them locate the key stages in the evolution of human sympathy 
within early social groups characterised by social affection, mutual solidarity and 
reciprocity. However, while Darwin invokes group selection and the evolutionary 
advantages of sympathetic and altruistic dispositions in warfare, Westermarck’s 
outline of the expansion of sympathy beyond family and kin relationships is based 
on reasoning about the gradual dispersion of kin altruism and evolutionary benefits 
conferred by reciprocity and cooperation at the individual level. Westermarck’s 
moral theory is expressly founded on emotional dispositions that are widespread 
among animals. Following the basic principles of Darwinian biological evolution, 
he realised that our retributive emotions are gradually moulded modifications of 
old ones, so that the uniquely human moral emotions – including the mediating 
psychological mechanisms through which these emotions arise – are outgrowths 
of emotional and social characteristics we share with many other animals.
Similarly, Westermarck analysed in his early moral theory several issues that 
proved essential for his mature account of morality. These include the idea that 
moral judgements are based on specific moral feelings or emotions, the explora-
tion of these emotions in the context of everyday social interaction, and under-
standing of the importance of perspective-taking (i.e. understanding the situation 
of others) in moral evaluation. The latter developed later on into his theory of 
sympathy, where it was the capacity to share the feelings and emotions of oth-
ers that became the key element. In addition, Westermarck recognised already 
at this stage that our emotions of moral approval and disapproval are social also 
in the sense that they are intertwined with social customs or norms of behaviour, 
through which they are typically felt as justified.
The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the nature and manifestations of the moral emotions. Westermarck’s 
aim is to show that moral approval and disapproval, together with the nonmoral 
retributive emotions such as gratitude and revenge, are an inextricable part of 
human behaviour and all forms of social life. Westermarck also deals with the 
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self-directed moral approval and disapproval which possess the same characteris-
tics as our emotions directed towards others. To sum up, due to the disinterested, 
impartial and general nature of the moral emotions, they involve a certain kind 
of experience of self-transcendence. When people react morally and make moral 
judgements, these responses do not stem solely from personal standpoints, but 
they are seen as possessing more objective, universal validity. The judgements 
of good and evil are perceived as self-evidently right and shared by one’s social 
reference groups, as they in many cases in fact are. Moral experiences are closely 
related to Westermarck’s view of the objectification of emotions as an essential 
part of moral judgements. In everyday thinking, different behaviours and human 
qualities are regarded as inherently right or wrong, independent of the approval or 
disapproval they evoke. One of the advantages of Westermarck’s analysis is that 
by taking the nature and characteristics of the moral emotions into consideration, 
it helps us to understand why ‘[f]ew things are more liable to arouse people’s 
moral indignation than opinions that differ from their own, and when the disagree-
ment is about morals or religion, the indignation may certainly have a claim to the 
epithet righteous’ (ER, p. 161).
A central part of Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions deals with their 
immediate causes. In his view, moral emotions typically arise from our sympathy 
with others, or retributive emotions that may spring to life even when the original 
cause of them in others is unknown to us, or emotions of liking and disgust which 
often are evoked by behaviours which do not affect other people in any way. In 
addition, people often disapprove of actions that deviate from social customs and 
norms, whose emotional and habitual nature I have aimed to clarify.
One of the chief aims of this study was to show the fundamental role of sympa-
thy in Westermarck’s moral and social theory. Westermarck analyses the nature, 
structure and sources of sympathy, but, above all, he is doing something with 
his conception of sympathy. Besides studying sympathy as part of how moral 
emotions arise, sympathy lies at the heart of Westermarck’s analysis of the gen-
esis and maintenance of moral norms. Sympathy is also key to his views on the 
evolutionary origins of human social bonds, social solidarity, and the circle of 
moral concern. Hitherto, however, Westermarck has been entirely neglected in the 
scholarship on sympathy in the history of human sciences and philosophy. This 
omission is unfortunate especially because sympathy is one of the key research 
subjects where Westermarck links David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s moral 
thought with Darwinian evolutionary thinking, thus introducing and modernising 
their legacy in the sphere of early twentieth-century social sciences and moral 
philosophy.
Throughout this book, I have been concerned to draw attention to the signifi-
cance of reciprocity in Westermarck’s moral-psychological and sociological work. 
Anthropologists from Bronislaw Malinowski ([1922] 2002, [1926] 1978) and 
Marcel Mauss ([1954] 1990) to Claude Lévi-Strauss ([1949] 1971) and Marshall 
Sahlins (1972) have addressed reciprocity as a system of exchange, giving and 
receiving gifts and favours, which cements social cohesion and group relations. 
Westermarck represents a different viewpoint, the core of which is the detailed 
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examination of the emotional system underlying reciprocity, the deep-rooted 
human desire to reward and punish people for their actions. Besides two-per-
son interactions, Westermarck devotes much attention to multiparty interactions 
where human beings observe the actions of others as third parties. What emerges 
is a conception of society as a nexus of social relations where people constantly 
observe and inform each other on how they or some others have been treated. At 
the same time, Westermarck outlines a theory of the norm of reciprocity, the social 
expectation that good deeds should be reciprocated in one way or another. For 
these substantial contributions and his endeavour to place these issues in the Dar-
winian evolutionary framework, Westermarck should be recognised as a major 
theorist of reciprocity.
In addition to these topics, Westermarck developed a wide-ranging theory of 
moral responsibility. He did not approach it as an abstract philosophical question 
but as an empirical phenomenon, as something reflected in people’s actual reac-
tions. The conceptions of responsibility are for Westermarck decisively dependent 
on the manifestations of retributive emotions, which, in turn, are influenced by 
their cognitive aspects. His work provides a rich and in-depth analysis of the dif-
ferent dimensions of conduct and character in relation to the workings of retribu-
tive emotions. For its essential parts, Westermarck’s anatomy of responsibility is 
based on the further development and integration of Hume’s and Smith’s legacy 
into his own theory of moral emotions.
Since Westermarck emphasises the social nature of the moral emotions, 
addressed to others or oneself, it may seem that he ignores actions motivated 
by a sense of duty which is independent of the emotions of others. However, for 
Westermarck, the inner ‘sense of obligatoriness’ that ‘filled Kant with the same 
awe as the star-spangled firmament’ is a real moral-psychological phenomenon. It 
is nevertheless only one of the many motives of action, ‘and variable like all oth-
ers: In some instances it is the ruling power in a man’s life, in others it is a voice 
calling in the desert’ (ODMI, pp. 14–15). Westermarck analyses dutiful action 
in the light of his theory of moral emotions. In some persons, the respect for the 
moral law ‘possesses a higher value than anything else’, which is ‘an expres-
sion of a strongly developed, overruling moral consciousness’. In other words, 
the felt authority of duty ‘results from the strength of the individual’s own moral 
emotions’. At the same time, it seems evident that for most people, morality is 
‘much less the outcome of their own feelings than of instruction from the outside’ 
(ODMI, pp. 16–17, emphasis added).
Without using these terms, Westermarck examines the moral emotions both 
from the proximate and ultimate viewpoints. The distinction between proximate 
(the ‘how’-questions) and ultimate (the ‘why’-questions) explanations is central 
to evolutionary biology and psychology (Mayr, 1997; Scott-Phillips, Dickins & 
West, 2011). Proximate causes relate to the immediate environmental and situ-
ational factors that trigger certain behaviour and, above all, the psychological or 
physiological mechanisms that enable it. Ultimate causes attempt to explain why a 
particular trait or behaviour exists within a species by looking at its possible evolu-
tionary function. They address the question why a certain trait or behaviour might 
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have been advantageous in terms of fitness consequences, and therefore favoured 
by natural selection. When Westermarck is describing the manifestations of moral 
emotions in different situations, he is concerned with the immediate proximate 
causes. When looking into why retributive emotions, both in their nonmoral and 
moral forms, exist in the first place, he is concerned with ultimate evolutionary 
explanations. Similarly, in his exploration of the role of sympathy in parental care 
and the formation of larger social groups, he is offering ultimate explanations. It 
is often emphasised that the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes is 
central to Westermarck’s theory of incest avoidance, but the same mode of reason-
ing characterises his approach to morality also more generally.
In his evolutionary reasoning, Westermarck tries to avoid constructing specula-
tive scenarios of the prehistoric past. His premise is that social phenomena and 
regularities found in the later or contemporary social arrangements cannot be 
viewed as proving their existence in the early stages of human history. We can-
not postulate the existence and prevalence of some phenomena in the past unless 
we may assume that the cause or causes of these phenomena have been uni-
versally operating. Consequently, drawing on anthropological, psychological and 
biological knowledge – including cross-species comparisons – we must first try 
to ‘find out the causes of the social phenomena; then, from the prevalence of the 
causes, we may infer the prevalence of the phenomena themselves’, assuming that 
these causes have been operating ‘without being checked by other causes’ (HHM, 
pp. 2–4; HHM I, pp. 9–10, 20; Westermarck, 1936a, pp. 236–237). This methodo-
logical principle underlies all of Westermarck’s evolutionary explanations.
Westermarck’s theory formation has clear points of resemblance to the way of 
thinking known as methodological individualism. In this view, all social scien-
tific explanations must be ultimately derived from the actions of human individu-
als. In response to Durkheimian criticism, he emphasises that ‘even collective 
behaviour’ – customs, beliefs or emotions more or less common to a particu-
lar group of people – ‘involves the actions of individuals’ (Westermarck, 1936a, 
p. 237; see also HHM I, pp. 8–12, 17–18). In his opinion, the study of ‘origins’ 
constitutes an essential part of sociological theoretisation, since emotions not only 
shape and influence human action in an individual level but also give rise to, 
structure and maintain social phenomena and institutions.
Because of his psychological emphasis, Westermarck has often been criticised 
for reducing social and moral phenomena to individual psychology. However, he 
does not deal with individual consciousness without social environment and soci-
ety. In Westermarck’s thinking, social habits, customary practices and especially 
the emotions of others make up the social setting that human beings encounter 
as already existing and within which they operate. Westermarck’s sociological 
critics have failed to appreciate how fundamentally his work on morality cen-
tres around the role of social influence on human emotions, beliefs and actions. 
Similarly, although Westermarck does not examine morality from an individual 
development perspective, he places a great deal of significance on the role of 
upbringing and socialisation in the formation of moral beliefs. Because humans 
have a strong tendency to adjust and adapt to the ways of thinking and feeling 
Concluding remarks 145
prevalent in their social environments, our moral ideas are significantly shaped by 
them. At the same time, it was clear to Westermarck that since the moral emotions 
always involve a cognitive dimension, individual moral beliefs and judgements 
with regard to different behaviours and phenomena may change in the wake of 
knowledge and reflective thought.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Westermarck’s work anticipates many key 
issues and approaches in modern evolutionary biology and psychology. Wester-
marck’s ideas on family and kin relations are supported by William Hamilton’s 
(1964, 1996) seminal work on kin altruism and ‘inclusive fitness’, which shows 
the importance of the degree of genetic relatedness to the evolution and mainte-
nance of altruistic behaviour (Segerstråle, 2013; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2006). 
His exploration of retributive emotions has an obvious parallel with Robert Triv-
ers’s (1971, 2006) theory of reciprocity as a key mechanism for the evolution 
of cooperation between nonkin.1 Trivers tells us that when developing his ideas 
on the role of emotions in human cooperation, he simply organised the empiri-
cal information ‘around the obvious psychological categories, such as sympa-
thy, gratitude, and moralistic aggression’ (Trivers, 2002, p. 13) – in other words, 
exactly the same emotional dispositions on which Westermarck built his moral 
theory. Like Westermarck, Trivers also analyses other morally relevant emotions 
such as guilt and forgiveness, and his work provides excellent tools to update 
Westermarck’s legacy.
Similarly, Westermarck’s theory of retributive emotions and moral norms bears 
a resemblance to Richard Alexander’s (1987) account of ‘indirect reciprocity’, 
which constitutes the third cornerstone of contemporary evolutionary approaches 
to altruism and cooperation. Developing the idea implied by Trivers (1971), Alex-
ander recognises that a large part of human social life is based on indirect forms 
of reciprocity where rewards and punishments come from others than the recipi-
ent of the beneficence or wrongdoing. Like Westermarck, Alexander focuses on 
third-party reactions and argues that certain behavioural tendencies are supported, 
while others rejected, because much of human interactions occurs ‘in the presence 
of interested audiences – groups of individuals who continually evaluate the mem-
bers of their society as possible future interactants’. Indirect reciprocity revolves 
around reputation ‘and results in everyone in a social group continually being 
assessed and reassessed by interactants, past and potential, on the basis of their 
interactions with others’ (Alexander, 1987, pp. 85, 93–94). In contemporary moral 
psychology, Westermarck’s basic conclusions on the emotional basis of morality 
are supported by the intuitionist-affective approach to moral evaluation (Haidt, 
2001, 2007). According to this view, moral judgements are post hoc rationalisa-
tions of our intuitive, emotional reactions. It is also noteworthy that emotions and 
behaviours associated with reward, punishment and a sense of fairness, studied 
1 For a brief discussion of Westermarck and Trivers’s work on reciprocal altruism, see de Waal 
(2006, pp. 17–20). Vernon Smith (1998) provides an insightful comparison of Adam Smith and 
Trivers.
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by experimental economists, mean much the same as Westermarck’s retributive 
moral emotions.
This study has focused largely on the importance of ‘origins’ – emotional and 
sociopsychological origins in particular – in Westermarck’s thought. However, 
the Moral Ideas carries the term ‘development’ in its title, in addition to ‘origin’. 
I have discussed one of these trends of change postulated by Westermarck in more 
detail, i.e. the expansion of sympathy and the resultant widening circle of people 
to whom moral rules are applied. Another key part of the development of moral 
ideas concerns the growing influence of reflective thought on moral judgements. 
We sketched the issue for the part of moral responsibility, but a similar devel-
opmental pattern is visible in Westermarck’s exploration of several other issues. 
These kinds of questions could probably be studied within a much more fixed his-
torical and sociocultural frame. However, in Westermarck’s case, the description 
of moral development is clearly the weakest part of his work on morality. While 
the central aspects of Westermarck’s moral and social theory are not dependent on 
his comparative materials, his examination of the changes in moral beliefs in the 
frame of long-term civilisational development relies directly on all sorts of written 
sources and the unreliable conclusions drawn from them. At the same time, these 
developmental aspects of Westermarck’s thought should be studied in more detail 
because such an undertaking would shed light on his social and cultural evolution-
ism, which has evoked many contradictory interpretations.
Moreover, although the influence of religious and magical beliefs on moral 
judgements is central to Westermarck’s Moral Ideas, we are lacking an explica-
tion of this side of his work. As the study of religion bulks large in Westermarck’s 
oeuvre also more generally, the scholarship on Westermarck would benefit greatly 
from a comprehensive study of his forty years of research on the topic. Because 
Westermarck deals extensively with the relationship between the moral emotions 
and law, it would be useful to integrate his views on the origins and character of 
legal systems and criminal law into the theoretical traditions of the sociology of 
law. Westermarck’s philosophical commentators should pay more attention to his 
ambitious efforts to demonstrate the emotional background of objectivist ethical 
theories, which constitute a central part of his moral philosophy.
The objective of this book was to clarify and explicate the foundations and 
central elements of Westermarck’s theory of morality. I have not argued that his 
analyses and explanations are from some angle – psychologically, sociologically 
or philosophically – the best possible. That said, I believe his writings abound 
with descriptions and explanations which have enduring value for understand-
ing human moral behaviour and social life. Westermarck was a very empirically 
grounded scholar who was not shy to give seemingly simple, common-sense inter-
pretations of social institutions (Ginsberg, 1961, p. 190). The readers of the Moral 
Ideas come constantly across observations that they recognise in themselves and 
others, along with explanations that intuitively make sense. While such views are 
subjective and potentially misleading, the kind of familiarity that is difficult to 
verbalise is often an attribute to a sharp-sighted and useful sociological theory. It 
indicates that a theorist has succeeded in identifying something essential to social 
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reality and then organised these observations into a form of such a theory that 
exposes the phenomena and regularities under consideration. In a way, a success-
ful theory sensitises us to things basically already familiar to us by gifting them 
with an exact form and making them visible.
The variety of topics bound together in Westermarck’s moral and social theory 
is exactly of this kind. They concern the way people are touched and roused to 
gratitude when met by benevolence and helpfulness, moral disapproval when 
faced with a wide range of behaviours and events. Human beings experience a 
spontaneous desire to inflict pain on a wrongdoer, and a disturbing feeling that 
follows if the wrongdoer gets away without punishment. Everyone knows what 
righteous anger feels like, as well as the feeling that something is self-evidently 
good or evil. We sympathise with friends and strangers. We must deal with moral 
disagreements, disapproval elicited by differences of opinion, moral indigna-
tion that intensifies and spreads within groups and disgusts that appear irrational. 
Many aspects of human action and interaction are regulated by socially binding 
customs and related moral emotions. People have an intuitive understanding of 
the importance of reciprocity in many areas of social life, and the relationship 
between remorse and forgiveness. We all make subtle judgements of responsi-
bility and appraise people’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in relation to 
various mitigating and aggravating circumstances. People are aware of what is 
typical and average behaviour in different situations in their sociocultural sur-
roundings, and pass moral judgements in relation to this common standard. The 
list could go on and on.
This study has brought out the vast and ambitious scale of Westermarck’s work 
on morality, even when focusing only on its moral-psychological and sociological 
aspects and leaving the moral-philosophical details and implications aside. A Brit-
ish sociologist, Ronald Fletcher (1982), asked nearly forty years ago, ‘where is the 
study of the elements of men’s moral consciousness which is more wide-ranging, 
contains a clearer theoretical basis, and brings together more empirical evidence, 
and more satisfactorily, than this?’ (pp. 209–210). The question is still valid, not 
least because Westermarck’s writings serve as an example of sociological theory-
building that is not organised around the dualisms of nature/culture and animal/
human which continue to penetrate much of the social scientific enterprise. At the 
time when the relationship between biological and social sciences is subjected 
to a wide-scale re-evaluation, Westermarck’s pioneering large-scale synthesis 
deserves much more attention and acknowledgement than it has received so far. 
It seems safe to predict that his basic conclusions on the significance of emotions 
in human sociality and morality will retain their relevance – ‘unless mankind 
changes radically some time in the future’ (Pipping, 1984, p. 330).
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